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Yazov Attends Meeting of Military Justice Officials
*18010196 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 89 p 2*

[Article by Col L. Nechayuk: "To Strengthen the Rule of Law and Order"]

[Text] An enlarged plenum of the board of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office with the participation of prosecutors of military districts, fleets, groups of forces and individual garrisons was devoted to the issues of further improving the work on reinforcing the rule of law and legal order in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

First Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor Maj Gen of the Judicial Service L. M. Zaika delivered a report on the status of and measures to enhance prosecutorial oversight over compliance with the law and military codes. He noted that at present the thrust of the prosecutorial oversight is acquiring new priorities. These are the socioeconomic sphere, environmental protection, protection of rights of the military personnel and other citizens.

Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor, Head of the Investigations Directorate Maj Gen of the Judicial Service V. I. Vasilyev dwelled in his report on the issues of the status of combatting crime in the army and the navy, of additional measures for safeguarding the rights of military personnel and other citizens in proceedings under the criminal law. It was said in the report and in speeches that, a certain reduction in the overall crime rate in the Armed Forces notwithstanding, combatting crime is in need of improvement. Particular attention has been paid to establishing continuous and close cooperation between military prosecutors' offices and commanders, political officers, social organizations and law enforcement agencies in reinforcing the rule of law and legal order in the army and the navy.

Minister of Defense Gen Army D. T. Yazov spoke at the meeting.

Chief Military Prosecutor Lt Gen of the Judicial Service B. S. Popov recapitulated the work of the board.

The meeting was attended by First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Fleet Adm A. I. Sorokin, Chief of the Border Guards Troops, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Army Gen V. A. Matrosov and leading functionaries of the CC CPSU, law enforcement agencies, chief and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

Glavpu 1st DEP Chief on Upcoming State Elections
*18010306 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Dec 88 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Col Gen V. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and member of the Central Electoral Commission for the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj V. Kazakov; date and place not specified; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The present week before the new year began a crucial stage in the campaign for the elections of people's deputies of the USSR. According to law, the nomination of candidates for the people's deputies of the USSR began on 26 December. How will this important process take place in the armed forces and what are its special features? We asked Col Gen V. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and member of the Central Electoral Commission for the elections of the people's deputies of the USSR, to answer these and other questions.

"Today it is obvious that there is already a greater democratic spirit in the first stage of the preparations for the elections and that the interests of voters and the specific nature of the electoral districts have been taken into account more fully and more objectively," said Col Gen V. Nechayev. "Glasnost has been achieved in the establishment of the district electoral commissions. Representatives of the armed forces have also been included in the commissions. The election campaign is entering its new stage. According to Article 37 of the Law of the USSR "On the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR," the command of the military units convokes the meetings of service members for the nomination of candidate deputies. An atmosphere of a real democratic spirit prevails at the meetings. The commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations establish all the conditions for the promotion of an unlimited number of candidacies. Each participant in the meeting has the right to present his own proposals on candidate deputies, to take part in their discussion, to support the proposed candidacies or to make suggestions about their rejection, and also to put forward his own candidacy.

[Kazakov] In the recent past, Viktor Stepanovich, the preelection campaign was basically concluded with the putting forward of the candidacies. Voters almost never met with the future deputy and they got information about his life and work from the meager facts of preelection leaflets and posters. This made a significant share of the people apathetic and indifferent to the elections. Do we now have a mechanism that makes it possible to activate the voters?

[Nechayev] Such a mechanism certainly does exist. It is *glasnost*, democracy and the entire process of renewing the society. The preparation for the elections is taking place with unprecedented political and social action by the Soviet people. The positive changes now taking place in the public consciousness already have the character of irreversible processes. The political initiatives of the Communist Party are finding the general approval of the people and are being anchored by normative acts. The electoral system that has gone into effect makes it possible to involve in this process millions of people who must form a democratic body that is capable of defending their interests under the conditions of *perestroyka* in a worthy and effective manner.

The above-mentioned applies fully to the armed forces. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, preelection meetings may be held in the electoral districts for discussion of the candidates put forward for people's deputies of the USSR. These meetings are convoked by the electoral commission after the completion of the nomination of candidates. If no more than two candidates are nominated in a district, then such meetings are not held.

At the preelection meeting, the candidate deputies come forward with the programs for their future actions. The meeting resolves the question of the registration of candidate deputies.

The fiduciaries of the candidate deputies will play a major role in the current preelection campaign. According to the law, each candidate can have as many as 10 such people. The candidate appoints them as he sees fit. After registering the fiduciaries, the electoral commission issues them certificates. It should be kept in mind that the fiduciary cannot be a member of the corresponding electoral commission.

Previously, to be frank, the fiduciary was a nominal figure. Now, however, much will depend upon him. In particular, the fiduciaries will help the candidate carry out the election campaign and will agitate for his election and represent his interests in interrelations with state and public authorities.

[Kazakov] In accordance with the law, public organizations also have the right to nominate candidate deputies. Tell us, please, how their election will take place.

[Nechayev] In the election of people's deputies of the USSR from public organizations, the voting takes place at a congress or conference of the public organization or at a plenum of its public body. At the same time, let me stress: on the day of the election, all of the voters, including the members of the public organizations as well, will vote for one of the candidates for people's deputies of the USSR in the territorial or national-territorial districts.

[Kazakov] Comrade colonel general, why will the voter just vote for one of the candidates?

[Nechayev] All of the registered candidates for people's deputies of the USSR are on the ballot in alphabetical order. The voter, having determined the one for whom he is voting, is obliged to mark out all the others. If, in opening the voting boxes, ballots are found that are of an irregular form or where more than one candidate remains after voting, then these are ruled invalid.

[Kazakov] Are there any coordinating bodies to provide help to the commanders and political officers in carrying out elections?

[Nechayev] Two such bodies have been established under the Main Political Directorate for the period of the preparation and holding of elections. One of them is the agitation and propaganda center, the basic task of which is the work to explain the political significance of the election of people's deputies of the USSR and its role in the further development of the process of *perestroyka* and also the propaganda and agitation for the preelection programs of the candidate deputies, whom service members and communists of the army and navy nominate at their meetings.

I would like to point out that the success of the preelection campaign is largely determined by the political work of all party organizations on a fundamentally new basis and by its depth and action. Today this is not a mechanical explanation of the new slogans, tasks and appeals or the popularization of particular candidates but painstaking ideological work in the full sense of the word, which requires serious practical arguments, personal conviction, and fervent and intense discussions.

The second body called upon to coordinate the organizational side of the elections is the operational group of the Main Political Directorate for the preparation and holding of elections. These bodies have adequate means and are given the appropriate powers. It should also be said that locally it is essential to be resolute in rejecting stereotypes now obsolete in ideological work and to be bolder in linking propaganda measures with the resolution of urgent tasks. Practical matters and the steady movement along the path of *perestroyka* must be the criterion of this work.

[Kazakov] Many of our readers are already asking whether the times of the control reports on the course of the voting on election day will be abolished.

[Nechayev] By a decision of the Central Electoral Commission, the noon and 6 pm interim reports of the election precincts have been abolished as being unjustifiable.

[Kazakov] And the last question. What is the Central Electoral Commission planning for its future work? For everyone knows that it is chosen for 5 years.

[Nechayev] The commission does not yet have any established rules for its actions. The forms of its work are mobile and change in accordance with the questions being resolved. I think that the most acceptable of these forms will be established in our work and will become traditional. The main powers of the commission are determined by the Law of the USSR "On Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR." After holding the elections, the commission is given duties mainly having to do with the organization of the recall of deputies, the setting of elections for deputies to replace those who quit, and the performance of other powers in accordance with the present law and other laws of the USSR.

As the Central Electoral Commission stresses, the preparation for elections is a serious test that must help unify all forces of our society in the struggle for perestroika and renewal. The duty of army and navy communists and Komsomol members in this critical period is to realize in full the possibility of bringing the broad masses into the active political process. The election campaign is a powerful stimulus to democracy. And everything possible should be done so that it will help to activate public and political life in the army and navy and so that the armed forces will come out of this campaign in a new high-quality state.

Col Gen Nechayev: Election Campaign Update
18010362a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Col Gen V. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, member of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of USSR People's Deputies, by "our own correspondent: "A Time for Strict Accounting"; time and place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Comrade colonel general, the election campaign has become a very important event in the country's political life. The nomination of candidates for the posts of people's deputies is now complete and work has begun on their registration by the electoral commissions of the territorial and national-territorial districts. What, in your opinion, characterizes these stages in the life of the military collectives?

[Nechayev] The unprecedented upsurge of political activity among the troops. This is exactly how I would also describe the clearly delineated features of this present election campaign. And this is quite natural. The energy of perestroika is being brought into play. It gives people strength. It strengthens their faith in the inevitability of the changes that are taking place. It prompts them to think and to act in a statesmanlike manner, boldly, responsibly and on the grand scale. And to assess everything according to specific deeds.

The troops recognize the significance of one of the most important and complicated election campaigns in the entire history of soviet power. For the fate of perestroika will depend largely on the activity of the future body of deputies.

Personnel of the army and navy have approached the nomination of candidates for the posts of USSR people's deputies in a most responsible way. Meetings have been held in units and aboard ships, in the military training establishments, in the party and Komsomol organizations and in all military districts, groups of forces and fleets. The final result was that 174 servicemen were included in the electoral commissions of the territorial and national-territorial districts for registration as candidate deputies. In addition, 24 candidates from the army and navy have been registered by the electoral commissions of public organizations.

[Correspondent] Can you tell us which categories of servicemen are included in that number?

[Nechayev] The most varied categories. They include marshals of the Soviet Union, generals and admirals, senior and junior officers, warrant officers, and a student in a military school. There are USSR deputy ministers of defense, commanders of military districts, groups of forces and fleets, unit commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists, and representatives of army sport.

In order for readers to gain a better idea of the range of people to whom the troops have given their trust, let me name some of the candidates. Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen V. Gromov, commander of the Kiev Military District. Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col R. Aushev, commander of a motorized rifle regiment. Maj A. Gonchar, regimental party committee secretary, already familiar to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. Maj S. Storchiay, squadron commander. Capt A. Kolodeznikov, officer in a city military commissariat. Warrant Officer I. Reznik, Komsomol committee secretary. Snr Sgt Yu. Shatrovenko, student at a military school.

I want to emphasize that during the nomination of candidates several thousand servicemen were proposed, particular for public organizations. But the most support was given to people who possess sociopolitical experience and have a bent for state activity and who enjoy great authority and are prepared to work actively for perestroika. It was precisely these criteria rather than the post occupied or previous service that formed the foundation of the electorate's choice.

[Correspondent] To what extent, in your opinion, are the democratic opportunities from the law "On the Election of USSR People's Deputies" being realized in the military collectives?

[Nechayev] Even in the very short time allocated for the nomination of candidates for the posts of USSR people's deputies we were all convinced how difficult it is to master the lessons of democracy. For the very electoral system has changed in a fundamental way. The provision of incompatibility of status of people's deputy with certain official positions has now been introduced. The public organizations have been granted the right to nominate their own representatives. A person can nominate himself, and any number of candidates can be included in the bulletins. These and many other new provisions have significantly extended the democratic opportunities of the electoral system.

In practice, they are being realized in different ways. There are many examples here. Typically, at one end we have proofs of people's very great political activeness. At the other end we have inertia. In the former case there is a statesmanlike approach to the shaping of the new body of deputies for the highest organ of power. In the latter, there is an obvious manifestation of parasitical attitudes, lack of initiative, setting hopes in the administrative style of leadership, and waiting for instructions from above.

It is also impossible not to notice the over-simplified approach to the actual realities. Therefore the experience gained during the initial and subsequent stages of the election campaign needs to be generalized, clearly systematized and comprehensively analyzed.

[Correspondent] During the course of the nomination of candidates to the posts of people's deputies many constructive proposals on improving military life and service were put forward by the public organizations. Do you think that there is any guarantee that they will all be considered and that decisions will be made based on them?

[Nechayev] Of course, many of the proposals from possible candidates were constructive in nature and aimed at further improving the qualitative parameters of combat readiness and strengthening military discipline. The focus of attention was questions connected with improving cadre policy and enhancing the cohesion of multinational collectives. Neither did the candidates nominated lose sight of problems in the democratization of army life and social, cultural and everyday conditions. In general it was a broad spectrum of issues.

I would like to single out one particular feature. At the meetings there were also clashes of opinion, sharp debate and heated discussion of various viewpoints. That is, people were obviously interested in nominating the kinds of candidates who could make a significant contribution to the renewal of army life. Here, a desire of the troops to look at the practical issues and the specific tasks facing the subunits, units and ships could be seen.

But of course, not all the servicemen nominated by party and Komsomol organizations were numbered among the candidates for the posts of deputies. Instead of this the military collectives nominated the real leaders. And in the future, too, they should be a bulwark for commanders and political workers in solving any problems. And as for guarantees, these lie in the activation of the military collectives and in their growing political maturity.

[Correspondent] Viktor Stepanovich, what are the basic features of the new stage in the election campaign?

[Nechayev] The new stage in preparations for the elections will last through 28 February. During this time the candidates must be registered in the electoral commissions of the territorial and national-territorial districts. That is the first thing.

The second is that the decision to nominate candidates for the posts of deputies for registration in the appropriate electoral commissions is made by the district election meeting. This meeting does not take place in the case of only two or fewer candidates being nominated.

[Correspondent] What is the procedure for holding the district election meeting?

[Nechayev] Let me name just the main factors. Thus, when reaching a decision on holding the meeting the electoral commission determines the date and number of participants, establishes standards of representation, and selects the premises. At least half of the meeting participants must represent voters in the district who have not participated in the nomination of candidates. Here, provision is made for representatives of the public and press to attend the meeting.

The labor collectives, organs of public organizations, election meetings at places of residence and servicemen for military units nominated as candidates must be represented by equal numbers of their representatives.

The list of representatives at a district election meeting is circulated in good time in the district electoral commission. Invitations are sent to those attending the meeting. From these, and also on the basis of the documents certifying the individual, registration of participants is carried out before the opening of the district election meeting.

A set of regulations is established at the meeting. Conditions are created for all candidates to have an opportunity to set forth the programs for their future activity as deputies, and for those attending the meeting to express their attitudes toward them.

Candidates are introduced for registration if more than half of those attending the meeting vote for them. A situation might arise in which none of the candidates obtains the necessary number of votes. In this event the district electoral commission may introduce a proposal

to vote for candidates obtaining the greatest numbers of votes. If again no one obtains the required number of votes then all candidates are registered. The meeting must adopt an appropriate resolution on this.

[Correspondent] And a final question, Viktor Stepanovich. Choice is choice. But it is possible that as a result someone may also not get through the second stage of the election campaign. Upon what, do you think, success will depend here?

[Nechayev] The immediate future will show who of the servicemen nominated for the posts of USSR people's deputies will be registered by the district electoral commissions. Let me say only that many of them have five or six or even more alternative candidates.

In order to gain the right to become a deputy a candidate must then obtain a majority of votes on 26 March and must be ready for the upcoming election campaign. Everything will depend on how constructive a candidate's program is and his ability to enter into discussion and defend the interests of the voters.

I think that the mass media can do a great deal here, including the military press. Now it is important to show concern to insure that each army candidate is able to familiarize voters, particular those who did not nominate him, with his election program. It is precisely their votes that play a decisive role both during the district election meetings and on election day. The winner will be whoever is able to make full use of the democratic opportunities offered by the new election law.

Development, Role of Komsomol in Military-Patriotic Education

18010292a Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20,
Oct 88 pp 10-17

[Interview with S. Yepifantsev, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent: "Our Common Cause"]

[Text] The Komsomol of the Soviet Armed Forces is rightly called the Komsomol's combat force. The heroic path traveled by the Army and Navy Komsomol, the problems involved in the military-patriotic upbringing of the youth and their preparation to serve in the Army and Navy, the factors necessitating a restructuring in the Komsomol, its main directions and the means of achieving the objectives are all discussed in an interview conducted by our correspondent with S. Yepifantsev, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

[Correspondent] The Leninist Komsomol and the Soviet Armed Forces are the same age. Their histories are closely interwoven. What could be considered to be the main landmarks in the history of relations between the military and the youth league?

[Yepifantsev] Almost without noticing it we have developed a tradition whereby we regard every important anniversary and every "definitive" date as an excuse for reporting on our accomplishments. But it is a strange report: loud and clear on achievements, murmured when it comes to problems, omissions and errors. The times insistently demand that we end this pattern. The 70th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol is an occasion not just for recalling our victories, but also for critically analyzing everything we have done, for pausing and looking back in order to proceed even more confidently and firmly.

Let us go back to history. Protecting the socialist homeland was one of the most important missions of the All-Union Lenin League of Young Communists from the first days of its existence. When mobilization of 18-year-old males into the Red Army was declared in 1919, during the difficult days of civil war, the RKSM [Russian Communist Youth League] Central Committee appealed to all of the young workers and peasants born in 1901: "You must build a powerful reserve from which the military can take young and fresh new forces for combatting the enemies of the revolution." More than 100,000 new fighters entered the Red Army in response to that appeal.

When the party appealed for the best workers and peasants to train to become red commanders, the RKSM Central Committee suggested that the Komsomol organizations recommend members for the training. The Komsomol conducted a mobilization of 2 percent of its members for the officer training in August 1919, and a second such mobilization was carried out in the summer of 1920.

The Komsomol participated actively also in the preparation of reserves for the military. Universal education agencies worked in very close contact with RKSM organizations. The 2nd RKSM Congress, held in October 1919, adopted a decision to provide universal military training for the youth.

"He who evades military training is not worthy of being a member of our league," stated one Komsomol document of that time. Military training was conducted in military sports, workers' and Red Army clubs and in sports associations. The work was directed by an instructor from the universal education system. The RKSM committee appointed a political instructor. It was during the civil war years that the military sports sections came into being in the Komsomol committees.

Preparation of the youth to defend the homeland was an important Komsomol mission after the civil war ended. The first specific work of this kind was sponsorship of the Navy, the decision being adopted at the 5th Komsomol Congress in 1922. During the period 1922-1924 8,000 Komsomol members were sent to naval schools for training. Komsomol members took an active part in the

restoration, repair and construction of combat ships and submarines. The propaganda work and the upbringing of the youth in the combat traditions of the civil war were improved and developed.

Nor did the Komsomol remain on the sideline with respect to development of the public forms of military training for the youth. It helped to develop the statute on military training groups, which were established at clubs and rifle ranges and in small-arms groups. The programs for the military training groups gradually expanded. They began to include firing practice and training in reconnaissance and other military specialties.

Other areas of Komsomol work relating directly to the training of the youth for service in the Red Army were strengthened and developed in the '30s. The GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] system came into being in 1931. Over a period of many years it helped to prepare a physically strong young generation ready for any trials. It is only natural that the GTO badge is called the Komsomol's order of physical culture in our country.

The Komsomol concerned itself also with developing the moral qualities and the will of the homeland's future defenders. Leaf through a file of any Komsomol newspaper from the '30s; articles on heroic-patriotic subjects appeared in them with enviable regularity. Nor did the poets, dramatists and artists lag behind the journalists. They frequently dealt with the image of the homeland's defender in their creative works. The work methods which became solidly established in the Komsomol's arsenal many years later as effective means of military-patriotic upbringing were conceived in the '30s.

Technical military testing began to be conducted at the initiative of the Komsomol in the '30s as a supplement to the state training for service in the military. There was a constant, vigorous quest for new ways to prepare the youth for service in the Army and Navy. It is interesting to recall today that unusual work method consisting of Komsomol line training subunits. The decision on sponsorship of the Air Force was adopted at the 9th Komsomol Congress in 1931.

[Correspondent] Everything the Komsomol did in the area of mass defense and sports work during those years helped to raise the level of Red Army replacements and to enhance its combat strength. How was this manifested during the war?

[Yepifantsev] The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous test for all the Soviet people. The young generation was at the forefront in the battle with the "brown plague." "And they did not flinch," M.S. Gorbachev noted in a report on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War, "but went to the firing line and surmounted all the trials of the terrible war years, demonstrating that a nation capable of bringing up and educating this kind of youth cannot be conquered."

Utilizing the civil war experience, the Leninist Komsomol reorganized its work to conform to defense missions. During the war years the Komsomol conducted 73 mobilizations of Komsomol members, the youth and Komsomol workers for the Airborne Troops, the NKVD and signals troops, ski units, for special operations in the enemy's rear area, and for divisions of the people's home guard. A total of 41,000 Komsomol members were sent into Guards rocket-launcher units (of Katyushas) alone.

Komsomol aviation, rocket-launcher and engineer units were formed at the Komsomol's initiative.

During the entire war Komsomol organizations sent 3.5 million Komsomol members into the Red Army.

During the period 1941-1945 Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces accepted almost 5 million people into their ranks, which was half of all those entering the Komsomol during the war. The position of Komsomol Organizer of the Komsomol Central Committee was established at industrial enterprises and large construction projects in the nation by decision of the Komsomol Central Committee.

During the war 3.5 million Komsomol members were awarded orders and medals, 7,000 Komsomol members and products of the Komsomol were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and 40 young innovators were awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor.

[Correspondent] But "definitive" dates are not just an excuse for discussing achievements, a fact stressed at the beginning of the interview....

[Yepifantsev] Of course not. It is also an occasion for taking a critical look at the entire path traveled by the Komsomol. It would therefore be incorrect, simply dishonorable, to avoid this fact: there was a definite drop in mass defense work at the beginning of the '70s. What happened is that many state methods of preparing the youth for service in the military were curtailed at that time because of a unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces. During that period there was a weakening of ties between Komsomol organizations and military units, of meetings with veterans and tours of combat glory sites, and field exercises became sporadic "undertakings."

Mass defense work began to increase following the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. A new and comprehensive form of military-patriotic upbringing was born in 1965: the All-Union Tour by Komsomol Members and the Youth to Sites of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory of the Communist Party and the Soviet People. In 1969 it was decided that the Komsomol would assume sponsorship of the Border Guards. Here again it needs to be frankly stated, however, that it was during this time that many activities began more and more frequently to

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acquire a formal, ceremonial nature. The abstract number of large-scale activities gradually forced the specific work performed with the youth and that performed with the individual into the background.

[Correspondent] And what is the state of military-patriotic upbringing today?

[Yepifantsev] Until quite recently it was the custom to say that everything was completely in order in this respect, that the most highly educated, well informed, cultured and well educated youth, most of them devoted to the ideals of the older generations, were entering the military. Generally speaking, perhaps all of that was true. We need to frankly discuss something else, however: urgent problems of the youth; alarming developments in their midst; the fact that elements of pacifism, complacency, lack of concern and contentedness exist in a certain segment of the youth. We have cases of draft-age youth breaking the law, and there are still cases of evasion of military duty. A significant number of young people enter the forces without receiving proper initial military training. Not long ago, for example, the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Education conducted a selective survey of 1,659 students at 217 republic secondary schools. They were given the following marks for knowledge, abilities and skills in pre-draft training: excellent, 300 (18 percent); good, 693 (42 percent); satisfactory, 541 (33 percent); unsatisfactory, 125 (7 percent).

Data provided by the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Cooperative School under the Komsomol Central Committee also gives us much to think about. It seems that around half of the draft-age and predraft youth surveyed do not fully understand the hardships and deprivations of military service, only 21 percent of them are fully prepared to defend the homeland, more than 35 percent do not have the necessary technical military skills and abilities, and 17 percent are not physically prepared.

In short, economic and political stagnation from the mid-70s to the beginning of the '80s had an extremely large impact also on the state of military-patriotic upbringing. The climate of universal complacency which developed produced attempts to instil the premise of socialism's advantages in the minds of the youth merely by rote. There was a further spread of rituals and large-scale activities, and upbringing in the historical, revolutionary, combat and labor traditions was extensively replaced with nonspecific educational work. All of this had to affect the way of life of the young men and women, their views and principles.

The 20th Komsomol Congress named the main deficiencies in the military-patriotic work and stated that the military-patriotic work had recently gradually lost its exploratory nature and become ceremonial, frequently simply boring, that the Komsomol committees had not succeeded in forming a broad aktiv of concerned people capable of participating in the military-patriotic work on

a voluntary basis. A gap developed in the substance of the military-patriotic upbringing between the ideological, moral and political preparation of the youth to defend the homeland and the military and technical military work.

[Correspondent] Then one of the tasks is to reduce that gap?

[Yepifantsev] Correct. And we regard stepping up the work with the young reservists, among other things, to be a significant reserve for improving the mass defense work. The principled approach to these matters consists in utilizing in the military-political upbringing the moral-political strength, the experience and the technical military knowledge acquired by fightingmen during their regular service. The All-Union Rally of Reservists, held in Ashkhabad in November 1987, and the documents approved at the rally confirmed the fact that involving the young reservists in the military-patriotic upbringing and preparation of the youth to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR is one of the most promising directions for the military-patriotic upbringing today.

An All-Union Assembly of Military-Patriotic Associations, yet another phase in the development of the reservist movement, was recently held in Novorossiysk. One important result was a decision to focus the efforts of reservists and Komsomol committees on developing the movement locally. Greater attention needs to be devoted to the substantive aspect of their work and to interaction with the military commissariats, military units and military educational institutions, veterans' councils and DOSAAF committees.

There is no question that the main role must go to the fightingmen-and-internationalists, those to whom the appeal was made from the speaker's platform at the 20th Komsomol Congress: "Go to the teenagers, tell them about yourselves, about your comrades, your commanders and mentors, about the valor, heroism and combat fraternity."

The young men who passed through the crucible of Afghanistan must make "their statement" about the restructuring of the military-patriotic upbringing. Who, if not those who have been put to the test of fire, could know what comes of deficiencies in the preparation of the youth for military service? At the same time, the "Afghan" fightingmen must not be set off against young men who have served in other places or against the veterans. Errors in this matter could result in irremediable damage.

The young-army movement is another promising direction for the military-patriotic upbringing of the upcoming generation. The structure of the young-army movement has now been worked out, consisting of the Gaydarovets, Zarnitsa and Orlenok military sports

games, military-patriotic clubs, sections, schools and associations (of young seamen, airborne troops, airmen, border troops and others), and stations at the Perpetual Flame of Glory.

As a comprehensive system the All-Union young-army movement must organically develop state forms of military-patriotic and physical education. The 7th All-Union Orlenok finals, held in accordance with the new program in Pskov in 1987, demonstrated that the guidelines for the system provide forms of moral and psychological, physical and technical military training which attract the youth.

Investigative work evokes great interest in both the activists in military-patriotic upbringing and the youth themselves. Not long ago, in the Komsomol Central Committee, a group of veterans were presented awards from the Great Patriotic War which had not been presented to them at that time for various reasons. Komsomol members from the "Search" unit of the Moscow Trade and Economic Tekhnikum made the presentations possible. This "Search" unit has been led for 16 years by Lt Col (Reserve) Nautin Zinoviy Veniaminovich, a war veteran. The "Search" club has looked for the veterans, their families and friends for 8 years as part of the All-Union "Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War" Expedition. During that time the trackers tracked down more than a thousand war veterans or members of their families.

Two veterans were made full holders of the Order of Glory, for example. Several people had been pronounced dead, but turned out to be alive and well and received their deserved combat awards. They included Georgiy Yefimovich Ogorodnikov. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War, 1st degree. The trackers were looking for his family, but they found him. Georgiy Yefimovich lives in Altay Kray today.

At the end of October, on the legendary cruiser Avrora, in the city on the Neva, combat decorations were presented to seven Leningraders, who were found by the club's trackers. They have taken around 2,000 excerpts from lists of decorations at the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, which are presented to the war veterans, the families of those who lost their lives, to museums and combat glory rooms.

The work of tracking down the heroes of the war years continues. It is supported by the Komsomol Central Committee and received the fervent approval of delegates to the All-Union Youth Rally in Leningrad.

A recent joint session of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee discussed urgent problems having to

do with immortalizing the memory of the homeland's defenders and educating the youth in a spirit of civic-mindedness and patriotism and a readiness to fulfill their military duty.

Right now it is very important to support the growing youth movement in the country to recreate our homeland's history through the biographies of the heros-and-patriots. We are going to have to immortalize in the popular memory the first revolutionaries, Bolsheviks of the Lenin Guard, the first builders of socialism, heroes of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, the victims of lawlessness and despotism, and the heros-and-internationalists of all generations. The youth want to know history through the people.

The work of burying, reburying and establishing the identities of dead fightingmen, partisans and underground fighters, has recently been stepped up. The trackers have collected an enormous amount of information. A great deal has been done, but even more remains to be done. It is estimated that the remains of 30,000 Soviet fightingmen are in the swamps just in the area of Myasnoy Bor in Novgorod Oblast, for example.

[Correspondent] The traditional form of interaction between the Komsomol and the Armed Forces is Komsomol sponsorship. What changes have occurred in it recently? [Yepifantsev] The Komsomol sponsors the Navy, the Air Forces, the Border Guards and the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Time has confirmed the importance of Komsomol sponsorship for increasing the fighting strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and training many generations of the homeland's defenders. Let us frankly say that a number of significant deficiencies have appeared in the sponsorship in recent years: military sponsorship has become a ceremonial, sometimes formal, thing. It sometimes seems that all of us Komsomol workers forget the simple fact that sponsorship is not just an exchange of delegations and not a series of fancy visits; it involves the painstaking, actually laborious, work of preparing young men for the military service.

The 20th Komsomol Congress pointed out that the need is upon us thoroughly to cleanse the Leninist Komsomol's sponsorship of the Navy, the Air Forces and the Border Guards of formalism and to make it completely concrete. The Komsomol Central Committee is presently preparing proposals for improving sponsorship of the Air Forces, the Navy and the Border Guards.

This work must be based on the demand set forth at the 20th Komsomol Congress that we provide great latitude for initiative "from below" in the military-patriotic upbringing and the orientation of the youth toward the occupations of military seaman and airman.

One of the important components is the publicizing of Army, Air Force and Naval history in the Komsomol organizations, involvement in structural modeling and

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the technical and applied military sports, the establishment of a broad network of schools and clubs for young airmen, cosmonauts, parachutists, seamen, and so forth. This work culminates with the selection and assignment of the best youth to military educational institutions, to the forces and fleets.

During the war Komsomol members and school children in Chelyabinsk Oblast collected 55 million rubles in just one month for building submarines. One of them was named the Chelyabinskiy Komsomolets. It was decided to man the submarine named for them with draftees from Chelyabinsk Oblast. The tradition continues today. There is a reserve submarine crew in the oblast, which includes reserve seamen and predraft youth.

Here is another example. Long-standing friendship links the ship Komsomolets Litvy and Komsomol members in the city of Klaypeda. Each year the Klaypeda Komsomol committee sends as many as 10 of its best draftees to serve on assignment from the Komsomol city committee on the ship named after them. The seamen, in turn, maintain friendly ties with the city's sponsoring organizations and periodically report on their performance to the organizations which recommended them for the ship.

The experience of the Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni V.P. Chkalov and the Gorkiy Oblast Komsomol Committee in establishing a Chkalov Squadron made up of Komsomol members from Gorkiy Oblast is notable.

Weeks celebrating the combat arms and services, agitation flights and train trips, exchanges of delegations, and joint undertakings by the youth and fightingmen of the Army and Navy have become traditional forms of Komsomol sponsorship. Agitation teams from the Komsomol Central Committee and workers from the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA are frequent guests in the subunits.

Challenge banners, pennants bearing the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union and memorial military valor badges have been established as awards for the best Komsomol organizations and fightingmen for heroism and courage and for the exemplary fulfillment of their international duty. It is important to know that the procedure for awarding Komsomol Central Committee badges to servicemen has been changed. Authority to grant awards for the Komsomol Central Committee has been vested in a limited number of political organs.

[Correspondent] Now I would like to leave the cheerful subjects and talk about the following. The time is past when the problem of military discipline was considered to be a "closed subject." A great deal is now being said and written about this....

[Yefifantsev] I will frankly say that I can see only one tendency in the series of certain articles on nonregulation relations: the undermining of our military's prestige. Ranting will not help matters, will not even begin to resolve the problem. Only considered and objective statements by the publicists can truly help to eliminate the defects, statements by journalists who are troubled to the depths of their souls by cases of nonregulation relations and feel personal pain because of them.

We know that many gross infractions of discipline are committed by Komsomol members. This shows that moral and military upbringing has still not assumed its proper place in the overall system of ideological and educational work with the youth in the Komsomol organizations and the subunits. Improving the individual work performed with the young fightingmen is perhaps the most important thing for Army and Navy Komsomol activists. Every single soldier should receive Komsomol attention. It is important for the Komsomol committees to devote greater attention to the numerous Komsomol organizations, particularly in the subunits which have no party organization.

Nonregulation relations are a special concern. One wonders that an older serviceman, frequently frail by nature, can sometimes permit himself, unhindered, frankly speaking, to ridicule comrades who are just beginning their military service, while all of the Komsomol members present ignore it. Why is such a thing possible today? I have spoken more than once with front-liners and veterans, and this did not exist during the war. On the contrary, history knows thousands of cases in which older soldiers covered the inexperienced youth from enemy fire and did everything possible to help them overcome the hardships of military service. Today, when the fightingmen's general level of education and development is far higher, are we truly unable to establish order in this area? I can say with complete frankness that nonregulation relations do not merely degrade human dignity; they are a factor which lowers our state's defense capability. It is inadmissible to reconcile oneself to this.

We brought up the problem of nonregulation relations in the military collectives practically for the first time at the 20th Komsomol Congress. We did not do this—I want to stress the fact once more—in order to exacerbate the situation, but to truly help to resolve it.

[Correspondent] But its roots lie not just in the military collectives....

[Yefifantsev] That is correct. Not just in the military collectives, but also in the schools, the vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums, where the predraft and draft-age youth are shaped.

[Correspondent] Now, if you do not object, let us return to contemporary problems in military-patriotic upbringing. The Armed Forces need morally and physically strong, thoroughly trained youth. The main criterion for

assessing the work of preparing the youth for military service is the young people's desire and preparedness to remain in the military formation....

[Yepifantsev] Absolutely. But the Leninist Komsomol needs support in this matter from the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Fortunately, we have defined a procedure for turning over to the military-patriotic clubs and associations the property, equipment, devices and visual aids to be used for the military-patriotic work and have outlined the procedure for enlisting reservists, particularly those with combat experience, to work at defense sports camps. There are even more unresolved issues, however.

The aforementioned, recent joint session of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee, for example, discussed the consequences of transferring lists of awards not presented to Great Patriotic War veterans from the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which is located in Podolsk. We still believe that this will prevent thousands of Komsomol members from participating in the search and the patriotic work and will hamper the achievement of justice for the war heroes.

We plan to discuss the improvement of the military-patriotic upbringing at one of the plenums of the Komsomol Central Committee, with active participation by representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the Council of War and Labor Veterans.

[Correspondent] Drastic changes are occurring in the international situation. We have succeeded in lessening the danger of war. How do we assess the importance of military-patriotic upbringing in this situation? Will it not recede into the background?

[Yepifantsev] Changes in the international situation and prospects for restraining the arms race do not guarantee that the positive processes underway are irreversible. Military-patriotic upbringing and the preparation of the youth to serve in the army or navy must, therefore, not be moved into the background and become lost in the press of daily concerns. We shall evaluate in a most principled manner everyone who demonstrates pacifistic sentiments and all unjustified attempts to belittle the role of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the establishment of the CPSU's peace-loving policy.

[Correspondent] And how do you regard the new "currents" in contemporary historical science?

[Yepifantsev] Recently, we have frequently encountered extremes in the efforts of historians, publicists and writers to reinterpret and rethink the facts about the

history of our nation and our state. The fact that many people are regaining their good name and that events which were forcibly forgotten in the past are being subjected to glasnost is a good thing. At the same time, one cannot ignore also the savoring of errors, the "swings" from one extreme to another. Our position can be described in simple terms: there have been no "bad" periods in our history; there have been errors, but it is all our history and is not to be rewritten or redone. With respect to the "difficult" periods, let us learn from them and derive conclusions in the process of the restructuring in all areas of Komsomol life. This will unquestionably help us to pursue our common cause better and more productively: to develop patriots, spiritually strong, capable of assuming responsibility for the fate of the homeland, worthy heirs and continuers of the traditions of previous generations of Komsomol members and the youth.

[Correspondent] And now, the final, traditional question. What are your wishes for the Army and Navy on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol?

[Yepifantsev] Success in the service, health, happiness, a peaceful sky overhead, and all of the very best.

Democratization: Conflict Between Regular, Political Officers

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[Editorial: "Democratizing Our Life"]

[Text] Restructuring. Democratization. Glasnost. These words are becoming the catchwords of our life, reflecting the nature of the changes occurring in the Soviet society, the increasingly developing political and social active ness of the masses, and their desire to participate directly in the running of the Soviet State with their labor and through the expression of their will. During these October days, when we are commemorating the 11th anniversary of the adoption of the country's present Fundamental Law, the statement contained therein that "all power in the USSR belongs to the people" has a special ring.

Every Soviet patriot—whether worker, teacher, doctor, grain grower, student or member of the Armed Forces—has a sense of participating in the democratization of the entire society today. It is a dynamic and multifaceted democratization. Think about these facts.

An engineer who proposes a precise, scientifically based social program for restructuring the life and work of the labor collective, one which opens up prospects for social progress, is elected director of the plant....

At a meeting the kolkhoz workers express a lack of confidence in the chairman, who holds numerous orders and medals but has lost interest in the cause and in the people over the years....

At a party meeting a young officer and Communist criticizes the commander for arrogance and hypocrisy. He is backed up by his comrades, who point out in a resolution adopted at the meeting the inadmissibility of such conduct on the part of a Communist in charge....

A city meeting adopts a resolution containing a request to deprive of his mandate as a delegate to the 19th party conference an individual who has compromised himself in an important leadership position. Their request is satisfied....

Dozens of informal associations and movements are being established in the cities and in the rural area to promote the cause of the restructuring, and they are supported by the masses. People are speaking out more and more boldly for the real implementation of those rights and liberties which are set forth in articles of the nation's Fundamental Law. Discussions of problems of the nation's economic, political and public life have become the norm for our life.

Decisions coming out of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference promoted a militant, truly revolutionary attitude in the Communists and all the Soviet people. The problems of democratizing our society and effecting a radical reform of the political system were at the center of its attention. The need for such a reform is upon us. After all, the Soviet State, born more than 70 years ago as a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat, turned into a common popular state at a certain stage of social development.

"Today," states the conference resolution "On the Democratization of the Soviet Society and Reform of the Political System," "the task is one of seeing to it that Soviet statehood fully conforms to this concept and that all affairs in the nation are decided by the people and their authorized representatives and are under their complete and effective control."

The conference precisely and specifically outlined the crucial direction for the reform of the political system, which was to give complete authority to the soviets of people's deputies as the foundation of socialist statehood and self-government in the country. Not a single issue pertaining to state, economic or social and cultural life may be resolved without the soviets. It is planned to establish conditions which will realistically guarantee the responsibility and independence of the soviets in the resolution of problems involved in the comprehensive development of subordinate territories. They must have stable sources of income based on long-term norms, including receipts from all the enterprises located within

their territory. This will enable the soviets to be economically independent and, consequently, to apply greater effort to improving the life of the population, protecting the environment and resolving other vitally important problems.

Increasing authority is one thing, but how it is used is something else. And for whom it is to be increased. All of us have previously taken part in elections in which we merely voted for a single candidate nominated by agreement with "higher-ups." And upon becoming a deputy, the candidate did nothing more than vote at the sessions.... This situation is no longer tolerable, no question about it, because it not only harms the cause but also creates fertile soil for demagogic. We therefore view with approval and interest the submission for national discussion of the draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution of the USSR and the draft Law on Elections of People's Deputies.

By ensuring the unlimited advancement and unrestricted discussion of candidates, the inclusion of a larger number of candidates on the election ballots than there are mandates, strict observance of democratic election procedures, regular reporting by the deputies and the possibility of recalling them, and the introduction of a number of other democratic changes, the electors can expect the soviets truly to become working agencies of power. Not just expect it, but actually demand it of them. The establishment of a limitation on the holding of elected positions and positions appointed and approved by the soviets to two consecutive terms is another important prescript.

In letters to the editors the readers are sharing their ideas about the restructuring of higher agencies of state power discussed at the party conference. Many support the proposal that an annual conference of CPSU people's deputies be the highest agency. According to the collective plan it will form a numerically relatively small bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a standing legislative and executive agency, and will elect the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet by secret ballot. This should eliminate the functional lack of personal responsibility on the part of the chambers and reorganize the functioning of the standing commissions and the deputies.

The decentralization of control and the redistribution of functions and authority to ensure maximum initiative and independence at the sites is an important part of the political system's reform. The laws of the USSR on the state enterprise and cooperation, the conversion of the labor collectives to economic accountability and self-financing, the contract and leasing, and individual labor activity have already created conditions conducive to the effective development of the national economy and, therefore, to the fuller satisfaction of the workers' needs.

Historical experience has shown that the grander and more difficult the assigned tasks are, the more important it is for the masses to take an important part in their

practical accomplishment. V.I. Lenin's belief that "the broader the scope and the greater the magnitude of historical actions, the greater the number of people who will participate in such actions...." It is with good reason, the conference participants believe, that the forthcoming reform of the political system is designed to provide maximum latitude for the society's self-government and to establish the conditions for total development of initiative on the part of citizens, representatives of agencies of authority, party and public organizations, and labor collectives.

It is only natural to ask how participation by the working man in the running of the government and public affairs is specifically manifested. There is no simple answer, since there is an enormous diversity of ways: from writing letters to the agencies of management to working out and establishing general state laws. Any specific participation by workers in public-political life—working as members of various soviets, committees, commissions and teams, performing public assignments, speaking at meetings and sessions, and so forth—is, in the final analysis, participation in the management of state and public affairs, the most common and most important form of which is direct participation in the monitoring of production and distribution, the measure of labor and the measure of consumption. It is only natural that the party conference would acknowledge the establishment of a unified system of public and state monitoring of the observance of our Soviet laws, subordinate to the elected agencies, to be democratic and expedient.

Primacy of the law, which reflects the will of the people, is one of the conditions for the shaping of a socialist legal state as that kind of organization of political power which fully conforms to socialism. The accomplishment of this task is inseparably linked to maximum protection of the rights and liberties of the Soviet people, the state's responsibility to the citizen and the citizen's responsibility to the state, enhancement of the authority of the law and its strict observance by all.

We are already moving toward this goal. Each day newspapers, radio and television bring us reports about how the public activeness of the masses is increasing and how people are becoming increasingly intolerant of bureaucracy, mismanagement and violations of socialist legality. The activities of certain extremist elements such as members of the infamous "democratic alliance" have been universally condemned. It was established by a small group of individuals whose "program" objective is to change the social structure of the USSR, who condemn the political system established in October 1917, who are against a leading role for the Communist Party and who call upon people to refuse to perform their military duty. Naturally, antisocial mobs assembled by such elements are nipped in the bud by state agencies, because our democracy has nothing in common with anarchy, with a situation in which anything and everything is permitted, with attacks on the Soviet way of life.

The process of renewal, although not a simple one and not without difficulties, is growing. As we carry out the restructuring, our thoughts return again and again to our party, to its place and role in this revolutionary process. And it is not surprising that questions pertaining to the party's work and its leading role are at the center of attention of our society. The people link the restructuring and democratization to it, the party.

When it proposed a new course at the April 1985 Central Committee plenum, the CPSU confirmed the fact that it is the political force which can lead the country toward renewal. The 27th CPSU Congress set forth the task of fundamentally restructuring party work and focused on the democratization of intra-party life. Lessons of truth are prompting a growth of self-awareness and self-purification in our ranks. Today, the party is setting the tone of life for the entire society. By initiating the reform and serving as its active agent, the party is in fact fulfilling its mission as the political vanguard of the working class and of all the workers. The country's Fundamental Law contains the following statement, tempered by history: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the guiding and directing force in the Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and its state and public organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people."

Unfortunately, no thorough scientific study has yet been made of the range of forms and methods used by the party during Lenin's time for scientifically influencing the broad masses of workers through other public organizations. And such a study is essential, because those democratic forms which we are developing in the contemporary situation are the fruit of the entire 70-year development of our state and public institutions.

Our path in history has not been an easy one, since it was a pioneering path. There were rises and falls, discoveries and errors, and tragedies. Repression and the most flagrant violations of socialist legality during the period of the cult of Stalin's personality, a departure from Leninist standards of party and state life, and various types of libertarian outbursts caused great harm to the development of socialist democracy.

Every objective observer, however, if he sides with the truth, has to admit that, overall, our history has been a history of economic and social progress, a history of a great military feat by the people. The result was a socialist social structure and a powerful, multinational state which gained strength by the year. And a qualitatively new level has been reached in its development at the contemporary stage. It is defined primarily by the kind of democracy which involves people in the process of accelerating social and economic development and ensures the irreversibility of the restructuring underway in the country.

Lenin's concept of the party's directing role in the society rejects its substitution for state and economic agencies and the adoption of party decisions containing direct instructions for them. The CPSU conducts its political course through Communists working in various areas of the society.

Strictest observance of the democratic principles, the requirements set forth in the Constitution of the USSR and other laws are a dictate of the times. It is the ability to perform the job in the new way, with the methods of ideological-political and organizational work in the masses, which makes it possible to assess the level of the party organization's activity and the maturity of the party activists today.

All of this fully applies also to Army and Navy party organizations. The party committees and bureaus are expected to stimulate and liberate the initiative of the Communists, to support concerned people who boldly speak out against all manifestations of arrogance, bureaucracy, inertia and dependency, and to establish conditions making it possible for the party members and candidate members to take full advantage of the authority vested in them by the CPSU Charter. The democratization of party work requires that all Communists, without exception, become involved in it, take an active stance in life and acquire a new mentality and a sense of being a full member of their party organization in the process of the practical work.

Relations between the secretary of the party committee or bureau and the commander and political worker of the unit or the ship, and the establishment of harmonious and coordinated work in every area require close attention. Both the situation in the military collective and success in the common cause depend upon this. We know, however, that certain commanders are incapable of relying on the party organization and do not consider its opinion, that some of them attempt to give instructions to the secretaries, to "extol" some Communists and subject others to party accountability based on personal likes and dislikes. There are also secretaries who try to order the Communists around instead of guiding them. Others, the so-called "puppets," are prepared to carry out any instructions, even to the point of overstepping the norms of party life.

Democratizing the life of the primary party organizations means enhancing their independence, ridding them of petty tutelage and regulation from above, strengthening the authority of elected party organs and the secretaries of party organizations, establishing conditions which stimulate their activity, and overcoming the passivity of some of the party members. Every Communist must be an active fighter for the restructuring and the revolutionary reform of the society. The requirements set for those entering the party are increased as a result. The main criterion for assessing their qualities is their position and actual participation in the restructuring.

The reports and elections universally underway in the party organizations are an important stage in the systematic democratization of party life.

It is during this campaign that further steps can and must be taken to place the party's vital activities onto a democratic foundation, to rejuvenate intra-party relations and improve the election process and the praxis of collective action by the elected agencies, to reorient the party aktiv toward the new methods of conducting ideological-political and organizational work among the masses and personnel policy, to enhance the militancy of the primary party organizations and enrich their life with political substance.

The principle that there must be extensive discussion of the candidates and secret balloting in the elections of all leading party organs, and the possibility for including on the ballots more candidates than there are mandates is of fundamental importance with respect to democratizing party life. A number of other principles ensuring democratization of the election process in the party are based on it.

The Central Committee plenum recommended that we use the report and election campaign to replenish the ranks of party leaders with fresh forces. The party's position on this matter is clearly defined and specific: anyone who accepts its concepts with his heart and soul and honestly strives to overcome in his thinking and his work style everything which does not conform to the spirit of the times, who is a promoter of the new and progressive and works conscientiously retains his prospects and has the moral right to remain a leader. Otherwise, he should relinquish his position.

This is the kind of climate of earnestness and sincerity in which we would like the report and the report-and-election meetings to be held in the Army and Navy party organizations. They should also discuss what makes up the essence of democratization in the Army and Navy situation. It should be focused on ensuring more fully all of the rights of fightingmen in the Armed Forces as full citizens of the USSR, on enhancing the role of party, Komsomol and other public organizations in the life of the military collectives, on the development of activeness in the personnel in the fulfillment of their service duties and the establishment of regulation order in every unit and on every ship.

Democratizing public and political life in the Army and Navy collectives helps to strengthen sole-command on the party basis. It is a matter of honor for every Communist and Komsomol member to support regulations governing relations among servicemen and maintain a high level of organization. Let us be candid and state that we are still lacking in this area. Service apathy and the isolation of some of the officers from the personnel intensify the negative influence of those "old ways" which take root back at the school or the vocational and technical school, even in the labor collectives, but flourish in the army only where there is fertile soil for them—that is, in those military collectives in which the officers and warrant officers forget that they are

responsible not just for the occupational and physical training of the personnel, but also for the moral health of the fightingmen. The seasoned general and the colonel, the captain and the young lieutenant—are they not the ones to set an example of good morals, social justice and true concern for the people? This too is a part of the democratization of the military collective's life.

The times demand a considerably enhancement of the role of party and Komsomol organizations with respect to securing the constitutional rights and liberties of servicemen and their families. This requires maximum openness in the work of public organizations and close ties with the masses. The way in which party and Komsomol meetings are conducted must be decisively altered. There must be greater democratism, efficiency and a critical and constructive approach to the discussion of problems both in the combat training and in the internal life and work of the primary organizations.

The military councils and political organs should summarize and disseminate experience in democratization and glasnost in the work of the primary party organizations and consistently implement the principle of democratic centralism, which calls for freedom of debate at the stage of discussion of issues and unity of action after a decision has been adopted by the majority. They need to strive to see that all party organizations function in a climate of comradeship and principle, collectivism and aware discipline.

Democratization in all areas of life of the military collectives and the establishment of purity and principle in relations between chiefs and subordinates, seniors and juniors, create a climate in which the creative strengths of the Soviet fightingman are revealed most effectively. In the final analysis, all of this enhances the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and strengthens discipline and organization in the personnel.

Our reality has convincingly confirmed the inseparability of socialism and democracy. Today we understand as never before the meaning of Lenin's premise that "socialism which does not practice total democracy cannot be victorious." The democratization of all aspects of life is making room for socialism's most creative force, the free labor of free man in a free country.

Readers' Responses on Reforming Officer Pay, Incentives

18010292c Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19,
Oct 88 pp 34-35

[Article by Capt V. Pedan, subunit commander, under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion": "A New Approach Is Needed"]

[Text] "Equalizing Harms the Cause" was the headline under which a letter from Lt Col V. Rempel was published in issue No. 9 of the magazine. The author discussed the

need to alter the existing pay system, since it equalizes the work of the conscientious officers and those who perform their duties with an adequate sense of responsibility.

The editors continue to receive letters in response to the article, the authors of which are in sympathy with Lt Col P. Rempel. They support the officer's above-mentioned belief that we need to take a more differentiated approach to officer pay and carefully consider the results of their work. Others did not agree with this view of the matter. The two points of view are hereby submitted for the readers to judge.

It still frequently occurs today that an officer who makes every effort to maintain the subunit at a high level of combat readiness, conscientiously stands alert duty, works skillfully with subordinates and is a rated specialist has the same standard of living as those who have been relieved of duties and details as a result of professional inadequacy or lack of discipline, who do not know how or do not desire to work with subordinates, who do not possess the elementary technical knowledge and skills, and are not striving to acquire them. In addition, we still encounter those who have lost interest in the service, and some officers with an atrophied sense of that "healthy careerism" which I believe is inherent in a military man. I recently heard such an officer say: "Why should I strive to become a battery, all the more a battalion, commander? In order to have no peace day or night? Living conditions are the same or almost the same, and I shall be discharged into the reserve as a captain or a major in any case." I have also heard the following more than once: "Try to get into an academy? Why? Just look at the life of a regimental commander. I don't want that."

Such a ruinous distortion of the sense of responsibility cannot but be reflected in the way in which the matters of combat readiness, alert duty and military discipline are handled. In my opinion, it is therefore time to revise the procedure for calculating pay rates for officers and warrant officers to provide more effective incentives for their work. Among other things, it would be a good thing to differentiate more markedly the rates based on position held for the various categories of officers and warrant officers and to establish significant rate increases for higher skills ratings, for standing alert duty and for the performance of duty involving working with regular personnel. It is perfectly possible that it would make sense to authorize immediate superiors, from the regimental commander on up, also to withhold amounts from the rated pay—as certain types of recovery, for example: for acts discrediting the rank of an officer or warrant officer, in cases of breakdowns in the combat readiness of the subunit commanded and for the personal commission of gross infractions of military discipline.

It seems to me that all of this would make it possible to link the quality and quantity of the officers' work more

closely to their earnings and would promote a conscientious attitude toward the performance of their duties.

Captain V. Pedan
Sub-Unit Commander

Articles discussing the need to improve material incentives for the work of military personnel are appearing more and more frequently in the military press. They include letters from Maj V. Mikheyev and Lt Col P. Rempel, published respectively in issues No. 2 and No. 9 of the magazine. They and certain other writers propose differentiating the pay for officers and warrant officers, rewarding some of them for their success and penalizing others for shortcomings. The opinion is also expressed that the corresponding commanders (or officers in charge) should decide who is to receive what rate. Naturally, they would base their conclusions on public opinion, primarily that of the party organization.

I feel that this problem should be resolved differently. In certain subunits of the Air Defense Forces in which I have served, for example, the shortage of officers ranged from 10 to 30 percent, even more for warrant officers. There was frequently a shortage also of NCOs. Just about every officer in those collectives therefore had to perform the work of two or three people. Naturally, he was far from always able to maintain combat readiness or discipline at the required level in his subunit. I am not even discussing the problems involved in providing officers and warrant officers with housing at the "sites," or with a complete and varied diet, the organization of leisure-time activities for them or the lack of jobs for their wives. All of this clearly does not promote what we consider to be normal service.

Under these conditions how can an officer or warrant officer be expected to achieve good results in his difficult job? How can he be penalized for some kind of deficiencies by withholding part of his pay? As a rule, after all, he literally gives everything he has to the job, and the fact that he cannot accomplish everything well is not so much his fault as his misfortune. Furthermore, in my opinion, the incentive system for the work of officers and warrant officers provides an unlimited opportunity for various kinds of military bureaucrats and simply unscrupulous people to take reprisal against those who do not suit them, those who, guided by service interests, criticize those in charge.

I therefore propose something different. First of all, we need to get rid of those who perform their service duties unconsciously. They must simply be discharged. I anticipate the objection that this will leave us without cadres. It will not if we seriously set about enhancing the prestige of the officer's occupation. It is no secret, after all, that this prestige has fallen somewhat in recent years. And there are reasons for this: the fairly low military pay (compared with the same amount of work involving the same amount of time in the civilian sector), the more

difficult social, climatic, psychological and other features of military service, particularly at remote garrisons and at the "sites." Can the existing situation be rectified? I believe it can. In the first place, we need to change the basis for manning the Armed Forces with officers (giving the officer the opportunity to retire into the reserve at any time after he has completed the required 8-10 years—this must be calculated). And in order to attract gifted youth to the military schools, we need to resolve at a higher level questions pertaining to material, social and cultural, and personal-service support for both the officers themselves and their families. I am convinced that this will create wholesome competition among those who want to link their destiny to the military and will contribute to their conscientious performance in the service.

Captain R. Shavkuba

Reader Responds to Press Criticisms of Military
*18010292d Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19,
Oct 88 p 36*

[Article by Col (Retired) V. Lyutikov, veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR and participant in the Great Patriotic War, under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion": "About the Article 'Strange recollections'"]

[Text] I carefully read the article "Strange Recollections" in your journal (No. 16, 1988) and I want to express my profound appreciation to the author.

The article seems to be a good example of reaction to articles criticizing the combat past and present of the Soviet Armed Forces and ridiculing the memory of renowned military leaders of the Great Patriotic War.

In the periodicals today one frequently reads assessments—and always negative—of specific operations carried out by our forces during the Great Patriotic War, the majority of them offered by people who are not competent in military affairs. One has the impression that most of these critics not only did not take part in the war, certainly not in positions permitting them to understand what was occurring, but did not even serve in the army at all, ingeniously evading the draft, like the well-known film director. Such critics, said V.I. Lenin, "are distinguished not only by the fact that they do not know a great deal, but also by the fact that they are not aware of their own ignorance."

I never set for myself the task of specially analyzing our press (or even our creative literature) from the standpoint of this issue. I have before me an issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (No. 34, 1988), however, in which writer V. Sapozhnikov states the following: "Some of our marshals fought like today's artists: according to the principle of expendability." The same issue contains (on page 16!) the article "What Are They Paid For," in which N. Loginova, commentator with the Communist

Education Section of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, endeavors with a smirk to describe the methods used for educating young soldiers in the Soviet Army.

In IZVESTIYA (No. 228, 1988) Historian and Academician A. Samsonov discusses the allegedly unwarranted severity of Order No. 227 issued by the People's Commissar of Defense on 28 July 1942 (the article "Stalin Gave the Order"), seriously attempting to enlighten the readers with the statement that "falling back can be a tactical move in mobile warfare," that it is inhumane to post retreat-blocking detachments. I recall how Order No. 227 shook up the entire army, however, particularly troops of the Stalingrad and Southern fronts, who were totally exhausted from the continuous heavy fighting. How they needed a shock stimulus, an abrupt change of attitude! The respected academician's maxims are questionable. ?? This kind of criticism is spread throughout the country in popular newspapers and magazines with circulations numbering in the millions. How does it influence the shaping of views in the youth, even those of older people, their attitude toward the Armed Forces, and toward the military service? The influence is negative, of course, and the harmful effects should not be underestimated.

Military journalists timidly try to counter this harmful development, of course, which flourishes under the pretext of eliminating "forbidden zones" and "blank spots." But their articles and commentary are ordinarily published in the military press—in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. That is, they practically do not reach the mass reader but remain "a thing unto themselves." V. Bushin's article too will be read mainly by servicemen, while the OGO-NEK containing V. Lakshin's essay "The Open Door" was read by millions (circulation 1,550,000!).

I believe that we need to publish articles like V. Bushin's "Strange Recollections" in the central press, thereby applying the principle of pluralism of opinions.

Complaint, Investigation Fail to Resolve Case of Dedovshchina

18010305 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Nov 88 Second Edition No 3

[Article by Maj A. Vorob'yev: "If One Tells the Truth: Thoughts After a Mission About an Alarming Letter"]

[Text] "I have been in active military service since June 1987. In May of this year, a unit of our military construction detachment was sent on a mission to assist in the construction of a delivery project.

"And here nonstatutory interrelationships began to appear in our company: a group of hooligans formed, who insulted soldiers because they were not carrying out their orders. On 24 May, they (the military construction personnel privates Artemenko, Grachev, Sukhov and Isakov) beat me up. I told all of this to the deputy company commander Lt A.G. Korytnik. On 29 May, I

was beaten up again. The next day, learning that I had been in the infirmary and that I wrote a report to Lieutenant Korytnik about what had happened, Artemenko, Grachev and their buddies attacked me with their fists after taps. As a result, I ended up in the hospital.

"They learned of this in the military procuracy. Lieutenant Mikhailov, the investigator, came and took down my statements. And then soldiers came, Grachev called and they tried to persuade me to change my testimony, but I refused.

"For some reason, however, they closed the case and I was released from the hospital ahead of time—within 20 days, so that my injury would not be considered serious.

"I tried to get in touch with Lieutenant Mikhailov but an investigating officer came from the unit where we had been attached (I do not remember his last name). He said that I had a minor injury for which the soldiers who beat me would not be threatened by anything anyway. Therefore, he said, it was better that I write an explanatory statement to the effect that Artemenko and I had had an argument and gotten into a scuffle, whereby we both fell and I hit my head on the floor. And the investigator forced me to sign this false statement.

"What should I do now? It turns out that I, instead of being the one suffering, have practically become the guilty party. Where can I and other young replacement troops seek protection? I ask you, the editors, to intervene and to look into this case."

Military constructor Jr Sgt Oleg Petrovich Sokolov.

After receiving this letter from Junior Sergeant Sokolov, I immediately called the unit and asked how he is getting along there. "Safe and sound," they answered. "No, he is not complaining about anyone, he is getting along just fine in the service." I admit that I did not believe this cheerful statement, for it was hardly in accord with the letter to the editor's office.

Thus, it turned out that I met with Oleg Sokolov at a railroad station. He was returning from a local mission. I discovered by accident that the nice young man with the shoulder boards of a junior sergeant and the emblems of a military constructor sitting across from me waiting for his train is Sokolov, on whose behalf I am making this trip. Such coincidences do happen.

I ask:

"So you are the one who wrote to "Krasnaya Zvezda" and asked for help?"

He nods in the affirmative and looks away.

"I wrote but only, you know, because they forced me to sign a paper stating that the conflict took place for personal reasons; there are quite different statements there...."

The first officers whom I saw the next day in the detachment were Lt Col V. Kropachev, secretary of the party commission in the political section of headquarters, and Col Yu. Dobrovolskiy, section chief. They did not hide the fact that they came especially to meet with the correspondent. They immediately took an interest in the content of the letter to the editor's office and the date when it was sent. Colonel Dobrovolskiy pronounced pensively: "Something is not right here. Someone put Sokolov up to it. He himself could not have thought of it."

Thus, my mission about the letter began in a somewhat unexpected way. Not in the platoon and not in the company, not in talks with the detachment commander, but with officers of the higher command element. And it seems that their objective was to squelch a ticklish situation. For Sokolov is a lower-echelon commander, has a secondary education, came to the detachment after finishing a 3-month course for the training of Komsomol workers, and, in his previous place of duty, was secretary of the company Komsomol bureau and a member of the unit Komsomol committee.

They called in Sokolov. Colonel Dobrovolskiy pulled out a stack of pages full of writing. Among them, of course, was the "explanation" signed by Sokolov. Silently he shows it to me.

"Those are false statements," says Sokolov with a sigh.

"But you signed them," said Dobrovolskiy, raising his voice. "And you declined to press charges. We were sitting down and arguing and you said: 'I do not want them to be put in jail.'"

Colonel Dobrovolskiy is clearly quite sincerely agitated by the new turn of events. Then, as if he wants me to share in his indignation, he shows me a document signed by Sokolov. Here, he seems to be saying, is the truth in this matter: "I want to explain that we were both guilty in this episode.... I believe that the conflict happened for personal reasons.... Besides this incident, no one ever beat me or humiliated me."

I know the truth from the letter to the editor's office. And one could, perhaps, fault Sokolov for timidity. But I do not want to do that. Just think what difficulties he was in: they are pressuring him from all sides—some by threats, some through persuasion and some through promises. Is it easy to stand up to that? Especially if you are all alone, without the support and understanding of those near you. For Sokolov, just as for any other person in a similar situation, this is a very bitter and difficult

thing. He later admits to me: "They taught one thing in the Komsomol courses in the political section but everything was different in real life."

In life, everything really was not the way Comrade Dobrovolskiy tried to describe it. After lengthy discussions, the military constructors did confirm that they beat Sokolov and not just once. Lt A. Korytnik, deputy company commander, also knew about this. Why did he take no action?

Korytnik looked at me with surprise:

"What do you mean, took no action? I repeatedly spoke with and warned Artemenko, Grachev and other soldiers. After all, Sokolov is a junior sergeant. And I reported these events to my superior officers. True, there was no use reporting to the company commander and therefore I turned to Maj Vladimirovich Podolnyy, deputy commander of the detachment in the political unit. He responded: "Educate them."

No, he was not alarmed by the circumstances of what happened and the clearly unfortunate atmosphere in the subunit. But even if Major Podolnyy is indifferent to all of this, should one be surprised that Lt Kortynik, instead of taking decisive measures, continued to scold the hooligans. Company commander Sr Lt A. Shchepetov simply resigned himself to the nonstatutory relations in the subunit. An interesting detail is that I did not find either encouragement or reprimands in the military service card of military constructor Pvt N. Artemenko, one of Sokolov's constant tormentors. His efficiency report, however, was absolutely in order.

In the end, after conversations with those participating in the incident and after familiarizing himself with the documents, the deputy chief of the political section Lt Col A. Novak did agree that the facts in Sokolov's letter to the editor's office are confirmed. But the question arises: Why did the commanders and political officers not attach any significance to the first signals? Why did they not want to look into them in depth, with party high-mindedness and persistence? Where does this formal-indifferent attitude toward people come from?

The army, of course, has not been left out of what has taken place in the society. It has suffered and suffers from "window dressing," the lack of glasnost and democracy. Certainly the destructive rust of the time of stagnation also had an impact on the moral atmosphere in the military collectives. The problem of "dedovshchina," barracks hooliganism, which was internalized for a long time, is now especially painful for the entire army organism.

Can these shameful phenomena be nipped in the bud, at the first signs of their appearance? They can be. There is no place for "dedovshchina" where commanders, political officers and Komsomol organizations act effectively rather than formally and indifferently. Unfortunately, some people lack firmness, consistency and sometimes simply honesty.

So here they employed all of their efforts mainly to distort the essence of the matter and to convince everyone including themselves that nothing serious had happened. You think that two men had a quarrel and got excited. That happens to everyone. And this is followed by the usual excuses with references to the fact that a very difficult group of conscripts is going to military construction units and that there have always been things like this happen in closed collectives.

In short, as Colonel Dobrovolskiy put it, it was an "insignificant event." And the investigating officer Lieutenant Yuzhakov merely documented this version. The decision of the directorate chief Col A. Korytko not to press criminal charges topped everything off. And, what seemed strangest to me, the judge advocates agreed with this.

The military prosecutor of the garrison Lt Col of Justice V. Zubov explained:

"When the written report arrived from the military hospital where Sokolov was being treated, I asked Maj of Justice V. Shlenov: 'What do you know about the circumstances and reasons for the injury to Junior Sergeant Sokolov?' He reported that the command of the construction directorate carried out the administrative investigation. The investigation was concluded and the legality and justification for the decision made by the command were verified.... But if Sokolov had insisted, it would not have been possible to refuse to bring criminal charges."

Still, this is a strange position for a military prosecutor, who is supposed to be an outside observer.

I objected: the journalistic investigation of Sokolov's letter, I said, shows a different result. But Lt Col of Justice V. Zubov insisted: "Formally we have observed all the requirements of the law."

Precisely: formally. In the case at hand, however, the workers of the military procuracy, unconditionally acknowledging the results of the investigation carried out by the unit command, were essentially cooperating with those who sought to hush up the extraordinary incident.

Yuriy Demyanovich Dobrovolskiy gave me his own commentary in this connection:

"One cannot bring criminal charges for every bruise."

I admit that I cannot get these words out of my head. For the essence is not bruises and other "bodily injuries." "Dedovshchina" in any of its forms maims a person mentally above all. Cruelty, the desire to lower the self-worth of another person, and heartlessness—these personality traits are not only repugnant in themselves but are also harmful and dangerous to the society. Only by putting an end to "dedovshchina" can one say that military service in any unit is truly a school of life and education.

Today this worries everyone—those who have served and those who have not, those connected with the armed forces and those not connected with them, and those who wear the military uniform and those who are only preparing to put it on. The procedures, traditions and moral climate in the army and navy are of equal interest to all. As you know, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo paid special attention to discipline in the armed forces at its meeting on 13 October. It called for greater responsibility of commanders and political officers for educational work among personnel and for the establishment and maintenance of statutory order.

"Dedovshchina" does not by any means prevail, of course, in every military unit and every barracks or crew quarters. But neither can one put up with it when it is a matter of individual cases. One must speak about it openly and honestly. This is what is especially needed now, as is accuracy in moral assessments.

Having returned to the editor's office, I received a telegram from Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Zubov. He reported that "in connection with the complaint to the newspaper by military constructor Sokolov, the procuracy is carrying out a further check of the implementation of the laws by the investigatory authority. Sokolov was sent a copy of the decree on the refusal to bring criminal charges issued by the investigatory authority. It was repeatedly suggested to him that he appeal the decision to the military prosecutor."

And another telegram arrived just a few days ago from the same garrison, this time urgent: "I agree with the resolution of the matter. I object to a criminal case. I have no complaints or statements. Respectfully, Sokolov."

They persuaded him, they "convinced" him. It is apparent that in the unit where the military constructor Junior Sergeant Sokolov serves and in the political section of the construction directorate they stubbornly refuse to draw lessons from what has happened. It is better, it turns out, not to recognize the obvious than to ruin "general indicators." But is a truly statutory order possible under such moral circumstances?

Response to Sakharov Call For Unilateral Troop Cuts

18010163 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
19 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by V. Pogrebennov, NOVOSTI Press Agency military observer: "A Discussionary Platform—How Long Should A Soldier Serve?"; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST introduction]

[Text] While speaking to the Paguosh Movement Conference in Dagomys Academician A. Sakharov proposed an almost fifty percent unilateral reduction in the length

of service in the Soviet Armed Forces and a like reduction in the Armed Forces' strength. His proposal was motivated by the fact that there is no state threatening to attack the USSR at the present time. In the academician's opinion, such a reduction would have colossal international significance.

Academician A. Sakharov's ideas about changes in the Soviet military structure were met with interest both in the USSR and abroad. There were different reactions to his proposal in this country and this is totally understandable. I think that competent experts in the USSR Ministry of Defense must provide the official point of view on his proposal and I do not want to speak for them, but I would like to express my personal opinion on this issue, although my opinion is probably not very disputable.

I will begin with the primary point. Does the United States intend to attack the USSR? I think that the answer to that is no. I am equally convinced that the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions toward the U.S. or another country.

Does this mean that there is no threat? Not at all. Reality is such that both sides have at their disposal multi-million-man groups of forces equipped with thousands of missiles outfitted with nuclear warheads. And these missiles represent an enormous potential danger. Thus here is one of the paradoxes. While recognizing the fatal consequences of war from both political and military points of view, both sides continue to maintain armed forces that can wage not only defensive operations, but also large-scale offensive operations. And yet the new Soviet military doctrine as published in 1987 and the military doctrine of participating Warsaw Treaty states as well propose transitioning to the limits of only defensive sufficiency.

One of the reasons for this paradox is obviously that, as a rule, armies are manned and equipped not so much on the principle of reasonable sufficiency as on the principle of necessary redundancy. Here is the psychology of national security: in order to guarantee security, redundancy is preferred to shortages. Therefore each of the sides has developed "surpluses" as a result of the arms race chain reaction; these "surpluses" are everything that has been accumulated above the norms of reasonable defensive sufficiency. These are the "surpluses," and they can represent a very significant percent (which experts must establish by considering the military potential of the opposing side), that actually must be reduced.

But what can you expect if this reduction is done unilaterally? The advantages are undoubtedly the moral value gained in the eyes of the peace-loving foreign society and the advantageous propaganda position which can be used to pressure the other side. And the disadvantages? They include the violation of the parity that both sides have recognized, with all of its "surpluses," and inequality and asymmetry in weapons and

number of personnel. We should obviously also remember that when we unilaterally reduced our forces by 1.2 million men in the early 60's we saw no support or adequate action on the part of the West. Therefore the safest route is bi-lateral action.

In my opinion a reduction in the number of personnel in the armed forces can be accompanied by two changes in the length of service—by increasing and reducing it. In the first case there are problems of an economic and demographic nature. Therefore switching the Army and Navy to three- and four-year terms (as rumors persistently state) is at least very improbable, if not inadvisable.

According to experts, a simultaneous reduction in both length of service and numbers of personnel can drastically undermine the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. And to tell the truth, there is another thing. Equipment and weapons that are constantly becoming more complicated and also poor pre-military training still do not allow our conscripts to serve "for themselves and their comrades."

The most realistic way is to reduce the number of people in the Armed Forces while retaining the previous lengths of service for the near future. By the way, it would also be of interest to learn about the lengths of service in NATO armies.

I will remind you that the overwhelming majority of NATO armies consist of mercenaries. This means that the soldier initially signs a contract for three or four years of service and then can extend it. Is it conceivable to imagine a tank driver in our army who, for example, improves his professional skills for four to six years? And there is more. The NATO soldier is older than our soldier, with an average age of 23-24. If you take our corps of sergeants, the backbone of any army, then the average length of service is eight to ten years and the average age is 26-28.

It would not be expedient for us to copy the NATO armies. But we must seriously think about Academician A. Sakharov's recommendation, especially after the XIX Party Conference which raised the specific task of transitioning to qualitative principles for filling out the Soviet Armed Forces while maintaining high combat readiness.

Glasnost, Self-Criticism Gets Mixed Response in GSFG Regiment
18010362b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 89 p 2

[Interview with Lt Col V. Bogatyrev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Leader Gives an Account of Himself"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This is something new in the life of the Armed Forces—accountability reports by communist-leaders in the party collectives. The first of such accountability

reports have taken place in regiments of the N formation in the GSFG. Our correspondent asked political worker Lt Col V. Bogatyrev to comment.

We are all learning democracy today, Lt Col Bogatyrev said. We are testing our ability to live in conditions of glasnost. Not everyone is coping successfully with this test. Whereas, for example, the reports of officers A. Poltavskiy and Ye. Malayev were characterized by extreme openness and a high sense of self-criticism, Lt Col V. Abramov was not ready for an honest and searching conversation with people. He was in a rush to respond and he just "ticked things off the list," so to speak, failing to understand the essential meaning of this step toward the democratization of life and relations in the military.

In addition to providing information, the accountability reports that have taken place have revealed one earlier shortcoming, namely, bureaucratic administration. It was precisely because of this that the report of Lt Col Ye. Shakula, who in general is a strong-willed and competent commander but believes that he is infallible and ignores the opinions of his subordinates, was not a great success. There are also other examples of general words uttered in a voice of iron, instead of a searching and self-critical monologue by the leader.

I cannot forget the following case. In one of the units the commander and his deputy used the tribune to explain their personal relations. The formation command decided that the collective itself should give an assessment of the situation. Of course, there was a fear of false rumors, but the collective not only itself was up to the job but also managed to get the communist-leaders to face the vitally important problems and helped in finding mutual understanding.

Let me say candidly that this meeting once again convinced us all of the strength of democratization and glasnost, and that similar accountability reports are needed at all levels, from the commander of the formation down to the platoon commander. For after each report something important and fundamental emerges between the leaders and the collective, and a sense of being persons with the same ideas is born. The climate improves and problems are resolved on a more immediate basis. Take, for example, the reports presented to the collectives of officers in the formation headquarters and political directorate. Many justified comments were addressed to us and issues concerning style of work, miscalculations in the planning of the training process

and so forth were touched upon. In short, the range of criticism was quite broad. People today will tell you how things have changed. Much has already been resolved. There have also been noticeable improvements on the plane of social justice.

Of course, there are still problems, but the main thing is that people know this; their opinions are heard and people go to meet them halfway. Moreover, when a commander of political worker approaches people with an open heart and talks sincerely about his work without concealing the miscalculations and shortcomings and is more attentive to advice and the wishes expressed, and to everything of value that he is trying to introduce into life, then people understand that the accountability reports exist not only for the leaders but for them themselves, and that it is precisely they who are the most important entity at the meetings. And it precisely these conditions that prompt people to be active in the life of the collective. And one-man command acquires the democratic features it needs and the closeness of the leader to people becomes real rather than merely for show.

I would also like to emphasize this detail. From one accountability report to the next rich material is accumulated for analysis of the moral atmosphere in any particular collective. And it is impossible not to notice how people and their attitudes change from one meeting to the next. Whereas initially matters were reduced to style and work methods, attitudes to subordinates, the specific actual situation, and the expression of someone's dissatisfaction, today the reports are becoming lively, interesting and principled dialogue on the basic issues of the life of military collectives. That is, with each new accountability report from the leader, the people themselves grow.

And the last thing that I would like to say is the following.

As a rule, those people who constantly work with people are ready for the accountability report. I have in mind certain of the commanders and political workers already named. But the chiefs of the combat arms and services are having difficulty in abandoning the old methods of leadership and are unwilling to approach people. Unfortunately, the standards of management activity are not high. It seems to me that this depends largely on the ability of each leader not only to manage but also to give an account of himself to people about his own personal contribution to the common cause.

Security Policy Must Emphasize 'Balance of Interests,' Not 'Balance of Forces'
*18010307 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Dec 88 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Reserve Maj Gen L. Korzun, candidate of military sciences, under the "From the Position of Strength" rubric: "Algebra but Not Arithmetic"]

[Text] The balance of interests and the balance of forces: their nature, place and interrelationship—that is how the time is putting one of the most acute problems for the fate of mankind.

On the one hand, the experience of many centuries of history is, it would seem, unequivocal evidence of the fact that the security of a state is ensured primarily through military strength. And it has always been believed that the greater that strength, the better. But that was the arithmetic of security in the prenuclear age.

The nuclear age required a new political thinking and the realization of the fact that it is now impossible to ensure the security of some state or other through military strength alone, for the preservation of human civilization itself is threatened. And the very measurement of strength has now entered a new dimension, from quantitative to qualitative, or, figuratively speaking, from the realm of arithmetic to that of the algebra of international relations. To paraphrase a poet, let me say: it is now possible only through algebra to test the harmony of international relations and the degree of international security.

In recent years, proceeding from the new political thinking, the Soviet Union has been demonstrating precisely such an approach to the problems of the contemporary world. The speech of M.S. Gorbachev at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly was a clear demonstration of this.

The past history of humanity has been a history of wars everywhere that broke out because of the clash of social and political interests, national enmity, and ideological and religious incompatibility. Now as well, there are interests behind the differences in the social order, in the life style, and in the preference for some values or others. There is no escaping this. "But neither can one escape the requirement that a balance of interests be found on an international scope, which has become the condition for survival and progress," stressed M.S. Gorbachev.

It should be noted that attempts were made to search for a balance of interests in the past as well. In essence, all military-political alliances and coalitions were built and changed on this basis. Then, however, the foundation of such a search was primarily state or national egoism. Such an approach is now outdated.

The correctness of the conclusion that we have entered an epoch when the common human interest will be the basis for progress was confirmed very convincingly and emotionally by the reaction of the world community to the tragedy in Armenia. Now there can truly be no foreign pain for any nation on the globe, regardless of the many versions of social development. This is valid for countries with capitalist or socialist systems.

The formation of an interdependent and integral world is precisely the basis and firm foundation for finding and continuously maintaining a stable balance of international interests of all countries and all political systems. And this is equally characteristic for global and regional problems.

That part of the speech of the Soviet leader at the UN in which he spoke of the absolute necessity of the principle of freedom of choice evoked particular resonance in the world community. The nonrecognition of this principle is fraught with the most severe consequences for the entire world. Only under the condition that freedom of choice becomes the general rule can one count on achieving a stable preservation of the balance of interests of all members of the world community. It is just as important for this purpose to remove ideology from international relations.

Humanity sees how the Soviet Union is realizing these principles in its policy in its approaches to the ensuring of comprehensive international security, to Soviet-American relations, and to the resolution of European and regional problems. Let us look, for example, at the specific proposals for a political settlement in Afghanistan. The USSR proposed, in particular, a full cease-fire beginning 1 January 1989, with the opposing Afghan groups maintaining control over the territories that they occupy; the cessation of arms deliveries to all hostile sides; the sending of a contingent of UN forces to Afghanistan to keep the peace; and the organization of an international conference on the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan. At the same time, the Soviet Union readily responded to the proposals of the Government of Saudi Arabia on the holding of a meeting with representatives of the Afghan opposition. And such a meeting was held at Et-Taif (Saudi Arabia). The American newspaper "Washington Post" called it "unprecedented" and the West German newspaper "Die Welt" acknowledged the great success of Soviet policy.

The increased importance of the balance of interests and the necessity that they be found and supported naturally requires a review of the nature of the balance of forces and of the ways to achieve and maintain it. Although it must be noted that this balance certainly still has a role as one of the factors in guaranteeing the balance of interests.

Under contemporary conditions, the most concentrated expression of the balance of forces of the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO is the military

strategic parity between them. Its establishment was truly a historic achievement of socialism. Nor is there any doubt that the maintenance of parity right up to the achievement of general and total disarmament will be a serious factor in guaranteeing peace and international security.

The main problem, however, is what the upper limits or the level of this parity must be and how they are determined and whether a merely arithmetic approach is correct here.

Military strategic parity has existed for almost two decades. It can now be asserted that the levels of armaments for both sides, especially nuclear, have been determined with a huge, in a manner of speaking, "margin of reliability."

The levels of the overall balance of forces, especially in quantitative terms, have greatly exceeded the real requirements for ensuring security.

The reduction in the size of the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men and of a large quantity of conventional arms announced from the rostrum of the United Nations will not change the existing balance of forces. And it is not at all that the USSR and Warsaw Pact have significantly more power, as they assert in the West. One can argue about this question endlessly. By the way, Gen J. Galvin, supreme commander of the NATO Joint Forces in Europe, pointed out in the April 1988 issue of "Air Force Magazine" that in the last 6 months NATO

has carried out more than 160 studies on the balance of forces in Europe, the authors of which "did not come to a common opinion." The fact is that the levels of the balance of forces must now be determined not under the principle of superarmament but under the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

The turn to this principle also allowed the USSR to make a significant unilateral reduction of its armed forces. The English newspapers "Times" and "Guardian" write of a "new era" in connection with the Soviet decision. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sees it as an important step in the establishment of a balance of forces in Europe. All of this is good. But let me point out that disarmament and the systematic lowering of the level of the balance of forces must, however, be a two-way street. And we are still the only ones traveling on it.

The American journal "Time" wrote that the potential possibilities now opening up for positive changes in Soviet-American relations are challenging Washington's foreign policy and that "a new role has to be found for the United States in an international system whose nature even in the lifetime of our generation will no longer be determined in the customary framework of the struggle between East and West." Well, those are fair words. And they also apply in full to the European countries of NATO. For they are also interested in a more persistent search for a balance of interests.

The agenda now includes not the arithmetic of the balance of forces but the algebra of the search for a balance of interests.

**Chervov: Military 'Counting on Reciprocity' from
NATO**

*LD2101165489 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1536 GMT 21 Jan 89*

[“We Are Counting on Reciprocity From NATO”—
TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan (TASS)—The Soviet Union's unilateral steps not only lead to a significant reduction in its armed forces, but give them a nonoffensive character, Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, has said.

In a conversation with TASS diplomatic correspondent Vadim Biryukov, he stressed that the Soviet Government's decision on the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, which Mikhail Gorbachev delivered at the United Nations on 7 December 1988, is a most important event which influences many aspects of the life of the human community. That reduction is very significant: The numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces will be cut by 500,000 men in the next 2 years. In Europe, 10,000 tanks will be withdrawn from the territory of the socialist countries. We are dealing precisely with those arms which have caused particular anxiety in the West. “Five-thousand-three-hundred of the most modern tanks are being withdrawn from the groups of troops,” General Chervov noted.

Of the 10,000 tanks, half will be physically liquidated, and the remainder will be converted into tractors for civilian needs and training vehicles. What is more, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft are subject to reduction in the European part of the USSR and on the territory of the socialist countries.

“It is exceptionally important that such a significant reduction in Soviet armed forces will take place with a simultaneous restructuring so as to give them a nonoffensive structure,” said General Chervov. “The divisions which remain for the meantime on the territories of our allies are being reformed. More than 3,000 tanks are being removed from their composition. At the same time, airborne and river-crossing formations and units with their equipment and technology are being withdrawn from the troop groups.”

Tactical nuclear weapons are also included among the armaments being withdrawn from Central Europe. “This is the key issue,” stressed General Chervov. The Warsaw Treaty countries have already on several occasions proposed to NATO talks on reducing and subsequently eliminating tactical nuclear armaments in Europe, including their nuclear components. “The elimination of tactical weapons in Europe is a ripe problem,” said the general. “Its solution corresponds to the interests of strengthening the security of all countries. The withdrawal from Central Europe of a certain quantity of

Soviet tactical nuclear means, which was declared in Vienna by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, is a sort of ‘contribution to the piggy-bank’ of those future talks.”

“We are not refining existing tactical nuclear missile systems, no substitution is being made of some kinds of these armaments by others which are more modern, and their quantity is not growing,” noted General Chervov. “By agreeing to this, we are naturally counting on reciprocity on the part of NATO. We are convinced that by step-by-step reduction, elimination, and rejection of the modernization of nuclear arms, it is possible to attain the goal which was proclaimed in the Soviet program for stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament that was advanced on 15 January 1986.”

Polish Unilateral Troop Cut Announcement

Praised

*52000004 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
6 Jan 89 p 3*

[Commentary by Vladimir Solovyev: “NATO Is in No Hurry”]

[Text] After the unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces, the number of people wearing military uniforms on our continent will be reduced by 500,000. The figure will be higher for the reason alone that the armed forces of yet another member of the Warsaw Pact has been reduced by nearly 15,000 men.

According to the PAP News Agency, in the final days of 1988 the Defense Committee of the Polish People's Republic passed a number of important resolutions on the reorganization of the republic's Armed Forces and the reorientation of the capacities of a number of military industry plants to meet the needs of the national economy and a reduction in the share of defense expenditures from 7 to 5.5 percent of the state budget. Two mechanized divisions and several aviation and artillery units have been deactivated and some combat ordnance has been removed from operational status.

This decision is a strong confirmation of the firm intention of the socialist countries to structure their defense on the basis of the principles of sensible sufficiency. Unquestionably, this step will trigger many responses and comments. It is anticipated that there will be total unity in assessing the contributory factors to this new step taken by the Polish government. It indicates changes in the political atmosphere in Europe thanks to the peace-making activities of the USSR and the other fraternal countries and the strengthening of confidence on the continent, particularly under the influence of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, which marked the beginning of real disarmament.

Let us note the following feature: The unilateral actions taken by the USSR and the Polish People's Republic were taken against the background of consultations

between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on formulating the framework [mandat] of the future talks on conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe. However, although the Western side has welcomed in words the reduction in the level of military confrontation, it is in no hurry whatsoever to add its own figures to the new "500 + 15" formula. Such a stance hardly contributes to enhancing the weight of its peace-loving declarations.

Second: By making a goodwill gesture, the socialist countries do not intend in the least to disarm themselves down to a point which would threaten their security. In the spirit of the new thinking, the only objective is to strengthen our common European home. Experience has proved that stockpiles of weapons do not strengthen security. Those who claim that peace can be preserved through force should think about this.

Rebuttal of Western Views on New Soviet Military Doctrine

18010368 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Feb 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Rodachin, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Why the Orwellian Language Here?"]

[Text] The names of the British writer George Orwell, and his book 1984, are still little known to Soviet readers. But it is known that this novel describes a totalitarian society where a special language is in use, a language of opposites: "freedom is slavery," "truth is lie," "peace is war," etc.

Such a substitution of concepts corresponds fully to the logic of totalitarianism, and, therefore, does not cause any particular surprise in the novel. Attempts by some in the West to equate the language of the new political thinking, taken by the Soviet Union, with so-called "Orwellian language," are astonishing.

This technique is used especially often when speaking about Soviet military doctrine. In its defensive aims, which reflect the political will of the Soviet people for peace and the defense of socialism, some Western theoreticians attempt to find a meaning that is exactly the opposite of the truth. Here is a sample of this approach. "With the aid of a 'new language' in the spirit of Orwell," writes West German sovietologist (G. Vetting), the Soviet side contrives, by the very same words to different addressees, to say different things. The whole military doctrine of the USSR, he discloses his thought, is nothing other than an embodiment of the thesis: "defense is offense." The Soviet military, writes (G. Vetting), views the defense merely as a forced method of military actions, or as secondary, capable "either of supporting an offensive in other sectors, or of laying the basis for a transition to offensive actions." At the same time, the concept of "defense" serves, in his words, as a convenient propaganda form, called upon to lull the vigilance of the West.

For the sake of fairness, we note that the article by (G. Vetting) was published in April 1987, at a time when the publication of individual postulates of the defensive in principle Soviet military doctrine may have caused false impressions about its essence. But even then it had nothing in common with the "aggressiveness" supposedly inherent to socialism. Modifications of doctrinal postulates undertaken since then—acknowledgement of the impossibility of victory in nuclear war; accent on the defense as the main type of combat action; reliance on intelligent sufficiency and qualitative parameters of military construction, and others—seemingly deprived the anti-Soviets of soil for speculations in the spirit of Vetting.

Unfortunately, this did not take place. Even against the background of Western public opinion, with approval of the responsive decision by the Soviet Union on unilateral reduction of its Armed Forces, the pressure of hostile fabrications about Soviet military doctrine is still noticeable. In "Mandate for Leadership - III," recently published by the American Heritage Foundation, intended for new President George Bush, the peaceloving Soviet initiatives are evaluated as nothing other than "a more refined challenge to the West."

(G. Sherr) was even more frank on the pages of the London TIMES. He was not reticent to write that "unilateral actions and agreements on arms may, under the guise of reductions, turn into modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces." And Soviet military strategy, in his opinion, depends "not so much on numerical superiority, as on the offensive nature of its force deployment and structure. Even if the Warsaw Treaty Organization implements deeper reductions than those Gorbachev proposed, NATO will not have any special capability to stop a conventional attack."

Thus, Soviet initiatives continue to be interpreted from positions of "Orwellian language:" "disarmament is armament," and "defense is offense." It can be seen from all this that sovietologists of the neo-conservative strain do not wish to reckon with realities, if they contradict preconceptions about the "Soviet military threat." You cannot pay the bills with realities, and exploitation of the image of the "communist enemy" has always been a rather profitable enterprise in the West. Many many people, in the words of American writer N. Mailer, have made a career on this. And if they are deprived of the idea that communism is evil, "they will be confronted with real problems. They will lose their bearings."

Truly, how in this case can the need to maintain watchfulness and distrust toward everything that comes from the other side be explained to the public? How can the increase in budget allocations for military purposes that has again been noted be justified, in view of the unilateral actions by the USSR, GDR, Poland, Hungary, CSSR and People's Republic of Bulgaria, to reduce weapons and the level of defense expenditures? The draft budget

for Fiscal Year 1990 that has been proposed to the U. S. Congress, provides for an increase in Pentagon expenditures to \$315.2 billion. The FRG military budget will increase 3.8 percent to DM 53.3 billion. France's military expenditures will increase 4.6 percent in 1989 to 182.8 billion francs. According to a report by the American-British Council on Defense Information, "NATO's New Nuclear Weapons," published in London, by 1995 the NATO bloc countries intend to deploy twice as many nuclear warheads in Europe as were to be eliminated in accordance with the Intermediate and Shorter Range Missile Treaty. In Great Britain alone, the number of American nuclear warheads may increase from today's 775 to 1,193. The program for building up NATO's conventional weapons is being implemented at full speed. Their overall military capability is to triple by the year 2000!

Distortion of the content and meaning of Soviet military doctrine is engendered, and, as long as the influential imperialist "military party" exists, will be engendered in the future, by its own militaristic aspirations. The conclusions of the ideologues of this "party" always derived, and will derive, not from the real content of our doctrine, but from their own ideological and political purposes. With such an approach, both open and veiled falsifications are inevitable. Characteristic in this regard are the manipulations that, as they apply to Soviet military doctrine, take place with the concepts of "defense" and "offense," and with the characteristics of a "defensive" and an "offensive" strategy. They attempt to prove, in particular, that one excludes the other; that a doctrine that acknowledges the possibility of offensive actions cannot be defensive. And since this is so, no matter how the Soviets renovate their doctrine, it still remains offensive, and consequently aggressive.

In this effort, a little-noticed substitution of concepts is taking place. The purely military, operational-tactical term "offense" [nastupleniye] is being presented not only as a political category, which defines the nature of a war, but even as a specific variety of war—aggression. Once this is done it is already easy to alter in one's own way the essence of Soviet military doctrine.

Such an approach is impermissible. Military science has already long shown the failure of equating the nature of doctrine with one or another type of military action. Even Klauswitz wrote in this regard: "Whether I make a battle in this theater of war that is either offensive or defensive in nature, it does not change matters."

The nature of military doctrine is determined by the policy of a state, by the interests and objectives that it pursues. For the Soviet state these are the tasks of preventing war altogether, eliminating it from the life of society, and ensuring the stable security of our country and its allies. Acknowledgement of the possibility of offensive troop actions, if war is nonetheless foisted upon us, does not change the defensive essence of our doctrine. During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet army used extensively both defensive and offensive operations, and not only on its territory, but also on the territory of other countries. Nevertheless, its doctrine, in contrast to that of the Wehrmacht, was defensive and not aggressive. It is impossible to imagine how, without offense, the forces of the aggressor could have been thrown out of the occupied territories, and peace returned to the peoples.

The practice of restructuring of Soviet society and its foreign policy is giving more and more new arguments for confirming the defensive nature of our military doctrine. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan is being completed. The Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles is being implemented. Reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces over a two year period by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat airplanes has been announced. Restructuring, not verbally but in deeds, is convincing the peoples of all the world that Soviet military doctrine is written not in "Orwellian language," but in the language of candor and peace. An ever increasing part of the population of the Western countries is ceasing to believe in the "Soviet military threat." But, it is precisely this that is causing alarm to the adherents of the "party of war," and is prompting them to resort to new falsifications.

Obituary Maj Gen I.N. Rogatin
18010370 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 89 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article entitled "I.N. Rogatin"]

[Excerpts] Major General (ret) Ivan Nikolayevich Rogatin has died after a prolonged illness. ...entered the ranks of the Communist Party in 1943.

I.N. Rogatin was born in 1928 in Bogoyavlensk in Tambov oblast. He began service in the Soviet Army in 1941 ... During the years of the Great patriotic War he took part in combat operations on the Voronezh, 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

In the post-war years he occupied responsible positions in the political organs of military districts and the central apparatus of the political directorate of the ground forces. ...

[Signed]

A.D. Lizichev, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, M.D. Popkov, V.S. Rodin, V.A. Silakov, L.L. Batekhin, V.I. Panin, Yu.S. Dortshev, A.V. Skoryy, V.I. Arkhipov.

Editorial Review on Problem of Raising Prestige of Military Service
18010304b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Nov 88 p 2

[Editorial article under "Review of Letters" rubric: "By Their Merits..."; first paragraph is boxed introduction]

[Text] How to raise the prestige of military service and how to induce violators of discipline to reexamine their attitude toward the performance of their military duty while at the same time restoring social justice—these were the questions raised by Lt Col I. Pribytkov, who served in the Turkestan Military District, in the article "By Their Merits..." published in "Krasnaya Zvezda" on 11 September 1988. The author proposes that an evaluation of the job performance of all compulsory-service personnel be entered in their military service card in the column "Special Remarks" when they are discharged to the reserves.

This article evoked the interest of the readers of "Krasnaya Zvezda." Representatives of practically all categories of service members from the ordinary soldier to the unit commander mailed in their responses to it. Also responding were the workers of military commissariats, military training officers and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. The responses are continuing to come in even today, despite the fact that 2 months have passed since the time of the publication of the article. Many readers think that Lt Col I. Pribytkov is quite right and that it is high time to restore justice: indeed, the soldier who honorably and conscientiously served his 2 years and the one who violated military discipline and

was careless about his service duties find themselves in the same position upon returning home and enjoy the same privileges. Is this right?

"I think that the existing system, under which soldiers discharged to the reserves enjoy equal rights and privileges regardless of how they served is defective," writes Reserve Capt S. Chernykh from Odessa. "It is important that the people in 'civilian life' know who has joined their labor collective and how this person performed his duty to the Motherland," says Jr Sgt A. Gorlov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in his letter to the editor's office. "The army simply needs social protection against all kinds of barracks hooligans tired of serving with 'grandfathers,' who hinder the service of decent boys, breaking down the military collective through their behavior and negative attitude toward service"—such is the opinion of Maj A. Morozov, who serves in the Siberian Military District.

This is more or less the point of view of F. Bakhrameyev from Perm Oblast; reserve officer B. Kharitonov from Altayskiy Kray; the political officer Capt Yu. Chuprin, who served in the Baltic Military District; the personnel of a military construction detachment, in whose name Maj V. Khrushch signed a letter to the editor's office; Lt Col A. Vysotskiy, secretary of the party committee of one of the units of the Central Asian Military District; and many others.

The readers of the newspaper also support the opinion of the article's author that the system he is proposing will work only when it is put on an official basis. About this, in particular, write the deputy company commander for a guard political unit, Lt M. Kalinin from the Northern Group of Forces, and G. Dontsov from Volgograd. Capt I. Melnikov, who served in the Belorussian Military District, thinks that it is necessary to have an order from the USSR defense minister prescribing the inclusion of an evaluation of the performance of the servicemen in the column "Special Remarks" of the military service card. "It is necessary to make the proper amendments and additions to the Law on the General Military Obligation," thinks Maj O. Dorogan from Ural Military District.

Some of the readers, developing the idea of the article's author on the necessity of restoring social justice, put forward specific proposals on how one should deal with soldiers who did not serve in the army conscientiously. "I propose that such people be deprived of privileges" (Sr Warrant Officer V. Ivlev, Baltic Military District); "If you spent 10 days in the stockade, you will serve 10 days longer; if you did not master your specialty, serve until you do..." (Maj A. Utkin, Siberian Military District); "The service time should not be counted in the total work time for negligent servicemen" (Capt Lt S. Napaskin, Baltic Fleet).

The readers also pointed out that it is not enough merely to make a comment on the service in the military service card. "Let them at home, in production and in the educational institution find out from the notation in the military service card how the soldier served" (Maj G. Ilyintsev, Moscow Military District); "The main thing is that the notations in the military service card reach interested persons: the military commissariat, the educational institution, the Komsomol committee, etc." (Reserve Capt A. Nazarov, Lipetsk); "Do not employ or enroll in an educational institution a serviceman discharged to the reserves without his military service card and notes in the 'Special Comments' column" (Lt Col V. Dupleyev, North Caucasus Military District).

Col V. Bondarenko from Moscow proposes an entire system of measures aimed at realizing the assessment given the soldier for the time of his service. He believes, in particular, that it has become necessary to establish committees under the local soviets of people's deputies to work with the families of members of the military in compulsory service, which would take special control of the granting of privileges existing for these families in accordance with the quality of the soldier's service. The author of the suggestion thinks that one should introduce advantages for those soldiers whose service is certified as good or excellent in accepting them for work and giving them monetary loans for the support of their families, the building of an individual house, etc. The letter of Col V. Bondarenko also includes a number of specific proposals.

Thus, many readers who became familiar with the article of Lt Col I. Pribytkov "By Their Merits...", as was already said, share the position of the author. Many, but not all.

"My opinion is sharply negative," writes N. Gribanov from Vorenzh Oblast, "under the guise of good intentions, it is proposed to put labels on those who have completed their compulsory service and to make notes in their military service card that compromises them for life. It is necessary to stop this crime immediately. Where is I. Pribytkov's disciplinary practice leading? To despotism...." The worker A. Vasilkov from Luginskiy Military Commissariat in Zhitomir Oblast: "...who gave the unit command the right to put a brand on a person, even a negligent person, that will follow him until the age of 50, the time when he is removed from the military rolls?" From the letter of the inhabitant of Vinnitsa Oblast V. Danilenko: "The commanders and superior officers of all grades and party and Komsomol organizations must organize the educational work in the Armed Forces of the USSR so that no one will have to rack his brains about what to write in the military service card." "I see in this the striving of some persons in authority to cover themselves with paper and to turn away from a realistic assessment of the life and service of the subordinate. For you must admit that it is hardly possible to summarize 2 years of service in two or three suggestions. And the opinion of the commander may be subjective,"

thinks Maj V. Plotnikov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Pvt S. Sheporda sent a letter from that same group: "The merits are, after all, different. Sometimes a comrade does not distinguish himself in any way but is always in good standing, because he knows how to be one of the commander's favorites. Are there really no sergeants distant from their subordinates, who get things done only through shouting and reprimands? In the eyes of the commander, on the other hand, they are efficient, energetic and exemplary. Of course, they have very good entries in their military service cards. I am against them." G. Abakumova from Kesimov, Reserve Maj G. Takhmazov from Azerbaijan and several others are against notes as a form of evaluating the soldier's service.

As is apparent from the letters presented here, the opinions of the readers of "Krasnaya Zvezda" on the suggestions contained in the article by Lt Col I. Pribytkov "By Their Merits..." not only differ in some ways but at times are diametrically opposed to each other. Well, everyone has a right to his own point of view. One cannot fail to notice, however, that with all the differences in their opinions the readers of the newspaper agree on one thing: it is necessary to raise the prestige of military service and the responsibility for the performance of the soldier's duty. Thus, we have a right to say that in the final analysis it is merely a matter of the form of realizing the approach to the evaluation of military service.

We asked Lt Gen Ivan Vasilyevich Matveyev, chief of one of the directorates of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, to comment on the mail of "Krasnaya Zvezda."

It was with interest that I familiarized myself with the responses to the article "By Their Merits..." I share the opinion of those who think that an objective evaluation of the military labor of each serviceman is essential and plays a key educational role. Nevertheless, I do not think that it is necessary to write the service evaluation in the military service card.

The supporters of Lt Col I. Pribytkov assume that such a measure raises the responsibility of servicemen in compulsory service for the zealous performance of their duties, will exert a certain positive influence on the strengthening of military discipline and will cause many of them to give thought to how they will be accepted in labor collectives and educational institutions after they are discharged to the reserves.

I agree: it will do that. But in education we do not rely on fear but on the conscientiousness and conscience of the young person. To think and act otherwise is to be guided by the obsolete methods of administrative control and intimidation of soldiers and sergeants, which conflicts with the nature of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The thought arises that if the military service and educational work of commanders and political officers did not have the proper effect on the serviceman, then will he not want to "lose" his military service card with the negative assessment of service?

And now about the juridical side of the question. The proposed system of rating those being discharged to the reserves contradicts legislation now in effect.

Decree No 231 of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers dated 25 February 1960 "On Measures to Eliminate Formalistic Bureaucratic Distortions in Registering Working People for Work and in Resolving the Everyday Needs of Citizens" prohibits requiring various kinds of information and recommendations not established by legislation.

In accordance with Decree No 656 of the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU dated 6 September 1973, it is prohibited to record punitive actions against workers and employees in their labor books. And all of this applies equally to military records, including the military service card. It is also quite legitimate to point out that the procedure for filling out the military service card is strictly regulated by the corresponding normative documents and no one is permitted to change this procedure.

As we see, the organizers of the experiment violated the existing rules for filling out and maintaining military records.

The concern of the authors of the letters with the state of military discipline is understandable. But the proposed notations in the military service cards will hardly help to strengthen it substantially. We can achieve much more by skillfully and thoughtfully utilizing the legalized forms of providing moral incentives for honorable service.

The army and navy have the practice of giving references on individual servicemen discharged to the reserves upon request by the corresponding organizations. The command of the units gives recommendations, referrals and ratings to the best servicemen expressing the desire to enter VUZ's and secondary special educational institutions after being discharged to the reserves. These give them a preferential right in beginning their studies as well as the right to noncompetitive enrollment.

In addition, it is necessary to make wider use of such a form of encouraging personnel as informing relatives and the place of work or study prior to the induction of the soldier into military service about his exemplary performance of his military obligation.

Chief of Administrative Directorate on Legal Reform

*18010304a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Nov 88 Second Edition pp 1-2*

[Interview with Maj Gen L. Ivashov, chief of the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, by unnamed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Strengthening the Authority of Law: Interview on a Current Subject"; first two paragraphs are introduction in boxed material]

[Text] Being guided by the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the country is beginning to realize a legal reform. This will inevitably evoke changes in the legal provision of the army and navy. Their final objective is the formation of a military organism that corresponds to our ideas on the armed forces of a socialist state under the rule of law.

What place is being assigned to the legal service in the coming reform? How are the judge advocates helping the command and political officers improve legal work? This was the subject of a conversation between our correspondent and Maj Gen L. Ivashov, chief of the Administrative Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Correspondent] In their letters, some of which were published, the readers of "Krasnaya Zvezda" are making many suggestions on the necessity of the active renewal of military legislation and the revision of many normative documents that are obsolete and out-of-date. What do you think about these suggestions?

[Ivashov] A decisive renewal of military legislation is doubtless necessity, above all so that the law works fully for perestroika and has a beneficial effect on the development of military service relations, which, as you know, are regulated in particular detail. We have already been able to implement some things.

For the first time in the history of the development of the Soviet military, a Manual on Legal Work in the Soviet Army and Navy and a Legal Minimum for the Officer have been put into effect. They are acts called upon to govern the activities of officers in the strict framework of legality. The positions of senior instructors-legal consultants (instructors) have been established in the military educational institutions. This was done with the objective of helping to raise the quality of the legal training of students and cadets. Work has begun on revising military legal acts that do not meet contemporary requirements. More than 500 such documents are to be updated in the near future and this is to be done in such a way as to reduce their number significantly.

New general military regulations and a draft Law on the Defense of the USSR are being formulated and military penal legislation is being improved. The draft Position

on the Assembly of Officers—one of the new forms of participation of the members of the army and navy in the affairs of military collectives—is being discussed in the units and on ships.

[Correspondent] It appears that today one can speak of the growing importance of legal work and of the subunits of the legal service?

[Ivashov] Precisely so. The jurists are helping the commanders and political officers to make proper use of legal means to strengthen military and labor discipline and to ensure the integrity of socialist property and the strict statutory organization of the life and activities of units and subunits. And several innovations were tested. And in those combined units of the Moscow Military District, for example, where judge advocates are working on an experimental basis, there has been a noticeable strengthening of legality and a reduction of the number of infringements of the law and complaints that servicemen are not being provided with what they should have.

Or take this example.... Lt Col of Justice A. Sukhorukov, chief of the naval legal service, has already been working for several months in the special group for the political administration of the North Fleet. Under the recommendations of the group, the navy is improving the selection of candidates for senior positions and they are activating public work aimed at eradicating nonstatutory relations among servicemen.

Jurists in the military administrative bodies are helping the command in performing work on contracts, grievances and claims, in working with letters and in receiving visitors. For example, Lt Col of Justice G. Dzhigero, senior legal consultant in the directorate of the chief of the chemical troops, personally participates in presenting claims and grievances to suppliers, seeing to it that they are fully satisfied, including through State Arbitration. In this way, losses amounting to almost 600,000 rubles were compensated last year alone.

Military jurists take an active part in the legal educational process: they carry out exercises with officials and personnel, work up manuals and instructions on the application of particular legal positions, and examine the officer's legal minimum. It must be said right out, however, that by no means everywhere do the subunits of the legal service resolve the tasks assigned to them with the necessary quality and persistence.

[Correspondent] In a word, as everywhere in the country, it is necessary to search more actively and to experiment, in short—to look ahead....

[Ivashov] But it is also useful to look back. By the way, I want to take this opportunity to point out that during these days our legal service completes 70 years of existence. We have considerable experience and Leninist traditions in the development of the socialist state order. This is also valid with respect to military development.

The formation of the juridical subunits in the administrative apparatus of the young Red Army was basically finished by the fall of 1918. Such subunits began to be established simultaneously in the directorates of the fronts and provincial military commissariats. A Military Legislative Council operated under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) and the administrative directorate of the RVSR had a codification section and a claims division. All of this contributed to the high level of legal services for military development.

As early as the end of 1918, the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] affirmed the first general military regulations of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]: routine and garrison duties and, in January 1919, the Disciplinary Regulations of the RKKA. They formulated and put into operation a Law on Compulsory Military Service, a Code on Exemptions and Privileges for Servicemen and Their Family Members, the order of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] "On the Introduction of One-Man Command in the RKKA," and many other acts that for the first time in world practice regulated military relations under the conditions of the socialist state.

Alas, everything changed under the pressure of the arbitrary administrative of the leadership. The legal service was one of the first to feel that.

Many valuable and interesting initiatives and plans were forgotten. Thus, in 1924, Soviet military science drew the fundamentally important conclusion on the necessity of increasing independence and expanding the rights of officials at the regimental echelon. The administration of the regiment, wrote M.N. Tukhachevskiy, "suffers from primitive organization here." But this alarming thought did not become the subject of military legal studies and did not become standardized. And the old standard frameworks were in effect with respect to the powers of regimental officials up to the very entrance into the Great Patriotic War, restraining their independence and initiative.

It remains to be said that in the postwar years there continued to be less attention paid to questions in the legal regulation of social relations in the state, which, of course, affected the state of legal work in the armed forces. Weak subunits of the legal service remained only in some main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In the army and navy, there was increasing disregard for laws, regulations and orders and legal nihilism. This, in turn, gave rise to such negative phenomena as irresponsibility, deception, abuse of official positions, protectionism and nonstatutory interrelationships among servicemen. Many of these problems exist today, as was noted at the meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee Politburo on 13 October 1988.

[Correspondent] Probably because the current level of legal work in the army and navy clearly does not yet meet the increased requirements?

[Ivashov] Not only for that reason. Today we are feeling especially clearly the lack of legal knowledge and legal culture in our command cadres. Every year hundreds of orders of commanders and superior officers are protested and rescinded because they do not conform to legislation. Losses from spoilage, waste and pilferage of property remain high. In a number of combined units and units, the work with letters and the reception of visitors is unsatisfactory, as a result of which the servicemen and their families write and visit Moscow, even though most of the requests can certainly be resolved locally.

Finally, there simply are few jurists in the forces. It is high time for commanders and superior officers to have dependable helpers for legal work.

In addition, it is the urgent need of the time that every serviceman, worker and employee have the real possibility of getting the proper legal advice from a specialist when it is needed. But the non-T/O legal consultations set up in the garrisons cannot always help them in a qualified manner.

[Correspondent] Do you think that all the problems will be resolved with the introduction of legal advisers?

[Ivashov] By no means. The resolution of the mentioned problems is seen in two directions. It must be a matter of improving the legal training of military cadres and of strengthening the role of the legal service. To a considerable degree, the effectiveness of the work of jurists in military administrative bodies depends upon their legal position. One ought to determine more precisely their interrelationships both with officials as well as with public organizations.

Unfortunately, the role and place of the judge advocate in the developing perestroika and expansion of democratic principles and glasnost in the army and navy have not yet been determined clearly enough—just as in the legislative process affecting the questions of defense and military development.

The critical and interesting time of renewal is presenting new tasks to the judge advocates of the USSR Ministry of Defense and demands new solutions and bold initiatives.

Responding to Parents' Overconcern for Welfare of Draftees

18010308 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Nov 88 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Lt Col A. Mikhailevskiy: "Why Give the Soldier 100 Rubles?"]

[Text] This headline has already appeared in "Krasnaya Zvezda" on 11 August and 15 September of this year—initially over my report from Odessa Military District and

then over the first responses to it. Altogether more than 100 letters came in. By the way, there were whole columns of signatures under some of them, so that many were deeply touched.

I remind you: it was mainly a matter of the fact that some parents pamper their soldier sons too much, sending them 100, 200, 300 or more rubles a month, and that the good motives of parents frequently produce the opposite reaction and lead to negative consequences. Another aspect was also noted: the too-frequent visits of parents to their soldier sons, accompanied by immoderate manifestations of "concern" about their wallet and stomach, are undesirable both from the point of view of the interests of the service and frequently of the soldier sons themselves.

In this context, some readers of "Krasnaya Zvezda" are interested in my rights, above all moral, to discuss these subjects. The mother of the soldier T. Prokopenko asks: "Dear comrade author, were you ever in a soldier's mess hall? Apparently you were not." She is seconded by Pvt A. Kadash: "It would be interesting to know whether this Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailevskiy ever served in the compulsory service. I am certain that he did not." Following elementary logic, the readers themselves answer him: I. Ugnya from Nebit-Dag, Lt Col V. Shultsas and N. Shevtsov from Tsyurupinsk in Kherson Oblast, and M. Kholodova. They point out one is not born a lieutenant colonel, that they are made, going through all stages of service growth.

Yes, so it is. I began my service as a private at a very remote rocket "point." Our barracks was not among the most up-to-date and the "government mush" was quite ordinary. So, in thinking about the everyday life of the soldier, I recall my youth and measure everything against my personal experience.

Some of the authors of the responses are convinced that the soldiers are not well fed in the army and, so that their sons do not go hungry, they consider it their duty to send them a sizeable sum for sustenance on a regular basis. Here, for example, is what A. Tsygankov from Moscow writes: "Again, about the mess hall. I want to say that not all of the boys are the same, someone might grab a larger piece and someone else goes half hungry." What can be said about this? I have been wearing shoulder boards for more than 20 years and I give you my word of honor that I never once saw anything like that. On the contrary, I saw something else. When I was a soldier, we took our food at large tables intended for 10 men. Everything at such a table was divided into 10 portions. The political officer Major Batanov told us: "Don't try to take a morsel more, you will gain a gram but lose for your entire life." And the biggest piece in our battery went to the one who was the last to take his portion.

Many responses came in from combat veterans. The main idea was that the nation provided our army and navy with everything necessary even in the hungriest and

most destructive years. Then why speak of the present day? "This is not the harsh year of 1941 and I do not think that the Soviet soldier is going hungry," writes Pyatakova from Moscow, who recently visited her son when he took the oath. "Our children fed us in their mess hall. Everything was very tasty and filling."

Disagreeing with the judgments of the mother of the soldier T. Prokopenko were veterans of the Great Patriotic War I. Kovalev (Slavyansk) and G. Samoylov (Rovno), former tank officer L. Leontyev (Pavlodar), veteran of labor O. Morozova (Tbilisi), Reserve Lt Col A. Ulayev (Yenakiyevo), A. Kozyak (Belya Tserkov), the Kitayev family from Dzhankoy, the mechanic V. Yefifantsev (Volgograd Oblast), the veteran of the civil and Great Patriotic wars G. Troyan, retired Lt Gen P. Chirkov, and others.

I cannot help but include the letter of Capt A. Skumatov: "Dear Comrade Prokopenko, mother of a soldier, your words surprised me: 'Now you hear of just about everything—there are beatings and the older men mock the younger ones. And many serve in a 'cosy place' because of their connections.' Involuntarily the question arises: Did you see all of this? If not, how can you judge by hearsay: someone somewhere said something. Yes, there are monsters in the family as well. But the army is a large family and we are fighting against such phenomena. But you cannot write about this indiscriminately."

Reserve Maj V. Kulinich (Lisichansk) recalls that the standard daily rations are scientifically based and that the preparation of meals is controlled by physicians, duty officers and ultimately by commanders.... So that there is no reason for concern when the established order is observed. But let us not flatter ourselves too much: there certainly are poor soldiers' mess halls. This, by the way, was also noted by the authors of the letters. "It may very well be that the unit in which Prokopenko serves really does feed the men poorly. But one should not generalize from an individual case," writes Maj G. Butmalay (Carpathian Military District). There are various reasons for this: poor control over food preparation, low skills of the soldier cook, not enough produce in the pot.

An extremely specific approach to the problem is taken by privates V. Chernykh, R. Lipinskikh and V. Shumov, who sent their own calculations to the editor's office to illustrate how much money a soldier needs to satisfy his daily needs. For each leave to the city, 13 rubles 50 kopecks are needed, for a daily total of 39-40 rubles. Well, it is obvious that when the state becomes richer there will also be an increase in the pay of soldiers. Nevertheless, I want to ask: Do you not think, fellows, that 13 rubles 50 kopecks is quite a lot for one leave? Remember your own recent civilian life. I doubt that each excursion to town cost you that much.

"Parents must remember to be reasonable about the size of their money remittances and their frequency," writes Lt Col A. Uskov, deputy political section chief of one of

the combined units. "We in the political section made an analysis of the remittances received and became convinced that most papas and mamas do not coddle their sons. But there are extreme cases that cause surprise, when the soldier or sergeant gets a remittance of 700, 800 or even 1,000 rubles." Opposing these extremes are V. Kovtomyuk (Lvov Oblast); Lt Col A. Vysotskiy, secretary of a unit party committee; Yu. Kozhukhov (Angarsk); N. Shestakov (Leningrad Oblast); the soldier's mother N. Petrishcheva (Stavropolskiy Kray); and the veterans of the Great Patriotic War P. Vinokurov (Yalta), P. Mezhuyev (Berdiansk) and I. Altunin (Kustanay Oblast). "To go to a tea room every day—that is a resort and not the service!" exclaims Sr Lt of the Reserves N. Kovtun (Kustanay). S. Bistiyakin (Primorskiy Kray) and Maj of the Reserves V. Guziychuk (Groznyy) are disturbed by the fact that the prices in soldiers' tea rooms are not always affordable to the soldier. Frequently they are right. There are cases when the woman in charge of the tea room intentionally brings in expensive candy or pastries instead of inexpensive ones to fulfill the plan more easily.

"Someone receiving 100 or 200 rubles is not going to wash his own socks," writes Ye. Guzhevaya (Vladivostok), "he will make a young soldier do this." For one soldier's abundance of money and another's lack of it create social inequality in the barracks with all of the resulting consequences. But who sends money to orphans? readers ask. Or to children of poor families? What are they, second-class people? They sometimes consider themselves as such in comparison with those with full pockets.

The pensioner A. Lopatiyeva (from Yel'sk in Gomel Oblast) sent a sad letter to the editor's office. "I have been reading your newspaper for 5 years since my grandson perished in Afghanistan. I read every article and cry over them. One day I observed the following scene in Gomel: three soldiers were taking turns eating a package of ice cream. I bought three packages of ice cream and brought it to them. They would not take it. I began to cry and said: take it, my grandson was killed in Afghanistan. Only then did they take it and said thank you, dear grandmother, we share your grief."

That was a very sincere and moving letter. Does it happen that a soldier cannot find any small change in his pockets? It does. And not only, by the way, to soldiers. In this situation, however, they do not consider themselves deprived. The service is an austere masculine existence and a test of character, when one must be able to deny himself in some areas.

Well, let us finally turn to the last burning and very delicate question: Is it worthwhile for parents to visit their soldier sons frequently? I do not know how it is in other districts, but during the summer in the Odessa District there is literally a pilgrimage to the gates of some units. The parents come to the Black Sea for recreation and visit their sons while there. Of course they bring

whole baskets full of gifts, fill the boys' pockets full of money, and pester the commanders with requests: give our son leave right away, and later several more times.

Not everyone will agree with me but personally I am in favor of parents not abusing frequent visits. Well, it is enough if they came to the taking of the oath and perhaps again after that. This, by the way, is how many readers who responded to the report think. In particular, V. Rzhevskiy from Kalmykiya, I. Kot (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast), V. Dikushev (Gorkiy), I. Getman (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast) and N. Slyusarenko (Cherkassy). There are also those who are more categorical. "The army is not a school with a long day and is certainly by no means a Pioneer camp. It is important for the moms at home to wait for their sons. The service time will not be shortened by their visits," writes V. Protasov from Irkutsk. V. Sychevskiy from Cherkassy, for example, favors the parents coming only with the permission of the commander.

What a range of opinions....

Let us summarize the conversation. The mail has shown that the overwhelming majority of the readers of "Krasnaya Zvezda" take a firm position: soldier sons should not be spoiled too much by absurdly large monetary "subsidies" and unreasonably frequent visits. Extreme actions are indeed contraindicated here.

Gontar Answers Aviation Week on Magnetic, Microwave Weapons
18010329 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Maj Gen F. Gontar: "The Arms Race"]

[Text] *An article appeared recently in the American magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY that asserted, without any grounds or proof whatsoever, the "development" of electromagnetic and frequency (microwave) arms supposedly intended for practical application in the European theater of combat operations.*

There is no doubt that this latest fabrication on the development of a new type of weapon in the Soviet Union was put into circulation for extremely specific purposes. First, to justify in the eyes of public opinion the broad-scale scientific-research and experimental-design work on the creation of microwave weaponry that is underway in the United States by assignment of the Pentagon. Second, to cast a shadow over the efforts being undertaken by the Soviet side to avert the transfer of the arms race to new types based on principles of physics not utilized earlier. It is well known, after all, that Soviet proposals on this score have long been under consideration within the framework of the United Nations, beginning in 1975. They were affirmed in the well-known Declaration of M.S. Gorbachev of 15 Jan 86.

Facts reported in the American press testify to the fact that practical work on the creation of microwave weaponry is being conducted in the United States according to the assignments of the Defense Department. The magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT of May 9 of this year noted that the Pentagon is conducting experiments with high-capacity microwave systems able to knock out enemy equipment via "cooking" their electronic innards, roughly "the same way a conventional microwave oven cooks a chicken." A researcher from Carnegie-Mellon University, K. Floring, noted in the March issue of SPECTRUM, put out by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers of the United States, that laboratory rats whose brains were subjected to microwaves went into convulsions and lost consciousness and memory. This gave the author grounds to assert that "microwave weaponry, causing blindness, burns and fatal overheating in humans, could be considered a nightmarish addition to the existing arsenal."

A report published in the American magazine SCIENCE NEWS noted as early as 1983 that a great deal of work on microwave devices (wavelengths from 100 microns to several decimeters) was being financed by the U.S. Defense Department. Microwave weapons, in the opinion of Pentagon representatives, could possibly appear as arms in the 1990s.

Also calling attention to itself is the fact that work in practice on the creation of nuclear microwave weaponry is already underway in the United States under the "Star Wars" program.

The magazine SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (April 1987) cites data on the fact that with the detonation of a single-kiloton nuclear microwave device at an altitude of 30,000 kilometers, the area in which various targets would be hit—radio electronics, computers, antennas, electrical-transmission lines and others—would comprise no less than 250 square kilometers. And TIME magazine (May 1987) asserts that the detonation of a 10-megaton nuclear microwave device in space could transform practically all electrical and electronic circuits and instruments in a radius of 3,000 kilometers into a heap of "useless junk." This same magazine quotes U.S. Assistant Energy Secretary S. Foley on the fact that his department alone is spending about 200 million dollars a year on scientific-research and experimental-design work for the creation of directed-effect nuclear weaponry.

The data cited testifies to the fact that in creating a new type of weapon of mass destruction, the United States is once again, as has happened more than once in the past, coming forward in the role of instigator and generator of the arms race, now in such a dangerous realm as microwave weaponry. All of this cannot help but elicit serious concern on the part of international public opinion.

Illiterate, Non-Russian Speaking Uzbek Certified for Military Service
18010322 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt A. Bogan of the Far East Military District under the rubric "Letter to the Editor": "Here's How 'Shams' Flourish"]

[Text] The situation I found myself in on a recent official trip can be described using well-known words: it would have been funny had it not been so sad. I was approached by two soldiers on the compound of the subunit commanded by Sr Lt S. Bezgubenko. Pvt M. Karabayev, through a translator, which his comrade-in-arms Pvt F. Eshmatov had become, asked for help. But it was difficult to tell about what, exactly.

"He doesn't understand a word of Russian," explained Eshmatov. And added, sighing, "And never mind Russian, he can't read or write Uzbek. We write his letters home for him."

"I never went to school for a single day, my father wouldn't let me. He said that an illiterate person could work in the fields too," confirmed Mukhiddin.

You will agree it was difficult to believe this. The soldiers who had been drafted with Pvt Karabayev confirmed the truth of the words of their comrade, but I decided to convince myself anyway.

This is what I read in the file on conscript Karabayev: "Satisfactory command of the Russian language, took active part in the social life of school, had a conscientious attitude toward social tasks. Studies basically satisfactory. (Also here). Took active part in the cotton harvest... Ready to perform military service." Underneath were the signatures of the chairman of the rural soviet and the sector inspector for the village of Ulta-Shakhrikhan. Unfortunately it was difficult to make out their names. The only name written legibly was that of the military commissar of Moskovskiy Rayon in Andizhan Oblast, Lt Col M. Sheraliyev, attesting to the reference with his signature.

In the professional and psychological screening file, aside from all the above, I read that "Karabayev has completed the eighth grade, has passed the complete course of basic military training and wishes to serve in the Air Force..."

I shared my sad "discovery" with Maj Yu. Khachiyan, Sr Lt S. Bezgubenko and other comrades who, in their official duties, often encounter conscripts. But no one was surprised. On the contrary, they explained that this was not an isolated instance. The documents that the conscripts bring with them from that region cannot be called other than a "sham." They cited a multitude of

examples where an excellent student (judging from the file) proves to be practically illiterate, and a model, active Komsomol member turns out to be a former delinquent.

It is not possible to enumerate all of these examples. But I will relate one more anyway. I had occasion to encounter the signature of the aforementioned rayon military commissar Lt Col M. Sheraliyev again. It was on the character reference of Pvt N. Shaniyazov, where it was asserted that he had "...no appearances at the police, not on the register of the police delinquency room... Behavior good..."

The commanders soon found out the price of these words when it became clear that Shaniyazov had spent two years in a juvenile correction colony before his army service...

Pvt Karabayev undoubtedly will learn Russian, and an approach will also be found toward Pvt Shaniyazov and other such soldiers. Only it seems to me that the commanders and political officers could begin this work much sooner if they had objective character references in their hands, and not a "sham" with the imprint and signatures of officials.

West German Lays Troop Cuts to Demographic Problem

Commentary: 'Forced Measure'
52000002 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Herbert Kremp, DIE WELT analyst: "A Look at the East"]

[Text] The pictures of development in the West and East are displaying deep shadows. Strange phenomena at the time of today's "dawn" of disarmament.

There is fear in the West that NATO may lose its meaning and lose the support of its members under increasing pressure of the unilateral reduction in armed forces announced by M.S. Gorbachev (and his New York speech is not considered the last word). When looking at the East, there is a prevalent opinion that the partial disarmament which the Soviet leader announced is not a chess move in a diplomatic game. Rather, this is a forced measure. The economy is on the verge of collapse. The management system is overloaded and has malfunctioned. The Soviet Union is unable to handle either the normal course of events or a catastrophe (Armenia).

As a result of an in-depth analysis, high-ranking American experts in Brussels (NATO Headquarters is located there—Editor) have come to the following conclusion. M.S. Gorbachev took an important step in New York. It gained him an advantage and respect in the West. However, the unilateral intention has not been made official in any treaty. It can be reversed or changed (for example, under pressure from the military). It is free

from verification and therefore should be subjected to additional discussion in Vienna. There was no statement about ending the enormous military production—the conversion of only a number of enterprises was mentioned.

In addition to saving on expenditures, which will make itself felt in 1991 at the earliest, there are also practical circumstances that explain this step by the USSR such as demographic development and a shortage of a young Russian labor force.

The first deep drop in the birth-rate took place under Khrushchev between 1958 and 1964. It was the result of Stalin's "purges" in the second half of the 1930's and the war losses of 1941-1945. At that time there were not enough draftees for the 3-year term of military service during those years (now 2-year). The birth-rate initially increased under Brezhnev, but in the early 1970's it again began dropping in the main Russian regions for a variety of reasons. A period of a new biological drop is setting in now, not so dramatic but longer than under Khrushchev.

Meanwhile, attention is very rarely paid to the fact that fluctuations in the numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces correspond quite precisely to demographic changes. Khrushchev cut back 36 of the then-existing 175 divisions 30 years ago. Sixteen divisions stationed outside the USSR were withdrawn; this was done without any negotiations either with the West or China. And two of them were withdrawn from the GDR. In 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted (also due to armed forces reductions), the Soviet Army numbered 3.3 million—140 divisions (including 26 abroad) and 35,000 tanks. A layer is being removed from this level today—qualitative and, possibly, quantitative, limiting the offensive capability.

Also of concern is the Soviet inclination towards unilateral and, consequently, non-committal actions. In 1948, Stalin withdrew troops from Czechoslovakia—Brezhnev put them in there in 1968. Khrushchev left Mongolia in 1956—Brezhnev again entered there in 1966. Khrushchev reduced the Soviet Armed Forces in the GDR by two divisions—Brezhnev drove people and equipment there, as they say, "for a start." American experts are convinced that M.S. Gorbachev is a man of a different mold. But no one in the West can be sure that someone like Brezhnev will not come after him.

The announced withdrawal of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is an important step, for it has significant importance for structures (especially as it concerns the capability for the offensive and surprise attack). M.S. Gorbachev announced 5,000 tanks and 50,000 service men in this regard. But even if four divisions and, as announced, ground assault units leave the GDR, the remaining divisions (there will then be 15 left in the GDR, 7 of which are tank divisions) will be "reorganized." But after this the East will still have a great superiority over the West. American experts are

convinced that Moscow must take into account the possibility of opposition from its military, which up to now has not come out against disarmament as such, but only against (and sharply) unilateral cuts. The Soviet General Staff is primarily afraid of the West's airborne potential, which presently, as a result of disasters and their resulting reaction of politicians, like flight restrictions is weakening in the FRG "from within."

Allies ask in this regard: Won't the benefit which implementation of the Soviet "forced operation," it appears, promises the West be nullified by the weakening of readiness and defense in certain Western European countries? Harmful disarmament steps which fix Soviet superiority at a "lower level" can lead to a weakening. Individual governments and parties are responding to this, but the consequences affect the North Atlantic alliance as a whole.

Reply by PRAVDA Correspondent
52000002 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Ye. Grigoryev, special PRAVDA correspondent in Bonn: "Are the Soviets Aggressive?"]

[Text] Herbert Kremp is a well-known West German journalist, not long ago editor-in-chief of the newspaper DIE WELT, and now an analyst for the paper. Readers of DIE WELT are very familiar with his conservative views. For several decades now he has been trying to convince us that the "Soviets" are aggressive, no matter what they do they cannot be trusted, they respect only force—military and that of forced circumstances, and therefore NATO's policy of armament and deterrence must be preserved.

It seems to me, however, this is not the predominant public opinion in the FRG today. The provisions of the Soviet leader's New York speech and the new USSR proposals and steps announced are finding widespread approval here. Even among conservative circles they are giving rise to sentiments in favor of new approaches and initiatives on the West's part. Be that as it may, there are still those like Herbert Kremp who occupy a prominent place in the West German political landscape.

It is another matter that Mr Kremp and like-minded persons have lost their former confidence. His article is instructive as a sample of stagnant NATO propaganda. At the same time, it is curious as an attempt to draw up some "set of arguments."

Undoubtedly, the readers of PRAVDA will have no particular difficulty in discovering its Achilles heel. The point is that even recognizing the major importance of the Soviet steps, try as he might, Mr Kremp cannot step over his own shadow. To accept our new political thinking and new political and philosophical concepts of security and dismiss, finally, perceiving in a confrontational spirit the processes of international development

would mean for him to be left without the "image of an enemy." Would NATO not be viable without this? Therefore the thesis that the Soviet Union's initiative is a "forced measure" is being taken as the basis.

Of course, economic considerations play their role, and a considerable one, in our country's actions. However, predicting that the Soviet Union and socialism are on the verge of collapse, Mr Kremp, judging from the disturbing tone of his article, does not believe this very much himself, nor do many in the FRG. Prominent representatives of West German economic circles are now speaking out against dramatizing the difficulties, as much inevitable, in their opinion, as temporary, in the course of radical economic reform in the USSR. These circles see well its prospects. The West German captains of economics have always been known for their circumspection and realism.

Kremp's demographic passage is also quite original. It has the same transparent implication as the "forced measure" thesis: He says, after the reductions, sooner or later everything will return to the averages. But let us look at the experience of the FRG itself. Its birth-rate is far behind the Soviet Union, being next to last in Europe. The demographic situation, of course, is not being ignored by the FRG Ministry of Defense, but its reaction is by no means to reduce the Bundeswehr. On the contrary, citing the unfavorable birth-rate, the ministry recently sought to increase the term of military service from 15 to 18 months. There are some demographic problems for you...

Like other defenders of NATO, Mr Kremp resorts to juggling figures taken arbitrarily. He wants to use them to drown the true scale of the forthcoming reductions of Soviet Armed Forces in Europe, which impresses the West German public so much. You see: In all his reshuffling of figures, he does not even mention that the Soviet Armed Forces will be cut by 500,000 soldiers and officers, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft.

But we will not be deceived: Certain passages in the article, to be sure, will create the doubts needed by its author in the minds of uninformed West Germans. It is good that most people in the FRG today understand the utilitarian meaning of NATO propaganda and the fallacy of talk about the "Soviet threat," and draw their own conclusions based on real facts.

But Mr Kremp has a far-reaching aim. One of the purposes of his article is to discredit any unilateral initiatives of the USSR as such. He is quite concerned—and he does not hide this—by the infectiousness of such a "bad example," even for allies, of "individual governments and parties." Analogies with the past are set in motion. But they are hardly pertinent when forecasting the future.

On the whole, the article in DIE WELT leaves a contradictory impression. To some degree, the spirit of the times has not side-stepped it and has forced the author to recognize the growing influence of the Soviet views and initiatives outlined from the rostrum at the United Nations on human minds. On the other hand, Mr Kremp still has not found a solution to the dilemma facing NATO—how to exist without an "image of an enemy," without more and more spirals in the arms race? It is hard to say when the new political thinking will make its way into the consciousness of the NATO apologists. They continue to oppose their own disarmament and today—and this is a paradox—even unilateral Soviet disarmament, which they have called upon the USSR to do from every podium.

Letter Notes Lack of Economic Expertise in Military Units

18010337 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter by Maj V. Shekhvatov, chief of field detachment of GOSBANK, Central Group of Forces: "Military Economists, Where Are You?"]

[Text] I believe that many economic work troubles in military units are a result of the fact that questions of an economic character are examined and decisions regarding them are made essentially by people who are not specialists in these matters and who, more accurately, do not understand anything about them. In short, the competence of military commanders in performing unit administrative and support manpower and facilities services at times is beneath criticism.

But on the other hand, can the finance service of a regiment be held responsible for breakdowns in economic management [khozyaystvovaniye]? I think not, if only for the simple reason that the service most often consists of one or a maximum of two persons. The finance official of a regiment, as the saying goes, is up to his neck in work, and he functions as a bookkeeper and an accountant, but in no way as an economist.

And when one thinks about it, such a profession as military economist, unfortunately, does not yet exist in the armed forces. And this is at a time when economic reform is moving at full speed in the country, which simply cannot but impact on the resolution of economic questions under army conditions.

The objection can be made, for example, that the Yaroslavskoye higher military finance school graduates officers with economist diplomas. Indeed, but what are they concerned with in military units? With everything but what they were taught. It has gotten so bad that people with advanced economic qualifications work as cashiers.

Of course, if one is to be completely objective, then it must be said that certain economic work in units and subunits continues to be conducted by economic soviets

established on social principles, and also by various services. But again it is not to an extent that would correspond to the spirit of the times. And the tasks now, in my view, must be resolved on a large scale and not on a unit level. A perestroyka program and a plan of renewal of its own has to be developed for military economics. It is already evident that it is not likely that today's problems, and even more so tomorrow's, will be solved with old methods.

Most likely, my ideas may even be debatable in some respect. I would like to read the opinions of other specialists as well in the newspaper, of all those who are sincerely interested in restructuring the economics of unit administrative and support manpower and facilities services.

Conference on Restructuring Cadres Work
18010373 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Krasnaya Zvezda Correspondent Lt Col S Levitskiy entitled: "Improving Work With Cadres".]

[Text] Yesterday in the Main Directorate of Cadres of the USSR Ministry of Defense a conference of cadre workers of the Army and Navy began. It is to discuss and resolve pressing problems of restructuring in the armed forces and cadres work, including [work with] initial certification intended to improve qualitatively the personnel component in the Army and Navy.

Fighter On-Board Radar Systems

81440382 Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in
Russian No 10, Oct 1988 pp 8-9

[Article by Col V. Shtoda and Sr Lt A. Vasilevskiy:
"Fighter On-Board Radar Systems"]

[Text] The first fighter aircraft on-board radar systems created abroad in the early 1940's operated in the pulse mode and ensured target detection at ranges up to 5 km. This range had already reached 15 km in the radars of the 1950's. The sighting mode provides automatic target tracking by angular coordinates and range, which is accomplished by conical scanning of the directional pattern. The accuracy of determining the range and angular coordinates was sufficient to use aircraft machine-guns and cannons—the main weapons of fighters of that time. The pilot would bring the fighter to aimed fire range according to the target's image on the radar scope. As a rule, the radar was coupled to an optical sight (its computer was used) and to the IFF system. Target data in the form of specially shaped markers, the position and size of which characterize the angular coordinates and range to the target, and also additional information on the results of identification, "lock-on" by the sighting circuit, and achieving the authorized firing range are displayed on the radar CRT (cathode-ray tube).

On-board radar systems developed further along the path of improving their characteristics by increasing the power of the transmitter, increasing receiver sensitivity, using the monopulse method of determining angular coordinates, which is more accurate and resistant to jamming than conical scanning radars, and also using new types of antennas with a reduced side lobes. Radars began to be used to guide air-to-air missiles. A typical foreign on-board radar of that period operated in the 3-cm wave band, which made it possible to obtain a considerable directive gain with a small antenna and a limited aircraft fuselage cross-section.

A magnetron having noncoherent radiation with an average power rating of 300 watts was used to generate electromagnetic waves in the transmitter. A reflector-type antenna was used.

Basic requirements, such as expanding the tactical capabilities when operating against aerial and ground targets under any weather conditions, visibility, day and night, were placed on fighters developed abroad in the 1970's. These requirements were realized in fundamentally new pulse-Doppler on-board radar systems with coherent signal processing. The main characteristic of these radars was the ability to isolate low-flying targets against the background of the ground and scanning the earth's surface (map-making) with a high resolution to support navigation and detect ground targets. These on-board radar systems make it possible to carry out flights at low altitudes by going around obstacles, that is, following the

terrain. Pulse-Doppler on-board radar systems became multifunctional. A structural diagram of such an on-board radar is shown in the figure.

Development of pulse-Doppler radars became possible as a result of the creation of high-power coherent transmitters, antennas with a low level of side lobes, microwave integrated circuits used in receivers, and also digital radar processors. The transmitters of pulse-Doppler radars, as a rule, are a coherent network with an output stage built on a traveling wave tube. The average power output of these radars is in the range of 0.2-1 kW, but in on-board radars of individual types of fighter-interceptors, where a particularly long range is required, it reaches 4 kW. This ensures operation in a wide range of repetition frequency and pulse (low, medium, high) and pulse duration. It is possible to use internal pulse modulation according to various principles.


Modern pulse-Doppler on-board radar systems, as a rule, use flat slotted-guide antenna arrays with a low level of side lobes (up to 50 dB in power). This is achieved by forming the optimum field distribution at the antenna aperture and by highly precise milling of the slots in the waveguide walls. One of the basic particular features of on-board pulse-Doppler radars is the use of a digital radar processor. The various operating modes of these radars are achieved because of the high speed of the digital processors and the large memory storage of the computer system. For example, the signal processor of one of the most common foreign on-board pulse-Doppler radars has an output of 7.2 million operations per second with a size of 25 cubic decimeters.

The first on-board pulse-Doppler radars used signal processors with a hardwired program. However, in the 1980's, they began using processors in which the program could be changed, including while in flight, with the use of an external memory. Foreign experts claim that using a programmable processor makes it possible, if necessary, to easily introduce new operating modes and also to interface on-board radars with new types of weapons.

As is reported in the foreign press, modern Doppler on-board radar systems can accomplish map-making in various modes. Scanning the terrain by a real directional pattern provides a field of observation of large areas in a sector of plus or minus 60° and a radar image on a television display in real time. However, the resolution, which is determined by the width of the main lobe and depends on the distance of the terrain sector being viewed, is not great. Therefore, this mode is used for navigation and also for detecting large (primarily naval) targets.

In the Doppler beam narrowing mode, the spectrum of reflected signals is analyzed by using narrow-band Doppler filters. Within the limits of the antenna directivity pattern, each of these corresponds to its angular direction. Using filters to isolate the signals corresponding to

Structural Diagram of Multifunctional Radar



Key: 1. Antenna housing;

2. Array;

3. Servo;

4. Receiver and analog-to-digital converter;

5. Transceiver;

6. Radar signal processor;

7. Computer;

8. Display and control console;

9. Data line;

10. Radar data processor;

11. Master oscillator and synchronizer;

12. Transmitter;

13. Multiplexed bus.

the central portion of the directivity pattern is equivalent to narrowing the pattern and, consequently, increasing the resolution. In the process of scanning, the necessary switching or retuning of the filters is done so that the Doppler signals corresponding to its central part are isolated in all its positions. By using Doppler beam narrowing in one of the modern foreign on-board radar systems, experts claim, resolution was increased several tenfold.

The greatest resolution in map-making, independent of the distance to the sector being viewed, is provided by

the antenna aperture synthesizing (AAS) mode or, as it is still called, the ultra-high resolution mode. In this mode, the radar antenna is installed at a certain constant angle to the aircraft's heading. Pulses reflected from the terrain are received and stored for the duration of the aperture synthesizing in x seconds. These pulses are then adjusted by phase according to the amount of deviation of the element of area being resolved from the axis of the real directional pattern and added together.

Adjustment and summation of the signals are done in each band of distance corresponding to the element

distance resolution and when each reflected pulse arrives, that is, there is a sliding summation in each distance resolution band. A directional pattern is formed (synthesized), the width of which corresponds in azimuth to an antenna size equal to the distance covered by the aircraft in x seconds. Since it is possible to add up signals for various distances to the target in various synthesizing times, one can ensure, as it were, the same width of the synthesized pattern at different distances and, consequently, the same azimuth resolution on the terrain.

The AAS mode was initially implemented in aerial reconnaissance radars. Here, the radar signals recorded on film during flight were processed to obtain a radar image by optical methods at ground stations after the aircraft landed. In this case, there was a delay of several hours in receiving information. However, with the development of digital technology, it became possible to process the signals aboard the aircraft on a near real-time basis.

Foreign experts maintain that the AAS mode requires a large memory capacity and high digital computer power, and this limits the resolution and size of the area of terrain being viewed. As reported, one of the on-board tactical fighter radars being developed provides scanning of a terrain sector 2.4 by 2.4 km with a range resolution of 5 meters and azimuth resolution of 56 km, which makes it possible to detect small-sized objects.

All the terrain map-making modes—"real beam," Doppler beam narrowing, and AAS—can provide for moving ground target indication. Their markers on the screen can be superposed on a map image of the terrain and identified by a color, for example. According to foreign press data, modern on-board radar systems can locate moving targets with a radial velocity component of no less than 5 km/h.

On-board radar systems built in the seventies and eighties used the so-called "in passing" tracking mode when operating against aerial targets. It provides simultaneous tracking of several targets while continuing to scan a wide search zone. When tracking a target, linear extrapolation of its trajectory is done according to the results of changes in the previous scanning cycles. If the target is detected in the current scanning cycle, the trajectory is corrected taking into account the new data. As the press reports, modern foreign on-board radars simultaneously track up to 20 aerial targets and simultaneously launch missiles against 4-6 targets. As a rule, on-board radars include a target illumination channel for semi-active radar missile homing heads. All information, particularly about the tactical situation, is displayed on TV-type multifunctional display screens or on the pilot's cockpit windscreen.

Pulse-Doppler on-board radars can be used when aircraft are operating against both aerial and ground targets, depending on the tactical purpose of the aircraft. The

most modern on-board radars have these modes, with the optimum mode selected in each stage of using the aircraft. The modes also can be alternated. It has been reported that on-board radars which have all the required modes are complex and expensive, are of considerable size, and are not too reliable. Thus, one foreign on-board radar, planned to be put into service in 1988, weighs around 250 kg and has a mean time between failures of about 70 hours.

A particular feature of modern on-board radars is the use of modular construction of easily detachable units which, it is believed, will make it possible to quickly upgrade systems if necessary or to increase their capabilities by adding new units.

Today, they are working intensively abroad to develop on-board radars for future fighters. Judging from released results of research and efforts, these will be pulse-Doppler radars with improved performance and with an expanded number of missions.

The task is being put forward to ensure discrimination of aerial targets flying in close formation and also automatic radar air-to-air, and in the future air-to-ground, target identification without interrogation.

Work is being done to increase the operating security of on-board radars by lowering the noticeability of its radiation by using multifrequency or wideband signal emissions. Ways are also being studied to realize multi-positional, particularly bistatic, modes in which an aircraft with its target-illuminating transmitter turned on can be located beyond the firing range of enemy air defense assets and the radars of attacking aircraft operate only in the receive mode, receiving the signals reflected from the target. A most important requirement is considered to be increasing considerably the reliability of future on-board radars: increasing the mean time between failures to 400-500 hours, their survivability, maintainability, and adaptability to servicing.

Improving digital signal processing systems and developing on-board active phased arrays are seen as a basis for fulfilling these requirements. It is envisioned to use ultra-high-speed processors on super-large integrated circuits in digital devices. Within the next few years, as reported in the foreign press, it is planned that processors will achieve a signal processing speed of 1-2 billion operations per second.

An on-board active phased array is being developed which consists of 2000 solid-state active modules with individual control and phasing. The average output power of each module is 2 watts. In the estimates of foreign specialists, an on-board radar with such an antenna will continue to function with 5 percent of its operating modules failing. According to the plan of developers, radars with active phased arrays should have high reliability and provide for simultaneous operation

of the on-board radar in several modes due to the possibility of parallel formation of several directivity patterns or rapid switching of the pattern electrically in the necessary direction.

Battle Against Cruise Missiles

18010365 Moscow *VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNYY OBORONY* in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 18 Nov 88) pp 78-80

[Article by Lt Col A. Manachinskiy, candidate of military sciences and Lt Col V. Chumak, candidate of technical sciences: "Cruise Missiles and Combat Against Them"]

[Text] Aggressive circles of imperialism have given special attention to the modernization of existing and the creation of new models of strategic offensive weaponry, among which cruise missiles hold special importance. Although according to a treaty between the USSR and the U.S., land-based cruise missiles must be eliminated, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles remain in the inventory

Air-launched cruise missiles are delivered by U.S. strategic bombers (B-52G, B-52H, B-1B), which, according to American military specialists, can significantly ease solving the problem of penetrating enemy air defenses [PVO]. This opinion is based on the fact that in the first place, significantly reduced weapon-platform aircraft losses can be obtained, since the cruise missile's long flight range allows for launching outside of the area of operations of active air defense weapons. Secondly, intensive employment of cruise missiles can lead to "supersaturation" of the air defense system with air targets, it ceases to handle their processing and bombardment; as a result, a portion of the cruise missiles overcomes the zone of heaviest air defense fire and reaches objectives deep in the interior.

It is noted in the foreign press that the range capability of air-launched cruise missiles is to a high degree determined by the altitude of launch from the weapon-platform aircraft. Depending on this, three variants of missile flight toward the objective are most acceptable: at the lowest altitude limit, on a low-high-low altitude configuration, and on a high-low altitude configuration. Launch of a cruise missile of the ALCM class, for example, is conducted, as a rule, by the carrier at an altitude of 11,000-12,000 meters, after which occurs its gradual descent to a point 80-90 kilometers from the target at missile velocity $M = 0.55$, missile altitude 15-20 meters. Then the ALCM velocity is brought to $M = 0.7$ in order to increase probability of breaching the air defense zone. It was noted in the foreign press that on the cruise missile, the radar altimeter allows the possibility of implementing flight over water surfaces or flat plains at an altitude of up to 16 meters, and over a moderately transversed locale, about 50 meters, and over mountains, up to 100 meters.

The air-launched cruise missile was developed by the Boeing firm in two variants: AGM-86A and AGM-86B. They are differentiated from each other primarily by maximum flight range (1200 and 2500 kilometers respectively). In 1986, production was halted of the AGM-86A missile, in service in the U.S. Air Force. In all, USAF was allotted 1715 missiles, which were used to arm 95 B-52G strategic bombers. Work is being done to improve the B-52H bomber for the purpose of arming it with ALCMs. In total, 35 B-52H aircraft are planned to be armed with cruise missiles. With the adoption of the advanced technology bomber, its use for breaching an air defense system is planned, while the B-1B, which now executes this task, can become the ALCM delivery vehicle. In calculating cruise missiles in the armaments, 194 B-52G and B-52H aircraft must be committed to production. In the early 1990's, with the armament of a significant number of B-1B delivery vehicles, the U.S. Air Force plans to remove the obsolete model B-52G from operational status.

The basic trend in modern scientific research and experimental design work connected with the prospects of the cruise missiles envisions increasing their flight range, reducing the level of identification features, creating micro-miniature on-board computers, and improving the guidance system in the transit and final stages of the trajectory, allowing great improvements in the characteristics of the modern missile.

Foreign specialists believe that through the mid-1990's, when the U.S. Defense Department proposes deployment of third-generation cruise missiles, the General Dynamics advanced cruise missiles [ACM] remain effective strategic weapons. "Stealth" technology will be used in the ACM; the missile will get the improved Williams International F-112 turbofan engine, providing longer range in comparison to the ALCM. According to plans, at least 1300 ACMs will be supplied, and the general complex of the USAF will receive approximately 3000 strategic ALCMs.

American military specialists are of the opinion that the combination of the cruise missiles' small dimensions and their low maximum altitudes will impede considerably the missiles' detection by ground-based radar and will complicate fighting against them. In addition, it has been noted in the foreign press that cruise missiles have a number of deficiencies as well, the most significant of which are the following:

1. The TERCOM computer system introduced on-board for digital information on terrain relief (these data are derived from photographs of the Earth's surface taken from space) may not have the degree of accuracy sufficient for the missile to follow the terrain over obstacles such as small hills.
2. The on-board TERCOM altimeter system is extremely prone to application of jamming.

3. The TERCOM system itself can be disoriented by seasonal changes in terrain due to loading of obsolete data.

4. The cruise missile's low flight velocity, its practically straight-line trajectory, its lack of maneuverability in light of its fixed programmed course allow for attack by all types of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery shelling.

5. The cruise missile's lack of vertical maneuverability in the target zone makes one relatively inexpensive means of combat against it extremely effective: Anti-aircraft artillery barrage (a fire barrier) on the approach to the defended target.

According to foreign military specialists, battle against cruise missiles is one of the main tasks of antimissile defense. The success of the struggle against cruise missiles depends to a great extent upon expeditious detection of the missiles or warning of the threat of their employment. Therefore, the development of such systems and weapons is being given very serious attention abroad at this time. Thus, utilization of information from a network of radar posts and AWACS aircraft is proposed; the latter will bring the bomber-weapon platforms and the in-flight missiles themselves into their sights, and fighter-interceptors armed with "Sparrow", "Phoenix" and AMRAAM. According to the data of the foreign press, for detection of cruise missiles and other low-flying targets, it is planned to position at a space orbit of approximately 900 kilometers altitude millimeter-band frequency sensors. According to the calculations of American specialists, continuous survey of the continental U.S. would require eight such sensors. This would allow the considerable broadening of scope and possibilities of the radar field within the continent, and would create a reliable information system on the cruise missiles and their delivery aircraft.

Radar systems are being created for cruise missile detection which are capable of expeditious detection of the targets flying at maximum low altitudes. An intensification has been noted abroad of development and creation of over-the-horizon radar systems of the over-the-horizon backscatter [OTH-B] type; attempts are being made to install radar systems in dirigible carriers, and to place locator antennae on specialized masts.

Judging by the published data, OTH-B systems have the following basic characteristics:

—achievement of target range detection, 1000-4000 kilometers (greater ranges are possible with a jumping range of signals, with a deterioration of the OTH-B characteristics).

—survey of the area of azimuth can be unlimited, however, a sector of 60-120 degrees is typical.

—the relative accuracy of range measurement is 2-4 kilometers; if the target is near objects with known coordinates, the absolute accuracy is 10-20 kilometers. As the foreign press states, in this type of station a range resolution capability of 2 kilometers is fixed, however, 20-40 kilometers is a more typical level of resolution.

—the resolution capability of angle coordinates is determined by the width of the antenna beam, and can be less than 1 degree, which at a range of 3000 kilometers corresponds to a linear measure of 50 kilometers.

—the resolution capability according to the doppler frequency (target velocity) can reach 0.1 Hz at a radar transmitter frequency of 20 MHz (roughly corresponding to a velocity of 2.8 kilometers per hour).

According to the statements of foreign specialists, the OTH-B system will have the chance to detect airborne targets of any class which could emerge up to the year 2015, since absorbent skins and "Stealth" technology are incapable of substantially reducing this system's capabilities. According to the American experts, U.S. territorial deployment of the OTH-B radar system (system 414L), in conjunction with the DEW and Pine-tree systems, will allow detection of sub-sonic targets 3-3.5 hours before their approach of the border, and super-sonic, 1.2 hours.

At this time, the U.S. has deployed three aerostat posts for observation of the airspace in the area of the Gulf of Mexico. The dirigibles are outfitted with Westinghouse AN/TPS-63 radar systems, which enable detection of low-flying cruise missiles at a range of up to 120 kilometers. In addition, the USAF is studying the possibility of cruise missile detection with a new AWACS system with a radar system functioning in the decimetric wave band (1000-2500 MHz), with increased power and a large antenna aperture.

Upon receipt of data on the appearance of cruise missiles or their delivery vehicles, a range of countermeasures are planned to be put into effect, including fighter aviation, ground-based engagement, as well as specialized systems and electronic warfare. Aerial refueling of fighter-interceptors is planned in order to lead the border intercept of cruise missiles and their delivery vehicles at a distance of 1500-2000 kilometers from the covered objectives.

According to Western specialists, the task of destroying missiles heading toward their objectives can be solved most effectively by the use of surface-to-air missile systems (ZRK). However, the low effective surface dispersion (EPR) of cruise missiles, not exceeding 0.1 square meter, considerably reduces the chances of the radar system's ZRK to detect and track such targets, and the control means, to expeditiously stage firing tasks by active means. The cruise missiles' engines' low level of thermal emission complicates their detection and interception by accompaniment of infrared intelligence systems as well as thermal GSN [expansion unknown] SAMs. The receiver's low signal-to-noise ratio provides

for growth in errors of SAM guidance, which in turn leads to a reduced cruise missile kill probability. The reduced target kill probability is affected by the size and shape of the area of dispersion of damaged elements formed during warhead detonation of modern SAMs, which do not ensure reliable destruction of the cruise missiles, since they are selected on the basis of delivering maximum damage to considerably larger targets. The long reaction time of modern SAMs (time from the moment of detection of the target to the moment a missile is launched at it) significantly affects the efficacy of cruise missile target kills.

Abroad, as the foreign press indicates, new generations of SAM complexes are being developed to carry out combat with cruise missiles. Thus, NATO plans envision the creation of SAMs according to ATM and ATAM programs. ATM complexes are tasked with fighting tactical airborne targets of any class which could arise until the year 2000: aircraft, cruise missiles, missiles with ballistic or non-ballistic flight trajectories. These include "Patriot," SA-90 and MFS SAMs. ATAM systems are tasked with destroying aerodynamic targets and various non-ballistic missiles: aircraft, cruise and antiradiation missiles.

Utilization of new generations of phased-array antennae, digital information processing and high-speed computers in multi-channeled SAMs allows realization of high velocity space surveillance, and automation of processing of output for target destination, significantly increases the quantity of simultaneously tracked targets, as well as sharply reducing the systems' reaction time, which raises their launch capability. According to the foreign press, a SAM guidance system is being improved, and a multi-mode seeker head is being developed to increase cruise missile target kill probability.

The 20-40 mm anti-aircraft guns with improved sighting systems and firing control are considered a significant supplement to the fight against cruise missiles.

Foreign military specialists assume that HEL [high energy laser?] laser artillery systems will find broad combat application against cruise and other missiles. It is proposed that they can be introduced into the inventory as soon as late 1990. The laser beam's activity on the target will induce heating, fusion of the metal of the skin and its vaporization in a very short period, precluding countermeasures.

In connection with the fact that the cruise missile is outfitted with TERCOM and DSMAC, using the principles of comparison of terrain which the missile is flying over, the foreign press indicates the possibility of concealment of the target itself, as well as changes in the configuration of nearby natural and artificial orientations for thwarting the cruise missiles guidance. Use of active jamming transmitters or TERCOM system corner

reflectors are proposed as a means of concealment, as well as various screens and aerosols to destroy the functions of the DSMAC optical system.

The use of mines has also been proposed for combat against cruise missiles and other low-flying targets. Development of specialized small-scale sensors (acoustic sensors for preliminary target detection and laser sensors for semi-conductor sets, for pin-pointing coordinates) is planned for these targets, as well as mines with self-forming destructive components, whose action is directed upward to an altitude of 100-150 meters. According to the data of the magazine WEHR TECHNICK, such mines could be utilized for air defense of slow-moving and stationary objectives, and for creating obstacles in the proposed cruise-missile flight paths. Mines can be installed in advance, quickly excavated and reinstalled. It is proposed that they be brought to combat readiness and removed from readiness by use of target-recognition radio channel equipment. Mine distribution density in the terrain is determined by the required target kill probability. The developers feel that such mines must be low-cost and interference-resistant.

Thus, the military specialists of the NATO countries have undertaken energetic attempts both to improve cruise missiles, and to seek effective means and capabilities to combat them. Under such conditions, the PVO troops must fulfill their sacred duty to the homeland—permanent battle readiness, the guarantor of swift resistance to the airborne aggressor.

Aircraft Reductions Will Increase Ratio of Fighters

PM1801124589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Pozdnyakov, Deputy Chief of the Air Force Main Staff, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy under the rubric "News: Facts, Events, Comments": "In Accordance With the Decision Unilaterally To Reduce the Soviet Armed Forces, 800 Aircraft Are To Be Decommissioned"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] Our correspondent Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy talks with Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Pozdnyakov, deputy chief of the Air Force Main Staff.

[Levitskiy] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, it is generally hard for an uninitiated person to understand whether or not 800 military aircraft are a lot.

[Pozdnyakov] Eight hundred combat aircraft are the equivalent of the FRG and Belgian air forces combined, or one-fourth more than the number of British combat aircraft.

[Levitskiy] Some readers ask: Will the combat might of the Soviet Air Force not be reduced?

[Pozdnyakov] We believe that to resolve precisely defensive tasks, the remaining air grouping will be adequate for reliably protecting the air borders and, if necessary, repulsing aggression. Of course, it is possible to resolve tasks with fewer forces just by restructuring combat training and emphasizing its qualitative parameters. Additional measures are now being taken to improve the training of flying personnel and ground specialists and to enhance the reliability of aviation hardware. In short, it is a question of taking measures to achieve reasonable defense sufficiency. How the United States and the other NATO countries respond to our actions toward compromise will be very important.

[Levitskiy] But some people in the West still believe that with this reduction the Soviet Air Force will rid itself of obsolete hardware.

[Pozdnyakov] No, and again no. The combat aircraft to be reduced are not inferior but sometimes superior in terms of tactical-technical specifications to the corresponding types of machines in capitalist countries' air forces.

[Levitskiy] Which aircraft are being decommissioned?

[Pozdnyakov] Basically, those capable of making strikes against ground targets. But a certain number of aircraft will also be reduced in other categories of the Air Force. The share of fighter aircraft within the Air Force will increase.

[Levitskiy] What fate awaits the hardware that is to be reduced?

[Pozdnyakov] Some of the aircraft will be utilized. Certain machines in good condition may be taken apart for spare parts. As for the ground support facilities that will then be freed up, we will distribute among military airfields the items we have an acute need for and transfer to the national economy what will not be needed. If some of the airfields are not needed, soviets of people's deputies will have jurisdiction over their territory.

[Levitskiy] Many airmen have bitter memories of the reduction in the Air Force in the sixties....

[Pozdnyakov] I well remember that time. Although I was a young pilot, I was well aware of the ill-considered and hasty nature of the actions. They cut up aircraft with oxyacetylene torches and then could have kicked themselves: The hardware would have come in handy for sportsmen in DOSAAF flying clubs, in the national economy, or for spares.... Of course, measures were envisaged then to settle those transferred to the reserves into a new life. But those "measures" frequently went unimplemented. On the other hand, some of these people were sometimes of no use to anyone—there was no work in keeping with their trades and housing was not available.

Past mistakes must on no account be repeated. I confidently declare that the Air Force Main Staff has taken all social questions into account and efficiently planned their resolution. The chief thing is to exclude injustice.

In the Air Force almost all officers have received higher military and specialized training. Therefore, measures are being taken to keep and employ in the Air Force some of the cadres released as a result of the reduction, while those officers who complete their army service on grounds of age are honorably transferred to the reserve.

Trial of New Ice-Breaker 'Successful'
18010161 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Dec 88 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Pasyakin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Sevmorput' Enters Service"]

[Text] There it is, captivating in its harmony, gigantic dimensions and grandeur, the nuclear powered, lighter-container transport icebreaker. The uncommon bright red color of the hull, and huge, snow-white superstructure—that is how I saw Sevmorput, which had just returned from performance tests.

Let us go up the extremely high side of Sevmorput; many things impress one here. Thus, radiation safety is ensured in the event of any accidents to the power plant or vessel. In contrast to ordinary heavy-tonnage vessels, Sevmorput has no limitations in navigation parameters. To determine the location of the nuclear-powered vessel, its navigation system uses data from the most varied systems, from our grandfathers' method of using the stars, to signals from space satellites.

Seventy-four lighters can be carried in Sevmorput's six cargo holds. Transportation of goods with their help is simply irreplaceable under conditions of our northern coast, where it is almost impossible to receive heavy-tonnage ships, due to the lack of ports. The autonomy with which Sevmorput sails, in terms of fuel, is virtually unlimited. One refueling is enough for 4 years. The ship develops a speed of 20.5 knots. Having a 40,000 horsepower nuclear power plant, and strong hull and bottom, the ship can punch its way through independently in ice up to a meter thick. The high degree of automation and extensive use of computers provide for unattended servicing of the nuclear power plant.

Performance tests are a most crucial period in the life of any warship or other vessel. They are implementation in practice of the capabilities built into the ship, testing its

"muscles," and checking the viability and reliability of all systems and mechanisms. How did this first and most important test go for the sailors and shipbuilders?

A. Ivlev, project chief production engineer, states:

"To put it briefly, it was successful. The ship was tested in its ballast variant. But lighters and containers were onboard in order to test the cargo fastening systems. I will say that in its tests Sevmorput not only produced, but even exceeded its designed speed by four knots. Circulation dimensions were satisfied. In short, the steerability and underway properties in the given parameters were better than calculated. The ship's equipment—the nuclear steam-producing plant, main turbo-gear aggregate, and power plant—functioned reliably and stably. We did not receive any major complaints about their functioning.

Now is a crucial period on the ship. Learning to understand its "character," and simultaneously the honing and coming together of the crew are going on. Capt Vasiliy Petrovich Smirnov was entrusted to lead this work. In 1956 he completed the Leningrad Higher Engineering Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov. He has held all duty positions from fourth assistant to captain. He served orientation tours on the icebreaker Arktika, and the lighter ship Aleksey Kosygin.

"In creating Sevmorput," stated N. Volkov, Zaliv Factory director, "we made use of the production of 250 enterprises throughout the country. Some of this production is unique, made to special order, and represents experimental, pilot models. Firms from the FRG, Sweden and Finland took part in building the ship. The Finns, for example, mounted the 500 ton load capacity crane.

Sevmorput is preparing to leave its cradle and begin its work. Soon the ship will take on a set of lighters with cargo in Odessa, and go around Africa. After offloading in Vietnam, the ship will take the lighters for delivery to Vladivostok.

Good journey to you, Sevmorput!

Engineering Troops Use Explosives in Demolition Work in Armenia

*18010343 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan 89 p 3*

[Article by Col. N. Mulyar: "Explosion Not Recommended"]

[Text] **Military engineers in Spitak carried out an operation with no analogues in world practice**

The Spitak grain products combine was one of the largest in Armenia. After the December tragedy, millions of Soviet people saw this tall structure on their television screens. The impression was that the combine had survived. But in fact it was seriously damaged. Specialists concluded that it should not be restored.

There remained grain, flour, and mixed feed in hoppers whose necks ran into the ground. It was practically impossible to extract them from the closed structures 35 meters high. It was extremely dangerous to tear down the structures: collapse could occur at any moment. Demolishing them with the familiar ram would take a long time: the work would require many months. Blow it up? But in this case the more than two thousand tons of flour posed a great hazard. In a suspended state flour explodes spontaneously. The shock wave would destroy hospitals and mess halls located nearby. Specialists of USSR Vzryvprom [Explosives Industry] and scientists agreed that an explosion was unacceptable in this situation.

On 24 December of last year, by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, the commander of the Engineer Troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, Gen. Maj. P. Brozhko, was assigned to find a solution to the complex problem.

"It was a job with many unknowns," Pavel Rafailovich recounts. "There were no analogues in world practice. No one had ever described the technology for preparing an explosion under such conditions. Specialists of USSR Vzryvprom could offer no recommendations: they had

never encountered this quantity of explosive flour. On the evening of 25 December, a service conference was held. I ordered Lt. Col. V. Zaytsev to make calculations and select a team of experienced demolition men. By 2 January a test explosion was performed. Initially we tried to cover the hoppers with firefighting foam. It didn't work. The foam quickly ran from the surface of the walls, an air cushion formed in the hoppers, and the flour was not soaked all the way through. We decided to use ordinary water. The flour was covered with a crust in the form of dough. That meant there would be no dangerous dust formation. The first explosion was successful, in keeping with calculations. On 3 January we blew up another three hoppers. There were no detonations. We decided to use the same method to blow up the shop of 36 bunkers with 60 tons in each. Again the explosive specialists expressed apprehension. But we already had practical experience..."

Throughout the night six fire trucks poured water into the hoppers, soaking the flour and wetting the walls of the structure. Battalion commander Lt. Col. V. Demin, company commander Sr. Lt. S. Chernykh, and deputy platoon leader Sgt. A. Cheremysinov with eight enlisted engineers set up 10 shaped line charges in the hoppers and four twenty-kilogram concentrated charges. They had faith in the calculations, but were still nervous.

They carried out the demolition, taking all precautions, at 0700 hours on 4 January. The building, which would require several months to be torn down, collapsed. Today the clean-up work is proceeding over a broad front at the site of the combine. A new installation will be raised here.

I asked the chief of Engineer Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense to assess the work of the military engineers of the district. Gen. Lt. V. Kuznetsov said:

"The experience gained in demolishing the combine is unique. It undoubtedly will come in handy in the domestic economy. In particular, in extinguishing grain elevator fires."

Further Details of Medical Work in Armenia
18010295 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
20 Dec 88 First Edition p 4

[Report by Sr Lt Med Serv Yu. Golov: "Every Third Victim of the Earthquake in Armenia Received Aid From the Military Medics"]

[Text] It seemed that the symbols of death would dominate for a long time here at the stadium in Spitak. It was the site for identifying the dead and a storage area for caskets. The very next day following the tragedy, however, military medics from Leningrad and from the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov set up tents at the stadium. Dispensaries, an operating ward, a ward for dressing wounds, a shock-treatment ward, a temporary hospitalization section, an isolation ward and a pharmacy were set up just 2 hours following the arrival of a group headed by Doctor of Medical Science and Col Med Serv V. Sapukhevich. The large-scale reception of victims began immediately.

...The year-old girl had lain beneath the ruins of the building for around 100 hours, naked, without food or water. When she was brought to the medical facility there appeared to be no hope of saving her. Col Med Serv V. Samakhdarov immediately began warming the child with hot-water bottles, rubbing her with alcohol and massaging her, and she was given warm fluids intravenously. When the girl was able to drink, she was given hot tea. She began to cry. Tears also rolled down the cheeks of Galina Boarshilova, the nurse who was caring for the child. They were tears of joy: the girl would live.

Majs Med Serv A. Smirnov and S. Zhidkov performed several complicated operations in the field.

What is the most stringent criterion of a doctor's virtue? I believe it is whether or not he saves the person's life. Well, not one of the victims reaching the military medics in Spitak died. All of them were evacuated to Yerevan by helicopter after receiving essential medical aid.

At the Yerevan Garrison military hospital I was shown Lena Logvinova and Yulya Khrebtova, daughters of servicemen and third-grade students at Leninakan Secondary School No. 33. They were getting ready for school when the earthquake struck. The elements turned their building into a pile of rubble within several seconds. How they suffered! There was unbearable pain, long hours of hearing their mothers cry, and despair. Soldiers rescued the girls in a semi-conscious state from beneath the ruins. They were taken to the military hospital. The military medics had to do everything possible and impossible to save the girls' lives, and were then able to avoid amputating their arms. Dozens of people helped take care of them. I heard the greatest praise for Lt Col Med Serv V. Didenko, however. "He is a man with a big heart and extraordinary sensitivity," is how Lyudmila Logvinova, Lena's mother, described him.

It was some time before I had an opportunity to speak with Vitaliy Viktorovich. He was performing operations and making the rounds of patients....

"When we learned of Armenia's tragedy at the Central Military Clinical Hospital imeni A.A. Vishnevskiy," the military surgeon recalled, "most of the nurses and doctors expressed a desire to leave immediately for the areas affected. The best trained doctors and nurses with experience in handling large numbers of victims were selected. The very next day we arrived in Yerevan as part of a composite group and immediately set to work. We shall work as long as needed."

At the headquarters for the medical reinforcement groups from the USSR Ministry of Defense's Military Medical Directorate I attended a conference of a medical service operations group headed by Col Gen Med Serv F. Komarov, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate. I asked him to comment on the performance of the military medics in their provision of aid to the victims.

"A medical operations group was formed at the instructions of Army Gen D. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, just a few hours following the tragedy," Fedor Ivanovich said. "A total of 290 of the best trained military doctors and nurses arrived in Yerevan the following morning from the central military hospitals and the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov. The group was provided with all of the necessary medical equipment and medicine."

The performance of the Transcaucasus Military District's medical service, headed by Maj Gen Med Serv P. Korotkikh, deserves the highest of praise. Just 4 hours after the main tremor personnel of the military medical facilities in the areas affected began providing aid to the victims. Although the building housing the garrison military hospital in Leninakan was almost totally destroyed, the military medics took all possible steps to evacuate the patients. A military hospital was set up in the field, where victims received medical aid until the medical reinforcement groups arrived. More than 2,000 victims received aid from district military medics during the first 2 days and nights alone. A 460-bed military hospital with all the necessary equipment was set up in Yerevan on 8 December, following the arrival of the composite group from Moscow and Leningrad. Groups of military medics were set up the same day, which began to work with republic medical facilities. For example, around 200 extremely complicated operations were performed just by the group of surgeons headed by Professor and Col Med Serv V. Dedushkin, who operated at the "emergency" hospital. The best military specialists in the treatment of wound complications are working at the city's (Erebuzhzh) hospital. The treatment is closely coordinated with doctors from the USSR and Armenian ministries of health. In view of the numerous phases of treatment it would not be proper to cite any specific figures on victims receiving medical aid from military

medics alone. To give an idea of the amount of work performed by the military medics, however, I can say that they took part in the treatment of practically every third earthquake victim. Summing up the data is a matter for the future. Practical work is the main thing right now.

The present agenda includes providing good medical support for troops stationed in the area of the earthquake and those arriving there to level the ruins and perform restoration work. In addition, infectious diseases must be prevented from breaking out among the local population.

Additional units are now being formed in the disaster areas. They include military clinics, a military field hospital, mobile X-ray and stomatological facilities, sanitation and epidemiology laboratories. The military medics are working closely with all the military rear services.

**Baku Martial Law Situation Described;
Commander Interviewed**

*18010300 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 88 p 6*

[Article by Special Correspondent Lt Col O. Falichev: "Truth is Strongest of All"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Our special correspondent met with the military commandant of the Special Area of the city of Baku.

Martial law... We have not had occasion to encounter it in peacetime, but just such martial law was declared in Baku as of 0001 hours on 24 November of this year. How did this affect city life? How is this situation characterized today, almost a month later?

We began the spot check along the city's evening streets from the military commandant's office of Narimanovskiy Rayon. In seeing us off Commandant V. Sokolov said:

"Until recently this rayon remained one of the most difficult. There are 34 enterprises on its territory. Now the situation has normalized because of the steps taken, although it cannot be called satisfactory."

Life in the city seems to die away after curfew begins. We drive along streets that are absolutely empty, with no vehicles or people. Mobile military details patrol government establishments, the telegraph office, and other important installations and enterprises. Lone passersby are checked to see that they have special passes, and vehicles are examined.

"Many people were taken into custody for violating curfew in the first days," says Col Yu. Gorbunov, who is next to me in the vehicle. "Now the people have accepted it as a necessity."

One of the first "sites" which we visited was the screening point where persons taken into custody are checked. Who is among the night "guests" today? Here is A. Aliyev, a pupil at the Ministry of Grain Products training-course combine. He says he knew it was curfew but was taking his mother to an evening train and was delayed. How are such people handled? A separate decision is made for each case. If it is found that a person was on the street at an unauthorized time through inadvertence or acute necessity they release him. As a rule this is done in the morning, and the place of work or study is informed. There are others as well such as E. Aslanova from the settlement of Akhmedli who attempted to escape in a vehicle and is being held until the circumstances are clarified.

As we see, it is still a far cry from tranquility. Nevertheless, this is nothing compared with the earlier situation in the city when crowds of excited people with black and green headbands and Islamic flags attempted literally to seal off government establishments and enterprises, and when they assembled on Lenin Square for many days. The most difficult day was 5 December. It was then, after numerous but alas fruitless appeals to reasonableness and requests to clear the square for sanitary cleaning, that the decision was made to dislodge the demonstrators. Soldiers displayed supreme self-control and calm in response to dirty shouts and the provocations of hooligan elements. Airborne soldier Lt Col D. Milishkevich, Lt Col I. Gasimov, Maj N. Konovalov, Maj A. Dorokhin and others put their best foot forward in that situation. The soldiers did not waver even when a passenger vehicle knifed into their ranks and Sr Lt I. Chiruk fell from the impact. Those who did not heed common sense had to be taken into custody.

Unfortunately neither party and soviet agencies nor the militia were able to adjust normal city life in that period and guarantee the fulfillment of citizens' constitutional provisions and rights. By that time many tens of motor vehicles had been disabled, shop windows had been broken out, and picketers were on watch at the enterprises. The citizens' honor and dignity were being openly flouted.

Imposition of martial law was not only a forced measure, but the only correct one. This concentrated all power in the hands of Col Gen M. Tyagunov, military commandant of the Special Area of the city of Baku. He was given necessary powers by decree of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, and above all for restoring citizens' constitutional rights.

The bulk of the people, all working people of Baku, and party members greeted this not only with understanding, but also with gratitude. "Our special thanks to Soviet Army personnel for imposing order in the city," said A. Dzhamalov, party raykom first secretary, in a report at the party conference. These words were drowned in applause.

When we were leaving the screening point Maj Militia K. Sudzhaddinov, an investigator, provided the information that 1,100 persons had been delivered to this point since 24 November. Now only a few are being delivered. In recent days there has not been a single serious incident of violence against Armenians in the rayon.

Our next site was a plant dormitory. Young people greeted us at the entrance. They introduced themselves: S. Akhundov and F. Ibishev. They were previous soldiers, both having performed international duty in Afghanistan. Up until 5 December they had helped troop subunits impose order on Lenin Square.

"It is difficult to understand those fellow citizens of ours," says Akhundov, "who decided to shut themselves up in their little national world and detach themselves from the surrounding world, including by a language barrier."

Unfortunately there were also attempts here to conduct all business correspondence and even write out prescriptions in the Azerbaijani language. Complaints began and it was necessary to appoint a commandant's office under the republic Ministry of Health.

We finished the spot check of the city in which martial law had been imposed. "The situation in the city has remained calm over the past days," I would hear in the latest television summary on the following morning. What lay behind this?

I asked the military commandant of the Special Area of the city of Baku to describe the situation. Col Gen M. Tyagunov said:

"The situation in Baku in late November and early December was complicated. The city essentially was paralyzed. Instructions of the local authorities were not being carried out. Nevertheless we succeeded in returning calm to Baku and establishing order in the city. Imposition of martial law played an important role. This measure substantially influenced the work methods and style. The republic Supreme Soviet Presidium gave the military commandant broad powers for restoring citizens' constitutional rights. A curfew was imposed and transportation, the post office, the telegraph office, trade, finances, medical services and many other spheres of life were taken under control. Orders of the Special Area military commandant became mandatory for all.

"Here is what I wish to emphasize in particular. Individual displays of extremism were stopped not only and not so much by force; our principal weapon consisted of frank, direct talks to the people and discussions in the squares, streets, plants and dormitories. We told the people exactly how things stood. We spoke the truth. We didn't hide from the people. At times it was not easy, but the generals, officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates put their very best foot forward. I would say that they were the agitators and propagandists of party and

government policy and its conductors to the masses. It was the force of the spoken word and the truth that helped us avoid instances of the use of firearms and avoid serious consequences. And military personnel really deserve the greatest thanks for their composure, awareness, self-control and finally simply for having great respect for every city resident. In numerous letters and telephone calls residents of the capital of Azerbaijan express sincere gratitude to our soldier for the fact that he returned peace to the city.

"Unfortunately I cannot yet say that the situation has fully normalized and that there are no longer causes for concern and vigilance. It will obviously take time to paralyze the forces sowing international discord once and for all. It is too early to speak of revoking martial law and removing troops from Baku. The soldiers will perform the duty of keeping order as much as will be required for ensuring the safety of the populace and normal working rhythm of the republic capital's life. The important thing is that Baku residents and the soldiers who hastened to their assistance are unanimous in their innermost dreams and motives: to see out the old year in peace and tranquility and to greet the new year in joy and labor."

More on Military Medical Work in Armenia
18010311 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Dec 88 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Col Gen of the Medical Service F. Komarov, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate, and Col of the Medical Service E. Nечайев, chief surgeon of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj Yu. Mamchur: "Armenia: A New Situation for Medicine"; date and place not specified; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In Armenia, the intense work of military medical personnel to help those suffering from the earthquake is continuing. The most difficult and dramatic stage of the work is already over. What new tasks now face the military medical service in overcoming the consequences of the natural disaster? What must be done in the near future? Col Gen of the Medical Service F. Komarov, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate, and Col of the Medical Service E. Nечайев, chief surgeon of the USSR Ministry of Defense, answer this and other questions of the "Krasnaya Zvezda" correspondent.

[Mamchur] I had the opportunity to witness how your colleagues fought for the lives of unfortunate victims. This was a truly heroic and—under peacetime conditions, perhaps—unprecedented labor of scientists, physicians and nurses, which was reported by "Krasnaya Zvezda" and other mass media. Comrade colonel general, what are the most important problems for the disaster areas that the medical personnel see as most pressing today?

[Komarov] Above all there is the problem of infectious diseases. Epidemiologically the situation is now satisfactory both among the population as well as the forces; there are only isolated and extremely rare cases of illness. But, taking into account the fact that for various reasons we are observing an acute decline of the public health conditions in the regions of the destruction, there is justification for expecting an increase in infectious morbidity, especially hepatitis. To prevent it, we are carrying out mass measures against epidemics—immunization and vaccination....

In addition, subunits have been established for disinfection, degassing and other kinds of disinfection of the area. To lead their work, major generals of the medical service V. Perepelkin and V. Chvyrev, the chief epidemiologist and chief hygienist, respectively, of the Defense Ministry, came here. They are working in close contact with the local public health authorities and medical service of the USSR Civil Defense.

[Mamchur] Comrade colonel general, there are many rumors circulating among the local population about the mental shock to those experiencing the tragedy and working in the zone of destruction....

[Komarov] Certainly those comrades who are participating directly in overcoming the consequences of the earthquake are, among other things, pulling dead people out of the ruins, burying them, and experiencing tremendous mental stress and excessive emotional strain. Many lost relatives and loved ones. People are sometimes under a triple load, which also produces a pronounced physical and mental overfatigue.

A great deal of practical and research work is being done in this direction by a group of physicians under the leadership of Col of the Medical Service V. Ivashkin, chief therapist of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Military psychologists and psychopharmacologist came to help. Their actions are being coordinated by Col of the Medical Service V. Smirnov, chief Defense Ministry psychiatrist. A system for preventing mental disorders has been developed and is in operation.

[Mamchur] Fedor Ivanovich, was the experience gained by the military medical service in overcoming the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station utilized in Armenia?

[Komarov] It was utilized in the most direct way. The knowledge from Chernobyl was not in vain. And the high degree of organization of the military medical personnel from the first hours after the earthquake is evidence of this. But the situation here differs significantly from that of Chernobyl. There only a relatively small group of people was subjected to the effects of radiation, whereas here the number of victims is in the tens of thousands. At Chernobyl, there was practically no destruction other than the station itself but here entire cities and villages were literally wiped from the face of the earth.

In short, the situation here in Armenia appears more dramatic. When we circled the destroyed villages and cities by helicopter on the first day after the earthquake, the impression was very oppressive.

[Mamchur] Fedor Ivanovich, what help will the Central Military Medical Directorate provide in the coming weeks and months to military service personnel and members of their families who suffered from the earthquake?

[Komarov] The necessary measures are now being taken to provide such assistance. As you know, all of the injured military personnel, relatives and loved ones have been transferred to the Yerevan Military Hospital from different medical institutions in the republic. It has been decided to give them and other victims the possibility to rest and regain their health in military sanatoriums. Places have already been prepared there.

I want to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all rear services of the Ministry of Defense—food supply, clothing, fuel and lubricants, military communications and others—for the tremendous help that they have given us. For the successful work of the medical service under such extreme conditions would be unthinkable without close contact with them.

[Mamchur] Who among your colleagues now working in Armenia could you single out?

[Komarov] The newspaper is not big enough for all the names. To be fair, however, I will say that the heaviest burden was on the representatives of the different surgical specialties. Col of the Medical Service E. Nchayev, chief surgeon of the Ministry of Defense, will speak of their actions in more detail.

[Mamchur] Thank you, comrade colonel general. So, Eduard Aleksandrovich, you have the word.

[Nchayev] The fact that we had a major disaster in Armenia required that we make maximum use of the essential current principles of military field surgery. A particular difficulty was the mass arrival of victims with severe injuries accompanied by the so-called prolonged-compression syndrome and, as a result, by acute renal insufficiency.

We were prepared for this and as early as 9 December we had organized a specialized artificial-kidney section with four machines and we immediately began to perform hemodialysis, that is, the cleansing of the victim's blood of impurities, which permitted us to save many victims.

A second and no less important problem that several military surgeons have tried to resolve was that of festering septic complications. Jointly with Doctor of Medical Sciences O. Sarukhanyan, chief surgeon of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Health at "Erebuni" Hospital, special departments were set up over the course of

several days to treat festering wound complications. More than 80 of our specialists (the group of the professor colonels of the medical service M. Lizanets and I. Kosachev) essentially established a republic center for purulent surgery.

[Mamchur] Eduard Aleksandrovich, what experience will the military medical personnel and, in particular, the surgeons draw from today's work?

[Nechayev] A scientific group has been established to generalize the results of the work. Its conclusions will have the most serious significance for the further development of military medicine, in particular for military field surgery.

Railroad Troops Rebuilding Lines in Armenia
18010325 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 89 p 1

[Reports by Capt A. Syrov, Maj V. Demin and Lt S. Kuzmin under the rubric "On the Military Wire": "Green Light to the Trains—The Railroad Troops are Restoring the Sidings in Cities and Towns that Suffered from the Earthquake in Armenia"]

[Text] SPITAK—Two railroad battalions—a track and a bridging battalion—arrived here as early as December 15 to restore the sidings to local enterprises—the sugar plant and the bakery-products combine.

Maj V. Kramskoy relates that "before Spitak we were working at the Nalband station, laying track and clearing obstructions. The company under the command of Sr Lt V. Kalinichev distinguished itself in those days. Today we are rebuilding the sidings to the bakery-products combine that were destroyed. All are working in inspired fashion and exceeding their shift targets."

The bridging railroad battalion under Maj Pinigin recently restored the bridge in the area of Spitak station. They then began the construction of sidings to the sugar plant. Here the railroad troops acted especially skillfully and smartly. (Capt A. Syrov)

BAYANDUR—This station has been mentioned more than once in reports from the region that was subjected to the earthquake. Today the efforts of the transport construction workers here are aimed at expanding the work front for the receipt of freight as fast as possible.

The task of developing the station has been charged to the railroad track battalion commanded by Maj S. Gonorcharov. This is 12 kilometers of track, 21 switches and about 20,000 cubic meters of ballast.

The battalion complement includes reserve troops just called up. Pvt O. Sadchenko, for example, who before this completed the school of combat training in Afghanistan. And Sgt Yu. Dyasuk and Sgt I. Korostyanov—participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. (Maj V. Demin)

AREVIK—This station is located not far from Leninakan. The flow of freight arriving here from all corners of the country is growing with every day. The cities and towns of Armenia that are being resurrected need brick, cement, piping and building materials. The station is in immediate need of a major unloading base. The railroad soldiers are taking part in building it.

Lt Col V. Kharitonov, commander of one of the subunits, says that "we have been given a difficult task, and the deadlines are as tight as can be. We have to assemble 40 sets of switching equipment and lay over 20 kilometers of station track."

When I left the subunit, they were finishing up a cut under the future rail line, and the first switches were already lying on the just-poured fill.

**Civilian Economic Gain From TEL
Dismantlement**

18010342 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 22, 1988 p 4

[Unattributed 150-word article entitled: "Cranes Instead of Missiles".]

[Text] AiF has already discussed how a civilian economic impact may be expected from the realization of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of short and medium range missiles. Highly qualified specialists will be freed for work in the civilian economy. Industrial power will be reconfigured for the output of new, currently urgently needed products, such as baby carriages and quality washing machines. ...

Recently the American magazine TIME discussed new possibilities for the use of elements of combat equipment for peaceful necessities. The discussion concerns a Soviet-West German contract on reequipping transporters for Soviet medium range missiles into gigantic mobile cranes. TIME emphasized in particular that the Soviet proposal on cooperation with the West German firm "Liebherr Werk" was put forward just six weeks after the Washington summit.

Installed on a Soviet transporter, the West German mechanism with a 75 meter telescoping arm is able to lift a 154 ton load. This will be used for the construction of bridges and large industrial objects.

The "Liebherr Werk" company has already supplied to the Soviet Union equipment for maintenance in the low temperature conditions of the construction of the Transsiberian gas pipeline, as well as equipment which was used in the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

As TIME notes in the next five years, given the cooperation of the Odessa enterprise "Yanvarets" the West German firm plans to achieve an output of up to 700 mobile cranes per year.

Military Economic Reform Discussed

18010162 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Lt Col S. Levitskiy: "To Full Economic Accountability"]

[Text] At the beginning of the year, USSR Ministry of Defense industrial and agricultural enterprises, and construction organizations, shifted to full economic accountability.

Our correspondent, Lt Col S. Levitskiy, talks with some of the specialists taking part in restructuring the military economy.

[Maj Gen V. Medvedenko, directorate chief, Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense] Economic accountability and self financing... the essence of the innovation is that, at USSR Ministry of Defense enterprises and organizations operating under economic accountability, not command and administrative levers, but economic levers will serve as the predominant moving force of production. Plans will be developed at local organizations, so that the labor collectives themselves will have an interest in doing more with fewer forces.

Authority is also being granted to organize the established quantity of production with fewer people, and to use the funds thus saved at their own discretion. Bonuses for military personnel will become the same as in the economy. Increasing the profit withholding taxes that go into enterprise and organization funds for the development of production and the social sphere is a principle of self-financing. And the main point is to interest people in doing good work.

[Lt Gen M. Polishchuk, chief, Military Finance and Economic Faculty, Moscow Finance Institute] As soon as the question of economic accountability was raised, it was found that even many experienced managers have at times inadequately thorough knowledge of contemporary issues. Therefore, initially a special cadre training center was needed. This unusual role was given to our faculty. And we have already had seven graduating classes of military production organization commanders. The military scientists carefully studied the achievements of the country's economy, in order to apply everything that is new and advanced when the economic accountability enterprises in the armed forces shift to full economic accountability. Our faculty has even begun to be called the 'military economic academy.'

[Levitskiy] Perhaps new names come to be in this way. But isn't what we call the economy of the regiment, and the ship, being left out in this so high-volume work?

[Maj Gen S. Yermakov, professor] Zealous economic management at the troop level is a serious problem. Of course, we are glad to work with each commander, but the faculty simply does not have the capability to do this. Meanwhile, economic cadres for the army and navy are not being trained in military educational institutions.

The new economic management principles require qualitatively new knowledge. Here is a simple example. Many commanders experience difficulties with organizing projects by the economic method. This is precisely due to lack of knowledge of this method. We prepared and disseminated to the forces material to provide practical assistance. They discussed the authority of officials, opportunities for their economic activity, rules for structuring mutual relations with civilian production organizations, and many other things.

[Levitskiy] Does the faculty graduate military finance specialists?

[Polishchuk] I understand the essence of your question. It is true that the duty position titles of our graduates are probably obsolete. The faculty trains not only finance specialists, but also economists. One could say, assistant commanders for economics. But it is not a matter of a title. I served in many command positions with troops, and, frankly, I regret that at times I saw only controllers and pay masters in the financial workers subordinate to me. However, it is precisely these specialists (each at his own level) who can make effective economic calculations of exercises and lessons.

[Yermanov] We still have to break the psychology that everything is free. The qualitative parameter of our defense doctrine is primarily the economic factor, something one does not hear about, unfortunately, in the flow of discussions on weapons and equipment. I think that it is necessary to expand the economic authority of unit and ship commanders.

[Col Gen V. Dutov, Hero of Socialist Labor] So far some commanders are not even able to use the authority granted to them.

We are at the start of the road in economic accountability and self financing. Intensive training of cadres at all levels, including political workers, is continuing. However, far from everyone has turned to economic accountability and zealous management at the troop level. The problems require serious attention, and, most importantly, solutions.

Range of Goods Produced by Defense Plant Noted
18270038 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 7 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by N. Lisovenko, *IZVESTIYA* special correspondent, Krasnyy Luch, Voroshilovgrad Oblast: "Defense Plant Without Secrets;" earlier item on this subject appeared in Daily Report FBIS-SOV-89-003A, 5 January 1989 pp 51-54]

[Text] Recently *IZVESTIYA* published a talk with I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, entitled "A Peaceful Profession for a War-Industry Plant." Following is a correspondence from Donbass on the experience of the Standart Plant, which was able to organize the production of high quality consumer goods in mass demand.

It was always accepted that this enterprise should not be mentioned, for although located in the very center of the second largest city in Voroshilovgrad Oblast, it was supposed to have neither buildings, nor workers, nor output, whether missile warheads or night-vision instruments. What was not there did not exist. It was simply under the jurisdiction of the respective ministry, which explained the entire strictness of its regime....

Nonetheless, during the period of perestroika Standart as, in general, many sectors in the defense complex, began to provide services to the population and to produce consumer goods. Together with V. Popov, the plant's director, we visited the shops where the production of goods in mass demand has now been organized.

"Look at our casting machines and automatic presses!" said S. Pyshkova, shop chief, admiringly. "It is precisely thanks to this modern equipment with which our production facility was recently equipped that we can produce excellent-quality goods."

S. Pyshkova was not exaggerating in the least. Indeed, the quality of output is excellent. Where Standart is particularly successful is the area of illumination engineering products, as the specialists describe them. We saw a superb five-bulb chandelier made of aluminum which, as a result of technological devices, seemed made of ancient bronze. It was hard to tear our eyes away from electric lamps made in the form of antique kerosene lamps. Artistic galvanizing had converted them into lamps made of black silver, brass and blazing copper....

"We have orders for such lamps from Riga, Minsk and Ashkhabad, and virtually all republics," said Ye. Petrenko, chief of the plant's planning department. "There is tremendous demand for them."

Today many are the customers for Ruslan and Lugan lamps, which cost respectively 32 and 14 rubles. However, the plant's annual output cannot exceed 50,000 of either model. Could serial production be increased?

"We must constantly increase variety," objects A. Chuprik, the head designer at the consumer goods shop. "Currently we already have 16 different models and intend to raise their number to 30."

The latest of the plant's developments is today a bathtub mirror set. It cost a great deal to the enterprise: It required ceramics which were scarce; a contract for cooperation was concluded with the Slavyansk plant for armature insulators. The new set will be on the market soon.

Last year the Standart Plant produced consumer goods worth almost 6 million rubles. This included chandeliers, candelabras, ancient style sports cups, children's school calculators, for which there is endless demand in our computerized age, and lamp shades made of multi-colored fabrics, which have once again become popular.

Today Krasnyy Luch produces goods worth 1 billion rubles. Of these, consumer goods account for 166 million. Eighty-five kopeks per ruble of such goods go to the city wage fund (at the start of the 5-year plan, no more than 60). The aim is to achieve a "ruble per ruble" by 1990. Standart has already surpassed this level.

DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School Short of Fuel
18010321 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 89, First Edition p 1

[Article: "Vehicles Laid Up—An Alarming Situation Was Created at the DOSAAF Motor Vehicle Schools in Rovno Oblast Due to Shortage of Gasoline"]

[Text]For the second straight month the training vehicles in our DOSAAF motor vehicle school have been standing idle. The reason is the same—no gasoline, although the limit on fuel and lubricants has not nearly been reached. Due to this, the schedule for training specialists for the Armed Forces and the economy has been disrupted.

The school leaders have twice appealed for assistance to the oblast state petroleum products directorate, but they did not even deign to reply. From whom shall we await help?

S. Koshin, motor vehicle school chief; L. Pinchuk, senior foreman, N. Los, instructor, and others. A total of eight signatures.

Dubrovitskiy DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School, Rovno Oblast

What is the POL [petroleum, oils and lubricants] supply situation at other oblast DOSAAF schools? Lt Col G. Lisenkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, asked this question to Capt 2d Rank V. Tosnak, chairman of the Rovno Oblast DOSAAF Committee.

"Not a bit better than at Dubrovitskiy. Scheduled gasoline delivery times are not being met. And this is not the only instance. Such things are repeated almost every year. It is necessary to coordinate with the military units and borrow gasoline from them. Thanks to the commanders, many come to our aid. Only, you see, the units also do not have special fuel reserves. So, we can count on only one or two hundred liters. In short, we collect a little bit here and there all over the world. Recently gasoline was delivered from Kiev and Ivano-Frankovsk oblasts. And this costs a pretty penny. But what can we do? There is little hope that the oblast state petroleum products directorate will react effectively. Twice, on 5

October and 1 November, I personally wrote to Comrade M. Pripasnik, the directorate chief, and asked that urgent measures be taken. To this day I have not received an answer."

I called M. Pripasnik, chief of the Rovno Oblast State Petroleum Products Directorate: Does he know about the distressful situation concerning providing fuel for the oblast DOSAAF educational organizations?

"I know, but so far there is nothing I can do to help. Many motor vehicle enterprises in the city and oblast are in the same situation. The delivery plan has been disrupted. Here are the latest data: It is nearing the end of December and the oblast has not received half of what it is authorized."

"And what are the causes of this situation?"

"There are numerous causes. The lack of a permanent supplier; shortage of capacities for lengthy storage of petroleum products; deficiencies in planning; constant "tension" with rail transport. And everything leads to interruptions in deliveries and has a painful effect on the work of our consumers.

"With respect to the requests from the motor vehicle schools, as soon as fuel arrives at the bases it will be distributed. I promise this. But some of these top-priority consumers will have to be put off. You see, the directorate services more than a thousand enterprises."

What can we say? The prospects are unenviable. How can the situation be corrected, and a precise schedule of deliveries of fuel to the DOSAAF educational institutions be established? This question, asked in a conversation with N. Popovich, deputy chief, Ukrainian SSR State Petroleum Products Resources Department, remained essentially unanswered. The only fact that I was able to ascertain was that the shortfall of gasoline shipped to the republic from the all-union fund was more than 240,000 tons for 11 months of last year.

A critical situation was created, of course. But we also cannot leave the motor vehicle schools on "starvation rations." What is the solution? In our view the defense society educational institutions must be considered among the consumers who are provided fuel in first priority. After all, they are training specialists for the Armed Forces, and the combat readiness of the army and navy depend on their work. I would like to hear the opinion on this account held by the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply.

Col Gen Lobov Visit to Turkey

*18010392z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Unattributed 30-word article entitled: "Official Visit"]

[Text] In conformity with a previous agreement the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Colonel-General V.N. Lobov will carry out an official visit to the Turkish Republic during the second half of May.

New Western Weapons Systems Noted

*18010320 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 89 First Edition p 3*

[Report under the rubric "In the Arsenals and at the Ranges"]

[Text]

Elevating Launcher

The magazine ARMADA INTERNATIONAL reports that the Krauss Maffei, MBB and MAN companies exhibited an experimental model of the Panther, a wheeled (8X8) self-propelled antitank launcher designed by them, at an international air exhibition in Hannover, FRG. The main difference between it and similar existing weapons is that the turret with weapons and gunner-operator is located on an elevating platform (see photo [photographs not reproduced]).

The rotating turret is armored and is equipped with a filter-ventilation system. One triple-unit launcher with Hot antitank guided missiles is mounted on each side (another 12 missiles are stored in the battle stowage).

According to the magazine WEHRTECHNIK, a version of the elevating platform armed with 16 Hot antitank guided missiles is being designed in the FRG for the Leopard-1 tank chassis. Foreign experts believe that vehicles with the elevating platforms will have greater survivability on the battle field and greater combat capabilities. Among other things, it is anticipated that the weapon can be used for combatting helicopters.

New Destroyer

The magazine DEFENSE has reported that the Asagiri, a destroyer bearing the number DD 151, has joined the fighting strength of Japan's naval forces. The ship's main specifications and performance characteristics: standard displacement, 3,400 tons; displacement loaded, 4,200 tons; main dimensions, 137X14.6X4.5 m; speed, more than 30 knots; crew, 220. Its armament includes two four-canister launchers of Harpoon antiship missiles, a Sea Sparrow antiaircraft missile system with ready inventory of 20 missiles, an 8-unit Asrok ASW missile launcher, an Oto Melara single 76mm turret gun mount

(maximum quadrant elevation 85 degrees) for combatting surface (land) targets at ranges of up to 16 kilometers and air targets at up to 12, two Phalanx 6-barrel 20mm artillery systems, two triple-tube 324mm torpedo launchers for Mk 46 ASW torpedoes, and one Sea King ASW helicopter.

Self-Propelled Mortars

The magazine MILITARY TECHNOLOGY reports that experimental models of VPX40M self-propelled mortars on a tracked chassis (upper photo) and RPX40M mortars on wheeled chassis (bottom photo) have undergone field testing in France. They are armed with a rifled 120mm mortar, which can fire a rocket-assisted shell (muzzle velocity 365 m/s) a distance of up to 13 kilometers. The mortar has a vertical laying angle of 45-85 degrees; horizontal, 10 degrees right or left; basic ammunition load, 10-12 rounds.

The self-propelled mortars are quipped with a 125hp diesel engine and hydropneumatic suspension. The armored hull protects the crew of four against 7.62mm bullets to a range of 100 meters (front) and 300 meters (sides).

It is planned to provide the mass-produced mortars with a device simplifying loading (which will make it possible to increase the rate of fire to 12 rounds per minute), with navigational equipment and a ballistic computer.

NATO Emphasis on Tank Asymmetry Criticized

*52000004b Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
11 Jan 89 p 3*

[Commentary by Vadim Biryukov: "Actual and Fictitious Imbalances"]

[Text] The new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, formulated at the end of last year at the UN General Assembly session, met with a broad response in the West. There were plenty of positive assessments of the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet government to reduce Armed Forces and armaments. The readiness of the USSR to make changes in the deployment of its forces was welcomed. Positive responses to Soviet initiatives were also heard in NATO headquarters in Brussels.

However, the North Atlantic Bloc has not stopped there. It is also formulating proposals on lowering the level of military confrontation. Unfortunately, their distinguishing feature is a unilateral approach to the problem of eliminating imbalances and asymmetries. Let us, it claims, reduce only the type of armaments in which the advantage is on the side of the Warsaw Pact. In particular, it is being claimed that the main threat to European stability is created by Soviet tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers. Therefore, according to the Atlanticists, it is precisely these types of armaments that should be the first to be reduced.

Is this fair? Whereas in terms of tanks the advantage is indeed on the side of the Warsaw Pact, in terms of artillery, for example, it has been artificially created in the West. Western specialists count only artillery weapons of a 100-mm or higher caliber. If we include all artillery, including 75 mm guns and 45 mm mortars, it turns out that NATO's superiority is in the order of 20,000 units. Furthermore, according to published Western data, it is obvious that NATO enjoys superiority in elements of military force such as fighter-bomber and ground-attack aircraft as well as fire support helicopters.

Nonetheless, so far NATO circles are not mentioning the need to eliminate this imbalance.

Therefore, the USSR has taken a unilateral initiative aimed at lowering military confrontation in Central Europe. Now it is NATO's turn. However, it would appear that its members are in no hurry to take counter-steps, again and again repeating the argument which sets the teeth on edge, of the alleged military superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, the world is awaiting the constructive answer of the Western countries.

**Soviet Chemical Weapons Use in Afghanistan
Denied**

*LD1901121689 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1052 GMT 19 Jan 89*

[Text] Moscow, 19 Jan (TASS)—TASS political observer Askold Biryukov writes:

It does not sink in. Indeed, how could such a respected British newspaper as THE INDEPENDENT literally, as the saying goes, swallow the hook without even any bait?

On 13 January THE INDEPENDENT carried a letter from a certain Gulam Yakhya, representative of an "Islamic alliance of mujahidin," which said, *inter alia*:

"The Soviet Union has been using chemical weapons in Afghanistan for over 2 years. Dr Heindriks, from Gent University, Belgium, is an appointed UN expert on chemical weapons. He has confirmed the fact that mustard gas and new gas had been used in Afghanistan...."

I have been in Afghanistan and have seen samples of the chemical weapons that the so called "fighters for faith" used more than once in the country, not against the enemy but on the peaceful population. Cases of extremists, who were sent into the country from outside, using these kinds of weapons have been registered in photographs and in films. It is precisely they who, trying to cover up their crimes, sought more than once to put the blame on Soviet internationalist servicemen.

Afghans know well who brings them bread, kerosene, and other items essential for existence, and who brings robbery and destruction. Here is a question: How has the esteemed British newspaper taken on trust the irresponsible assertions of a certain Yakhya? Is it not because this person has used the authority of a well-known Belgian scientist as a cover?

We asked our correspondent in Brussels, Valeriy Shashkov, to get in touch with Professor Heindriks. The scientist told him: "I never analyzed samples of soil, urine, or blood which had come from Afghanistan, and I never maintained that chemical weapons were used in that country."

As is known, THE INDEPENDENT is a popular newspaper and one can understand the wish of those who publish it to increase its popularity. Even so, it should not do this in the way resorted to by this publication. By drawing indiscriminately from a dirty source it is not difficult to soil one's own reputation.

**Coverup of Civilian Deaths Recounted,
Unreliability of Afghan Troops Noted**
*18010197 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Feb 89 p 13-14*

[Article by Gennadiy Bocharov, entitled: "International Life: Afghan"]

[Excerpt]

III

The first of our people in Afghanistan were greeted with flowers and smiles. Their hands were shaken and the first ones were welcomed as friends. Not always and not everywhere, but—for the most part. Thus the illusion was born: they were glad to see us.

Soon, however, the war divided the people. And then the situation became quite confused.

Boys from the Soyuz discovered that along with the people devoted to the ideals of the new life there were those who could betray it. And they did.

The soldiers became convinced that in the villages where the peaceful, true-believing people lived, the ones they had come to defend, they would fire at the Soviet soldiers with all kinds of weapons.

With lightning speed there spread throughout the army rumors about the monstrous outrages committed on the dead, about the beasts who, alas, were actually Muslim fanatics. The soldiers were no longer able to tell which of the Afghans were for them and which were against them. The logic of war ultimately led to mutual hostility. What seemed unthinkable yesterday seemed ordinary today. Or at least not as unthinkable as it had been. In such situations, once you have gotten into them, as we know, there is no way out.

There was also another aspect.

There is an immense difference between the internationalist volunteers who participated in the events in Spain during the thirties, with their independently developed convictions, and the soldiers of the eighties, who before being sent to Afghanistan were called to formation on the parade ground and told that they were internationalists.

The result was a moral deformation. We did not want to notice that in the black shadow of the Afghan war freaks of all stripes were casting their own dark shadows—foreign currency speculators, narcotics dealers—God only knows how many of them crossed our border from Afghanistan during these years—speculators in firearms, all kinds of them.

For a long time we ignored the fact that there were many sides to the Afghan war. It was as though we had forgotten that any war—the Afghan war included—

means not only combat, but also life; that any war produces not only heroes but also scoundrels; that war is a terrible thing for everyone. And along with the manifestation of courage by some, there is the indifference of others—and it is not always the person's own fault. In a place where Ivanov can hold out, Petrov might fail. Some people came out of battle stronger while others went directly to the psycho wards. How many of them were there who lost their minds?

When a soldier is sent to a foreign country, even with the noblest purpose, society should be prepared for very unpleasant things—such as cruelty, bitterness, and hatred. And sometimes also a perversion of the goal itself. Which is what occurred.

The entire country became a battlefield and the soldiers saw all the horrors of such a war. The soldiers recognized the ubiquitousness of its fronts, which crossed through one and the same village and sometimes even through one and the same family. The development of events and the situation itself led to a point I shall be discussing in the next episode. But here I emphasize: the circumstances are not a justification for the cruelty, they are merely an appropriate condition for it.

This must be mentioned one time. And not just in general terms, which are like waste water, but concretely. The more so since the incident that took place in Afghanistan echoed along the banks of the Neva.

...A passenger car was traveling in the direction of the border. In response to the soldier's command to halt, the driver increased his speed.

It might be that this is just the way it seemed to the soldier.

Warning shots rang out. The driver did not react as before. Possibly he did not hear them.

The subunit had one mission: to fight against the caravans that hauled weapons. The region was dangerous and there were constant skirmishes.

"Fire at the car," ordered the subunit commander, Sharayevskiy.

They fired at it.

It turned out that there was no evidence that the Afghan tourists belonged to the terrorists or the rebels. As a result of the firing the driver was severely wounded, a young woman was killed, another young woman was wounded in the chest, and an adolescent boy was wounded in the arm. An old woman and two youngsters, a boy and a girl, were not injured. The soldiers gathered around Sharayevskiy. He was dispirited.

"What shall we do?"

He answered his own question:

"I shall call the commander. Let him send a chopper to pick them up," and he nodded in the direction of the frightened captives.

The conversation was conducted on a walkie-talkie. It was nervous and muffled—the unit commander Rudykh, it seemed, was also in a bad mood. He listened inattentively, and Sharayevskiy, in turn, spoke in a confused and indistinct way.

"I do not need prisoners," Rudykh finally said brokenly. Next to him was the unit's chief of staff Mursalov. He could hear very well: "I do not need prisoners." And Rudykh, apparently counting on his moral support, repeated: "I do not need them." And he explained fully: cover your tracks, do everything quietly. They did it. The crushed the car with a BTR [armored fighting vehicle] and buried it as well.

A couple of months later a fragment from a rocket shell struck Sharayevskiy on the head and deprived him of his memory of the immediate and distant past.

Rudykh was sentenced to 6 years in prison—the case was heard in an open court in Tashkent. The decree of amnesty in connection with the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War helped to release Rudykh immediately after he had been sentenced.

Private Shmakov (who carried out Rudykh's order to "do everything quietly") was sentenced to 5 years in a strict regime corrective labor camp. He did not come under the amnesty.

In this connection his friends, students at the Leningrad Sanitary-Hygienic Medical Institute submitted a protest: "When making their decision the military tribunal declared Shmakov guilty, but the commander who gave the order was set free. We former soldier-internationalists do not understand what the court was using as guidelines in making this decision. Having been in battle, we are well aware that, according to the regulations, the commander's order is the highest law for the subordinate."

War manifests and strengthens the human essence that is concealed during peacetime. Let us assume this.

Let us assume also that I too am unable to understand why the officer Rudykh was not really sentenced. The more so since, as we know, this was not the only deplorable event on his conscience. There were others as well.

Let us return to the letter from the medical students.

It is striking that even today, having escaped from the heat of battle, taking pride in being internationalist soldiers, they do not even try to think about what their comrade did.

The letter completes and crowns the immorality of the tragedy.

But what should this war have done with them so as not to distort and ruin the idea of duty and human feeling, crime and pardon, truth and untruth, and, finally, human civilization! They will be living with this. They will be healing people with this.

I repeat: society, when undertaking the Afghan action, should have, was obligated to foresee what it would lead to, how it would end. Including in the moral sense.

But society did not undertake this.

IV

The 44-year-old Lieutenant General Gromov sat at a heavy desk lit by the Kabul morning sun and looked at his communications equipment with which he had just spoken to Moscow.

I understand: The commander of the OKSV [Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops] spoke of the tragedy near Qandahar.

"Do you already know?" asked Gromov.

"I know," I nodded. "What next?"

"We are taking measures," said Gromov. "The BShU [ground-support bomber strikes] have not produced anything for us yet. The ghosts are silent."

"Maybe there were no captives?" I asked.

"Maybe," Gromov answered.

He took the phone and contacted the flyers: "Get the helicopters ready. Two waves. Report when they are ready." Glancing at his watch, he added: "at 11:20."

The night before in Moscow there was a press conference within the framework of the Soviet-American summit meeting. Speaking at it M. S. Gorbachev reported, in particular, about this, "...yesterday in the region of Qandahar," he said, "our comrades died, and several people disappeared without a trace."

"The BShU has done nothing for us," repeated Gromov. "I will send the airborne assault troops."

He got up from his desk: stocky, not very tall, neat, composed. He described the situation. A group of Soviet military servicemen—three lieutenant colonels and two enlisted men, a rifleman and an BTR mechanic-driver—

joined the subunits of an Afghan infantry division. The subunit provided security for the departure of the border brigades. Near the village of Dila government troops were fired on with rockets. There was massive shelling. Lieutenant Colonel Bobrik was severely wounded. The shelling was replaced by machine gun and rifle fire. Ghosts surrounded the convoy and the village. Private Smertenyuk died in battle trying to lift the blockade of the village. Lieutenant Colonel Serikov, who had just given first aid to Bobrik, was also killed. The commander was immediately informed that these two had been killed. The Afghans reported what they had seen: an enlisted man and a lieutenant colonel lay near the BTR. Both were dead. Well, what about the others? After all, they were in the same BTR—the wounded Lieutenant Colonel Bobrik, Lieutenant Colonel Kryuchkov, and also the mechanic-driver Kravtsov. Where were they? Or, rather, where had they disappeared?

Perhaps they all went in different directions.

They could have been captured—then they would have been nearby. A rifle was all that was needed to kill them. As a rule, in these situations they began with the BShU. After the first attacks our radio operators picked something up on the air, from which followed: "we are prepared to return the captives. Just return our fliers."

"In such a case," said Gromov, "this can mean two things: either the price is too high—after all there are three lieutenant colonels—or else all of our comrades are already dead."

"But," he said, "they could also be alive."

Perhaps they are alive and counting the seconds and believe that their fellows will not abandon them, they will come, they will fight off the enemy, and they will return life and property.

Gromov grew up and was educated as a military leader here in Afghanistan. Of course, he took the full course of military sciences and domestic and peace-time service. But his main school was here—among the battles, among the deaths.

At 11:20 they reported to him: they were ready.

"Let's go," he said. And added: "Be careful. Send in reports constantly."

The information that reached the OKSV leaders from the Afghans was, to put it mildly, not always reliable. But in such cases there was no other information.

Gromov reflected and analyzed the situation. He drew a picture. The Soviet officers and enlisted men, again he presumed, quite possibly, were all killed at the same time. Two of them lay on the open side of the BTR and so they were seen immediately. They were seen and reported. But the other three, quite possibly, could have

been lying behind the BTR. They might not have been seen and could have been counted as prisoners. Or else they disappeared without a trace.

How do you verify it?

There were nothing but Afghans all around. Not a single Soviet. To whom could one give the order: go up to the BTR, go up to it, the devil take you, closer, and check everything out the right way!

Gromov knew: there was nobody to whom he could give that order.

Many have idealized the soldiers and officers of the Afghan government troops. But those who have fought next to them, shoulder to shoulder, have known for a long time: there are plenty of all kinds of people among the government troops. For every one true patriot there were at least five simpletons. They could see neither the goals nor the meaning of the battles. At their first chance they would flee and become deserters. Sometimes entire regiments. Especially lately.

So, as always, one could rely only on one's own.

Two helicopter waves of airborne assault troops approached Qandahar. They had to find the village of Dila, land, and reconnoiter the area. They had to check out the situation and, if possible, remove the living. They had to check out the situation and, if possible, rescue the wounded. And the dead, if possible, they would take with them and return them to their friends and relatives.

But it turns out that there was no one to engage in battle. Everything was there, of course. But in any case there was no enemy in the region of the recent battle. And the dead bore witness to their own death: two—Lieutenant Colonel Serikov and Private Smertenyuk, as the Afghans had reported, lay on one side of the BTR, and three—the mechanic-driver Kravtsov and Lieutenant Colonels Bkobrik and Kryuchkov—on the other. As Gromov had presumed, the Afghans had not seen them.

But they had been killed. And even their deaths had been profaned.

Quite in the spirit of the ghosts.

The first mission of the airborne assault troops had been carried out: the people had been found. The second was before them: to return to the base. To return without losses. And to return the dead to their friends and relatives.

Gromov knew very well how the airborne assault troops would return to Kabul. How, knocking the leaves from the tops of the eucalyptus with their hard rubber tires, they would race above the dangerous valleys and maneuver through the labyrinths of ravines.

At the beginning of the war helicopter pilots flew wherever they wanted to here—at high or low altitudes. But now it had become dangerous to fly at low altitudes: the ghosts had begun to fire from coaxial DShK [Degtikkyarev-Shpagin Heavy Machine Guns], they were using Oerlikons and—for the time being!—individual Egyptian "Strelas." The boys ascended higher. But the ghosts were not asleep either: soon they were to receive "Stingers" and "Blowpipes." The "Strelas" even became almost mass weapons. This arsenal fired at helicopters only at a high altitude. Then the boys approached the ground again. But now they could go no lower. They roared upward several meters. Of course there was the danger of being hit by small arms—this had happened repeatedly. Sometimes the choppers returned to the base literally riddled with holes from bursts from automatic weapons. But after all they did return! But when they met up with "Blowpipes" they flew apart into small pieces.

Gromov was well aware of this. And now, sitting in his office, he could very well picture the actions of the helicopter pilots. People without whom the war in Afghanistan would have been simply impossible.

Nonbelievers pray more than believers do: if only one of the choppers does not fly into a tree or cliff! If only one of them does not meet with an accurate sniper's bullet! If only they return safe!

And then to the motherland.

I knew: even if Gromov had guessed that the enlisted men and officers who had gotten into the mess had died, he would have done the same thing. Because he had to know all the possibilities. And even if there had been only one chance—he would have had to act in precisely this way. Even if these efforts did not lead to anything—which turned out to be the case. Even in this case Gromov would have remained a human being and not just a military officer. And every helicopter pilot and every airborne troop sent by Gromov to Qandahar would also have remained a human being. Human beings above all. None of them would have anything with which to reproach themselves: each did everything he could.

And each believed in the last chance.

And each knew that if something similar happened to him, they would come to his rescue too. Even if there were only one chance.

"They are approaching!" they reported to Gromov.

"They are here."

"They are coming in for a landing."

...The commander evaluates the actions of the soldier in war.

But time evaluates the commander.

This war is ended for us. Its participants have their own, personal evaluations.

Perhaps Gromov, like many other military leaders, has a heavy heart: somewhere, someone did not fly right, did not fire right, and at some moment, perhaps, did not give as much consideration as he would have liked to. It was all there!

But I am confident that a person with such an immense amount of military and organizational experience as Gromov will not be out of place in any circumstances. The same thing can be said about his closest adviser, the chief of the Political Department of the OKSV, General Aleksandr Zakharov. About Generals Viktor Barynkin, Lev Serebrov, and many others. About Colonels Konstantin Belov, Yuriy Starov, Petr Rudskov, and, again, many, many others.

The same thing, finally, about the majority of "Afghan" officers. About the young lieutenants who are still to become colonels and then even generals. About the young graduates of schools, who in one moment in Afghanistan recognized the difference between what they had learned there and what they discovered in real life.

About the officers who in their first battle recognized how short is the distance between the commander and the soldier and how much human relations and military comradery mean. And how at the same time this distance is so great, because the commander always has the difficult duty of deciding whether to leave a soldier in the covering force or to send him into battle. Sometimes to certain death.

Having become generals, let none of them forget the soldiers who here, on Afghan land, protected them, their still young officers, from bullets and fragments.

And the soldiers—as has been repeatedly proven—do not forget their commanders. Even today, when gathering together, they recall them and they know better than any personnel specialist who was worth what. And they sing their own praises to the best of them.

...Gromov sat at his heavy desk, lit by the evening Kabul sun, and looked at his communications equipment with which he had to report the results of the operation in Moscow. And when he was told that the choppers were on the ground, all of them without any losses, he lifted the receiver and in a measured voice, firmly stated: this is Gromov.

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